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his book forms part of a large, five-year research project of the 6th 
Framework Programme of the European Union, called ‘Microcon’, 
which stands for the micro foundations of conflict 
(www.microconflict.eu). The programme is structured around over a dozen 
work packages. The present contribution is the second and final component 
of a work package led by CEPS, concerning ethno-religious tensions and 
conflict in relation to Europe’s Muslim minorities. It is the sequel to a first 
book published by CEPS in 2008, entitled Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe, 
which is freely available online.1 
While the first book focused on the causes and nature of conflict, the 
present study is concerned with the search for more adequate models of 
multiculturalism, using this term for shorthand for the moment – chapters 
1 and 2 delve into the matter of definitions. 
The studies seek to understand the movements in the societal models 
and policy sets currently at play in Europe in the relations between the 
majority populations and the new Muslim minorities. The research is based 
on five country case studies, for Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain 
and the UK. (Short summaries are also provided for France, Italy and 
Russia in view of their importance to the European scene: practical 
constraints prevented the undertaking of full studies for all.)  
The more precise purpose has been to analyse, within a consistent 
framework, the societal and policy landscape in these countries pertaining 
to the familiar terminology and concepts of ‘multiculturalism’ and 
‘assimilation’ with regard to Europe’s new minorities of Muslim culture. To 
these two familiar terms are now added ‘interculturalism’ and ‘integration’ 
as crucial signposts or references to what may be happening between the 
                                                      
1 M. Emerson (ed.), Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of radicalisation in 
Europe’s Muslim Communities, 2009, CEPS, Brussels. 
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stylized polar opposites of multiculturalism versus assimilation. These 
broad and often politicized if not polemicized terms are not devoid of 
objective and observable foundations. Realities are highly complex, 
however, and the policy set that is relevant to these broad concepts has 
many objective constituent elements, with many possible compromise 
cocktails and ambiguities of interpretation. This is the material at the heart 
of our contribution, which lays out its constituent elements in an ordered 
manner to see how far they can justify broad characterizations of societal 
models and their movement.  
There is also a chapter on the EU policies in this area, reflecting the 
relatively new but rapidly increasing activity in the fields of anti-
discrimination, immigration and integration.  
Overall policy conclusions are presented at the end of Chapter 1. 
They have been drawn at a time when the political debate concerning the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ has been virtually exploding in its intensity across 
the whole of the EU, with a succession of leaders having proclaimed it a 
failure. If this single word can identify a failure of society and of the 
policies of government, then there has to be a better model, concept and 
policy. This study tries to work towards a better solution, and uses the term 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
he simmering debate in Europe about multiculturalism versus 
assimilation has now come to the boil. The German Chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, famously stated in November 2010 that 
“multiculturalism in Germany (Multikulti) has failed, completely failed”. 
On behalf of Belgium, Prime Minister Yves Leterme immediately agreed 
with her. In February 2011, both Prime Minister David Cameron and 
President Nicholas Sarkozy could also be heard declaring that 
multiculturalism was a failure, although only the French President 
endorsed assimilation as the alternative. Professor Olivier Roy, an eminent 
French scholar of contemporary Islam, has broadened the critique, 
declaring that “both assimilation and multiculturalism have failed”. These 
quite dramatic statements represent the challenge of interpretation and 
policy analysis to which this book is addressed. 
Europe’s relationship with its Muslim minorities has been under 
stress and changing for some years, under the impact of several driving 
forces. There is awareness that this substantial minority category (roughly 
8% of the population) is here to stay, and not, as was earlier supposed, a 
matter of temporary immigration. Even if immigration rules are now 
progressively more restrictive, this minority is growing demographically. 
The emergence of radical Islam among a small minority in Europe’s 
Muslim communities worries the population as a whole. The attacks by 
radical home-grown terrorists, such as those responsible for the Madrid 
and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, have added a major security 
dimension to the Muslim communities within Europe. There have also 
been spectacular instances of urban riots, such as those seen in the suburbs 
of Paris, also in 2005, which have had little to do with radical Islam, but 
which have fuelled societal tensions and awareness of the problems of the 
new Muslim underclasses. Combining all these factors, there is an 
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increasingly prevalent view that European multiculturalism is not working 
well, as Chancellor Merkel remarked (but without her spelling out what 
she meant by multiculturalism). In response to these factors there has been 
a widespread policy shift in favour of measures to integrate the Muslim 
minorities more effectively. While not incompatible with the values of 
tolerance and mutual respect for ethno-cultural-religious diversity, these 
integration policies nonetheless mark a move away from the earlier variant 
of multiculturalism, which at least in some European countries sought to 
encourage the distinctiveness of minority communities. 
But before going further there has to be some clarification of 
terminology, notably four key terms: multiculturalism, assimilation, 
interculturalism and integration. We summarize our understanding of 
these terms here, with a fuller academic rendering and references given in 
Chapter 2. Alternative definitions for each can surely be debated, but we 
have to be clear in this publication, at least for ourselves.  
Multiculturalism is a particularly hazardous term, since it is so widely 
used with so many different meanings; mixing analysis, political 
statements and emotions. Our sense of the term is strictly analytical, and 
we have in mind something more than mere pluralism in society. We 
understand multiculturalism to mean a situation where ethno-cultural-
religious minorities are, or are thought of, as rather distinct communities, 
and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness. The term 
communitarianism is sometimes used with the same meaning.  
Assimilation is the polar opposite of multiculturalism. It means that 
the individual who has come from a minority immigrant group has totally 
blended in with the landscape of the country of adoption – in terms of 
citizenship and mastery of the language, and as a matter of attitudes and 
perceived identity. The individual may think of him or herself as ‘French’ 
rather than ‘Moroccan’, ‘British’ rather than ‘Indian’ or ‘German’ rather 
than ‘Turkish’, and is perceived by the population of the host nation as ‘one 
of us’. The assimilated person no longer has any wish to relate to his origins 
except as a matter of family history. In policy terms, assimilation means 
refusal to admit or recognize distinct communities. There is a monolithic 
concept of citizenship, and no policy measures should be based on minority 
ethno-cultural-religious differences. Assimilation suggests that the 
responsibility to integrate is entirely that of the immigrant.  
Interculturalism is a new term giving a name to attempts to find a 
compromise between the polar opposites of multiculturalism and 
assimilation. It is sympathetic and respectful towards ethno-cultural-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 3 
religious minorities, and helpful with selected measures targeted at 
disadvantaged situations, yet it also aims at ensuring commitment to the 
values, history and traditions of the host nation. This may include the use 
of integration policies and efforts to water down excessive distinctiveness 
or segregation, for example in urban concentrations of minority groups. It 
is sympathetic towards people from immigrant families perceiving 
themselves as having a hybrid identity, who feel Anglo–Indian, or French–
Algerian or German–Turkish for example. 
Integration may be a process, rather than a supposed end-state like the 
three preceding terms: dynamics rather than statics. As a term it is now 
being used specifically in the present context to relate to active measures to 
improve the competence of minority groups in the host country’s language, 
and to increase awareness of its values, history and traditions. It is also 
used with respect to a wide range of active policies to facilitate social and 
labour market inclusion. These policies and movements in society mark 
movement in a certain direction along the spectrum from multiculturalism 
towards assimilation, yet the end-point of these integration processes is not 
defined a priori. It could be a movement towards something in the category 
of either interculturalism or assimilation.  
The European Commission has provided a reference, with its 
understanding of integration as follows:  
Integration should be understood as a two-way process based on 
mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident 
third country nationals and the host society which provides for full 
participation of the immigrant. This implies on the one hand that it 
is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal 
rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual 
has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural and 
civic life and on the other, that immigrants respect the 
fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate 
actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish 
their own identity’.2 
In trying to analyze how or to what degree actual situations 
correspond to these model types it has to be underlined that the people of 
Muslim culture who are resident in Europe are not at all homogenous, 
either among or within individual European countries. There is no pure 
                                                      
2 European Commission, Communication on Immigration, Integration and 
Employment, COM(2003)336, Brussels, 3 June 2003.  4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
model type in practice in contemporary Europe, for either multiculturalism 
or assimilation. The policies have multiple components, each of which can 
be placed somewhere along this spectrum. Broad characterizations that 
country X is more multicultural and country Y is more assimilationist may 
be true, but this does not imply homogeneity in either case. At the micro 
level it is everywhere a matter of individual choice to assimilate or to 
withdraw into a separate community, or to integrate into society and the 
labour market, while maybe still marking one’s ethno-religious-cultural 
identity with symbols or styles of clothing. Yet there will also be a macro 
reality in the most predominant societal model, and at the policy level 
explicit or implicit choices have to be made, which will fit somewhere on 
the spectrum between multiculturalism and assimilation.  
In the five case studies presented in chapters 3 to 7 a more or less 
standard set of policy variables is examined, drawing on the detailed list in 
Box 1. The box shows that there is a mass of policy variables that can 
determine how the stance of policy may be assessed as tending towards the 
multicultural or assimilationist ends of the spectrum, or towards the 
middle ground of interculturalism.  
A few examples serve to illustrate how these policy variables may 
relate to the three paradigms – multiculturalism, interculturalism and 
assimilation. At the same time it would be excessive and artificial to try to 
fit each possible setting of each variable into this straitjacket of categories. 
The realities are too complex. It is nonetheless still of importance to try to 
understand the broad direction and movement of policies and societal 
practice, for which the three-fold categorization is relevant.  
As a first example, schooling systems are of crucial importance, for 
both shaping society and signalling the choice of governments in their 
policies towards minorities. The multicultural policy favours separate 
schools for minority communities, not just recognizing schools belonging to 
religious or cultural foundations, for example, but also extending subsidies 
to them on a par with regular state schools. The assimilationist policy 
excludes subsidies for such schools, while usually being willing to 
recognize them. The intercultural compromise may see state subsidies and 
support for the provision of special classes of religious instruction for 
minority groups, or special classes for the languages of immigrant peoples, 
but without state subsidies for separate schools. 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 5 
 
Box 1. List of policy variables whose settings will contribute to shaping the 
societal model in the spectrum of multiculturalism-interculturalism-assimilation 
1.  Citizenship and political participation 
a.  Ease of obtaining citizenship 
b.  Practices of dual citizenship 
c.  Integration course and tests 
d.  Voting in local elections 
e.  Role of ethno-religious representative organizations 
2.  Education 
a.  State support of Islamic schools? 
b.  State support for special classes (languages) within regular schools? 
3.  Housing 
a.  Attempts to de-concentrate ethnic minorities 
b.  Attempts to organise urbanization with regard to ethnic groups 
(gentrification) 
4.  Health care 
a.  Meals 
b.  Chaplaincy 
c.  Translation services 
5.  Employment 
a.  Affirmative action targeting ethnic groups 
b.  The scope of the anti-discrimination legislation 
6.  Policing 
a.  Ethnic profiling complaints, counter-actions 
b.  Recruitment of minority groups to police 
7.  Allowance of Islamic practices and symbols 
a.  Construction and recognition of mosques 
b.  Muslim burials 
c.  Provisions for halal slaughtering of animals 
d.  Islamic call to prayer in public 
e.  Restrictions or tolerance of headscarves or burkas, in public buildings 
or spaces 
f.  Wearing of religious symbols 
Source: This list draws on M. Alexander, “Comparing local policies towards migrants: 
An analytical framework, a typology and preliminary survey results”, in R. Pennink, 
K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec (eds), Citizenship in European Cities: 
Immigrants, local politics and integrations policies, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.  6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
Another example concerns religious symbols in public buildings 
(schools and public administration) or public spaces (the street or public 
transport), especially regarding elements of clothing like the headscarf or 
full face cover (burka). The multicultural policy will tend to be supportive 
of such symbols, while the assimilationist policy will be restrictive or 
exclusionary. The intercultural compromise may be tolerant towards the 
headscarf but exclude the burka, for example, with many finer graduations 
of policy possible over the visual importance of the symbol or the 
borderline between the public and private space (a recent court case in 
France considered whether a taxi was a private or a public space).  
Citizenship law, as a third example, is a major issue. The 
multicultural policy is liberal and offers citizenship automatically as a right 
depending on criteria such as length of residence. The assimilationist policy 
may subject the applicant to strict tests of language competence and 
knowledge of the country’s history, institutions and values. The 
intercultural policy may favour integration programmes. This also concerns 
immigration and residence policies. The most restrictive policy, which may 
be described as assimilationist to the point of being exclusionary, requires 
language tests to be passed before entering the country of immigration (for 
individuals with little education the requirement to learn Dutch 
somewhere in Africa or Asia amounts to a policy of exclusion).  
The role of migrant community associations is a fourth example. The 
multicultural policy favours the establishment of such associations and sees 
them as agencies for the empowerment of minority communities. The 
assimilationist policy rejects the need for such institutions or considers 
them to be even contrary to national values. The intercultural compromise 
may welcome the role of such institutions to facilitate confidence-building 
and the integration of the minority groups, but without seeking to 
empower them. 
An interesting example of intercultural policy, seen in Canada, is the 
organization of courses and activities for the majority population to become 
more knowledgeable about the minority languages and cultures. The case 
for mutual intercultural learning is now receiving attention in Germany as 
well. 
There is also a large range of policies aiming at labour market 
inclusion for unemployed people. Here the major distinction is between 
policies that amount to affirmative action in favour of immigrant 
communities or specific disadvantaged groups, i.e. discriminatory in a 
positive sense, and policies that are strictly colour-blind or non-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 7 
discriminatory. Such affirmative action may be described as multicultural 
or intercultural in intent, but they can also be described as facilitating 
integration to the point of assimilation. The EU’s anti-discrimination law 
only excludes negative discrimination, and certainly does not discourage 
positive or affirmative action in favour of disadvantaged groups. 
In any case these are stylized examples, with finer graduations of 
policy possible not only for each policy variable, but also for the complete 
policy set where given policy variables may be located at various points on 
the spectrum of multiculturalism to assimilation. The country case studies 
demonstrate such tendencies.  
The Netherlands has moved most dramatically, from 
multiculturalism to interculturalism at the level of actual policy, but with 
influential, extreme right-wing politicians advocating the radical 
alternatives of assimilation or even expulsion. Dutch multiculturalism of 
the 1970s and 1980s was initially based on the long-established 
‘pillarization’ of society, with different Christian faiths and secularists 
receiving state recognition and support, notably for Catholic, Protestant or 
secular schools. It was then natural to grant the new Muslim communities 
analogous status and support for their social, cultural and religious 
institutions. But from the late 1980s on the multicultural approach became 
subject to increasing criticism. It led to a new integration policy in 1994, 
based on the idea that immigrants should participate in mainstream 
institutions rather than their own, and adapt to Dutch norms and 
standards. This was followed in 1998 by the law Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers. The word ‘inburgering’ defies easy translation. The Dutch 
country study translates the law’s name as the ‘Newcomer Integration 
Law’, but one may also detect the more emotive connotation of ‘becoming a 
burger’. The policy set now includes off-shore integration programmes as 
prerequisites for would-be immigrants, notably learning the Dutch 
language and passing examination tests in their home country, even for 
cases of family reunion. This is in reality more of an extremely restrictive 
immigration policy than an internal integration policy. In the current 
decade the political atmosphere has become ever more highly charged, 
especially since the murder of the anti-Islamist filmmaker Theo Van Gogh 
in 2004 by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent. The growing electoral 
success of Geert Wilders, advocating an outright populist, assimilationist 
policy, has so far not driven actual policy away from its present hybrid 
intercultural character.  8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
In Belgium, the country’s complex federal structure directly affects 
how policies towards Muslim minorities are defined. The Flemish region 
inherited this same ‘pillar’ structure from its earlier history, shared with the 
Netherlands as part of the Low Countries, and explained in the chapter on 
the Netherlands. Meanwhile the Francophone part of the country has 
remained closer to the French tradition of the secular state, which 
recognised no such distinctions at the level of public policy, with the bi-
lingual city of Brussels experiencing a complex blend of both. As in the 
Netherlands, the pillarization tradition has led to the requirement of an 
official representative body as a precondition for various state subsidies, 
notably for funding religious education in schools and religious personnel 
(imams). In Flemish Belgium, as in the Netherlands, the term ‘inburgering’ 
has come to denote policies and programmes aimed at ensuring the 
integration of Muslim minorities, influenced in both cases by extreme right-
wing political parties that would like to go further. In April 2010, Belgium’s 
federal government almost unanimously adopted a law banning the burka, 
o r  f u l l  f a c e  c o v e r i n g  i n  p u b l i c  s p a c e s  ( “ m a k i n g  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
person impossible”). The fall of the government soon after has prevented 
this law entering into force, but this will presumably happen in due course. 
The wearing of the hijab (or headscarf) in schools and public 
administrations remains a subject of tension and some uncertainty among 
different jurisdictions, but the tendency is towards a ban. The study in this 
book uses the term ‘mosaic’ in its title to signal the multiple cleavages in 
Belgian society on grounds of language, faith and political parties; the issue 
of how to integrate Muslims is yet another dimension. In general the 
movement of the policy set is away from multiculturalism, but so far 
remains as some kind of intercultural compromise.   
Germany is also a complex federal case, with separate competences 
involved at federal, state and local levels, which the case study included 
here illustrates with comparisons between Berlin and Hamburg. At the 
federal level the traditionally very ethnic condition for naturalization has 
given way to a more open, residence-based criterion, especially for those 
born in Germany of immigrant parents, i.e. a move towards an intercultural 
approach. Consultative structures have been created, with the German 
Islamic Conference, for example. Education policies are largely 
assimilationist in tendency, although in Berlin Islamic religious education 
has been introduced in state schools. Regarding religious symbols such as 
the headscarf, Berlin excludes these in public employment including 
schools, whereas Hamburg is more liberal and has no such general ban. For 
the most part, in both Hamburg and Berlin politics and civil engagement at SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 9 
the local level show a different picture from what can be observed at the 
federal level. In varying ways both cities have a long history of familiarity 
with diversity and a general tendency towards more pragmatic and even 
inclusive policies at the local level can be seen. In Hamburg one can 
observe a switch in perspectives from looking at migrants’ deficiencies to 
their potential and their intercultural competencies, and stressing the need 
for mutual intercultural learning in society as a whole. In Berlin a new law 
on integration and participation is being put into place, albeit against 
strong resentment from some segments of the political class.  
Alongside these multiple and diverse developments, the major trends 
in public opinion and political discourse are going in a distinctly right-wing 
populist direction, with openly racist arguments about defending European 
values against the Muslim invasion. The large attention attracted by 
Chancellor Merkel’s declaration that “multiculturalism has completely 
failed”3 in Germany is interpreted by the authors of this chapter as 
symptomatic of this tendency, notwithstanding the fact that the Chancellor 
was at pains to say in the same speech that “Islam was now part of 
Germany”, this latter phrase being largely ignored. But in March 2011, the 
new Minister of the Interior, Hans-Pieter Friedrich, declared on his first day 
in office that “Islam in Germany is not something substantiated by history 
at any point”, and that successful integration required “a clear awareness of 
the Western Christian origin of our culture”.  
In the British case, in the early post-war period policy on 
immigration from the Commonwealth operated under a laissez-faire 
assumption of assimilation. This gave way to an integration policy, in 1968 
defined by the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins as ‘cultural diversity, 
coupled to equal opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’, with 
a strong emphasis on non-discrimination. Significant elements of 
multiculturalism were subsequently developed in areas of social policy, 
from education and employment to urban regeneration and policing. Yet 
the political context of the last decade, marked by radical Islamic terrorism, 
w i t h  t h e  L o n d o n  b o m b i n g s  o f  2 0 0 5  keeping alive the threat perceptions 
generated by 9/11, has led to a complex recalibration of policy. On the one 
hand, the rules for acquiring citizenship have moved in an assimilationist 
direction from being based solely on the length of time of legal residence to 
                                                      
3 A. Merkel, at a meeting of young members of the Christian Democratic Union 
party, Potsdam, 16 October 2010.  10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
including programmes and obligations aimed at developing ‘a sense of 
civic identity and shared values’, with tests of language competence and 
knowledge of the UK. At the same time, immigration policy has been 
progressively tightened, such that only individuals with valuable labour 
market skills have a chance, apart from asylum and family reunion cases, 
which are also becoming more restricted. On the other hand, the priorities 
of security policy in relation to terrorist threats have driven the authorities 
to work more intensively in a multicultural mode with representative 
organizations of Muslim communities, with a view to achieving better 
‘community cohesion’. These apparently divergent trends reveal the 
complex rationale of a hybrid interculturalism. David Cameron’s critique of 
‘state multi-culturalism’ in February 2011 appears to signal a shift in policy, 
but whether and to what extent this will be translated into actual policy is 
still unclear.  
In Spain the Muslim minority groups are relatively recent compared 
with the other countries studied, with one consequence that there is no 
established policy doctrine or model. Spain is bound by its constitution to 
cooperate with religious confessions, and the Law on Religious Freedoms 
enacted in 1980 paved the way for establishing Muslim associations, which 
are the government’s counterpart for regulating matters such as religious 
instruction in schools, the protection of mosques, the status of Islamic 
religious leaders, etc. This has given a certain multicultural content to the 
policy set, but only of a rather mild intensity. For example, there are no 
separate and distinct Muslim schools, only the guarantee of Muslim 
religious instruction in schools where this is demanded. Meanwhile, a 
political debate has arisen over the case for integration policies, which so 
far has not been translated into actual policy. The overall situation is one of 
hybrid elements of multicultural, assimiliationist and intercultural modes. 
In France (although not the subject of a chapter in this book) there is 
an explicit adherence to the idea of assimilation, as seen for example in the 
conditions for naturalization, which read as follows: “No one can be 
naturalized if he does not justify his assimilation to the French community, 
notably by a sufficient knowledge, according to his condition, of the French 
language and the rights and duties conferred by French nationality.”4  
                                                      
4 Article 21.24 of Loi 2003-119 relative à la maitrise de l’immigration, au séjour des 
étrangers en France et à la nationalité, quoted and recounted in detail in S. Carrera, In 
Search of the perfect citizen? The intersection between integration, immigration and 
nationality in the EU, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 11 
The framing of policy is also conditioned by the laïcité of the state. 
This is most clear in the education system, where the state schools provide 
no religious education and private schools created with religious 
foundations are not subsidised. Moreover, the wearing of religious symbols 
is excluded in state institutions, including schools and the public 
administration, as confirmed by the banning of the headscarf in 2004 
(although discreet signs of faith are permitted) and reinforced by the 
banning of the burka in all public spaces in 2010.  
During the present term in office of President Sarkozy, there have 
been various acts or expressions of intent to push the French model further 
in an assimilationist direction. At the beginning of his term of office he 
created a very symbolically named ministry of immigration and national 
identity, although this was dissolved and integrated into the ministry of the 
interior in November 2010. Also in 2010, the president proposed to make it 
possible to withdraw French nationality from naturalized citizens 
convicted of criminal offences, but to date this has not appeared in a 
legislative proposal.  
These developments in France are taking place amid an increasingly 
tense political debate, with vocal contributions from the extreme right 
leading to a situation characterised as “a radicalised conception of laïcité 
opposite the emergence of Islam”.5 Again in 2010, there was the ‘Roma 
affair’, with the government instructing its préfets to target illegally residing 
Roma immigrants from Romania for expulsion. European Commission 
Vice-President Viviane Reding declared that she believed such measures to 
be inconceivable in post-World War II Europe, with implicit reference to 
Nazi Germany. This triggered a spectacular verbal conflict with President 
Sarkozy. The discriminatory references in the government circular were 
withdrawn and admitted to have been a mistake. Still, this incident saw the 
politics at the core of Europe over immigrant communities moving 
perilously close to crossing the red lines that define its central values. The 
debate in France has become politically very highly charged. While Marine 
Le Pen of the extreme right National Front party has described the presence 
of the Muslim minorities as “occupation”, President Sarkozy has been 
returning to the language of ‘assimilation’ with references to the need to 
protect the Christian heritage.  
                                                      
5 S. Le Barts, «  Les Musulmans indignés après les propos de Mme Le Pen sur 
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The situation of Muslim minorities in Italy (also not the subject of a 
chapter in this book) shares some features with Spain and France. Like 
Spain, it is a country without a long history of immigration; on the contrary 
it was a country of emigration until a few decades ago. But the immigrant 
population has risen fast in recent years, reaching around five million 
(without counting illegal immigrants). Their composition by country of 
origin and culture is very heterogeneous – the first three countries of origin 
are Romania (Christian and Latin), Albania (a highly secularised country of 
Muslim culture) and Morocco (a ‘regular’ Muslim country). As in Spain 
there have been several major waves of regularization of the residence 
status of immigrants (three in the 1990s), but without the granting of 
citizenship, which remains very restrictive. Also as in Spain, the relatively 
recent origins of this immigrant population explain why there has been 
little development of any political concept or model regarding their 
integration into Italian society. The implicit presumption seems to be 
assimilation, but without citizenship, which in due course will prove an 
inconsistent and undemocratic combination. There are no separate state-
funded schools for immigrant communities, and little development of 
representative bodies or associations. As elsewhere in Europe, integration 
tests and conditions have been introduced as requirements for non-EU 
nationals to obtain residence permits (language texts and sponsorship by 
an employer). Right-wing parties within the coalition government have 
pushed hard for elements of repatriation policy, both in general and 
notably in bilateral relations with Libya, the geographically closest source 
of immigration. There is manifest tension between on the one hand right-
wing politicians who are pushing an agenda of tighter restrictions on 
immigration alongside elements of repatriation policy, and on the other 
hand business interests in northern regions that need immigrants to make 
up for labour shortages.  
There are also important and disquieting developments in Russia 
(the subject of a chapter in our first volume),6 which is seeing tensions 
escalate between Muslim minority communities and extreme right 
nationalist movements. Russia has Muslim communities with very 
different characteristics in three geographical regions: first, the Northern 
                                                      
6 See A. Malashenko and A. Yarykapov, “Radicalisation of Russia’s Muslim 
Communities” in our first Microcon volume, M. Emerson (ed.), Ethno-Religious 
Conflict in Europe: Typologies of radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities, CEPS, 
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Caucasus, where there is widespread radicalization, the advance of sharia 
law and terrorist violence, alongside repressive measures by the Russian 
security services; second, the Tartar communities of the Volga basin, which 
are tranquil politically with leaderships maintaining loyalty to the state, 
albeit with gradually increasing Islamisation; and third, the new immigrant 
population from the Caucasus and Central Asia in major urban centres, and 
above all Moscow.  
While the first two regional communities were analyzed in our first 
volume, it is the third category that is most relevant for the present study, 
since these are new immigrant communities that only started to take shape 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Of course the Soviet Union 
was a certain kind of multicultural society with many recognized 
nationalities. But the propisk system for controlling residence meant that 
there could be very little voluntary internal migration, and so the arrival of 
large numbers of Caucasian and Central Asian immigrants starting in the 
1990s has been a new phenomenon, notably for Moscow and St Petersberg. 
In these cities inter-ethnic tensions have emerged, leading to violence. This 
was for a time largely a matter of individuals with dark skin being 
assaulted in the streets, but more recently there have been mass 
demonstrations by thousands of ethnic Russian, skinhead youths in 
Moscow, as in the Manezh square in December 2010, under the slogan 
“Russia for the Russians” and some explicitly neo-Nazi symbols.  
Alongside these youth movements there are vocal political 
personalities sustaining a radical and racist nationalist discourse, which is 
gathering large-scale support among public opinion. These developments 
still seem to be escalating. Particularly ominous is that ethnic Russians are 
leading the action in terms of street violence. Little or nothing can be seen 
b y  w a y  o f  a c t i v e  p o l i c i e s  t o  f a c i l i tate the integration of the immigrant 
minority groups in Russia’s major cities. In this respect there is a big 
difference in mainstream policies between the EU and Russia, but the 
extreme right political discourses are strikingly similar.  
The policies of the EU itself have also been undergoing important 
developments. Following adoption of the Tampere Programme in 1999, 
which was the first multi-year action in the field of freedom, security and 
justice, in 2000 the EU adopted two non-discrimination directives, the first 
concerning racial equality and the second employment equality, which 
embodied a ‘rights-based’ approach. By the end of 2006, all member states 
had transposed these directives into national law, with significant impacts 
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transposition also opened up a comprehensive legal basis for litigation over 
complaints.  
This approach was extended with further proposals on the rights of 
family reunification and of status for legally resident third-country 
nationals. For this group of proposals, however, member states (with 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands in the lead) moved beyond the 
liberal–multiculturalist, rights-based approach, insisting that these rights be 
accompanied by obligations or conditions under the heading ‘integration 
conditions’. In the case of non-refugees, such obligations include satisfying 
certain conditions, such as language competence, before being granted 
immigration permits. This led to the second multi-year programme 
adopted in 2004 as The Hague Programme, which, while affirming that 
immigration policy was primarily a national competence, also set out a set 
of 11 ‘common basic principles’ for immigrant integration policies. These 
principles amount to a compilation of various concepts, highlighting a 
‘two-way process of mutual accommodation’ of immigrants and the host 
country population, with a mix of rights, obligations and active integration 
policy mechanisms. Overall they represent a move in an assimilationist 
direction. In 2007, the Council of the European Union adopted a European 
Commission proposal for a European integration fund endowed with a 
substantial budget of €825 million for the period 2007–13. Priorities for the 
fund include programmes in support of the common basic principles and 
‘intercultural competence building’ in the member states across various 
levels of government.  
In 2008, the French Presidency of the Council seized the occasion to 
push through a European pact on immigration and asylum. The pact is 
characterized by an essentially intergovernmental approach and emphasis 
on the need to regulate family reunification ‘more effectively’ by taking 
into account the capacity of families to integrate (i.e. their resources, 
accommodation and language knowledge), and the need for specific 
measures stressing the identities and values of the member states. This 
amounts to further momentum in an assimilationist direction. Yet another 
twist in EU policy may be in the making with the third multi-year 
programme for 2009–14 under the Stockholm Programme. This builds on 
the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations, which are significant for this field in that 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights has become legally binding, and 
legislation is now subject to qualified majority voting. The Stockholm 
Programme places fundamental rights at the heart of integration policy, 
calling for ‘proactive policies for migrants and their rights’.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 15 
Concluding remarks. How should one interpret the overall trend in 
policy-making in this broad field, where there are multiple policy 
mechanisms that represent different paradigms, which are being executed 
through multiple tiers of governance: the EU, national and sub-national 
governments? Some things are clear. The legal rights-based non-
discrimination paradigm is deeply embedded at the level of EU and thence 
national law. This in itself can be described as either passive liberal 
multiculturalism or support for assimilation. But active multiculturalist 
policies on the part of member states are on the wane in countries such as 
the Netherlands and the UK where they were most explicit, and elsewhere 
(in France and Germany) such policies are being explicitly rejected at the 
highest political level. Immigration and citizenship policies have become 
more restrictive and more conditional on positive integration criteria and 
tests, which means movement in the assimilationist direction. On the other 
hand, some extremely exclusionary provisions have been moderated in 
favour of general rights (e.g. the shift in German citizenship law). The 
major terrorist acts of the last decade and the securitization of multicultural 
relations have had an impact, pushing in favour of active integration 
policies incorporating obligations alongside rights, while at the same time 
underlining the importance of organizations representative of Muslim 
minorities. Overall, this is looking like a political landscape favouring a 
compromise middle ground between the polar opposites of assimilation 
versus multiculturalism, driven by experience and comparisons, based on a 
combination of rights, obligations and active policies, and which for want 
of a better term may be called ‘interculturalism’.  
Still, there is clearly a powerful movement of public opinion and 
political action continuing to push the policy set more towards assimilation 
and away from multiculturalism. But so far this movement is only a limited 
tendency, with hybrid interculturalism occupying space between the two 
polar types. The movement towards assimilationist regimes seeking better 
integration is certainly understandable, but it is also a movement full of 
pitfalls for European politics and society. European centre-right parties in 
government see themselves competing for support with extreme right-
wing parties that have racist and therefore undemocratic agendas. This is 
witnessed in both political discourse (Chancellor Merkel’s statement about 
the failure of multiculturalism) and selective actions (President Sarkozy’s 
campaign against the Roma and proposals to withdraw citizenship). 
Analogous positions can be observed in the politics of the Netherlands, 
Flemish Belgium and Italy.  16 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
Some writers are sounding the alarm bell, interpreting these current 
developments in European politics in more fundamental terms.7 For Slavoj 
Zizek, the old political competition between centre-right and centre-left 
policies is giving way to a new configuration, in which a broad amorphous 
centre finds itself in competition with an extreme right on the rise. The 
governing class of the centre is sliding into increasing acquiescence 
towards moderate versions of the agenda of the extreme right on matters of 
immigration and citizenship policy. It is debatable how far this argument 
should be taken, yet it has sufficient credibility at least to reinforce the 
crucial need, as regards policies towards Europe’s minorities and especially 
Muslims, for discourse and practice to coalesce around an intercultural 
compromise. If the European extreme right gains further support for racist 
and exclusionary policies (the French National Front leader is now ahead of 
President Sarkozy in the polls), the scene is set for the most fundamental 
challenge to European political values since the Second World War. 
Ominously, these movements towards the extreme right are now common 
to virtually the entire old core of Europe, or the founding states of the EU 
(France, Germany, Flemish Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy).  
Even so, the ‘explosion’ of the internal European debate about 
multiculturalism looks relatively mild compared with the revolutionary 
implosion of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. These two seemingly 
independent political movements are actually profoundly interconnected. 
Both are products of the inability of the North African states and even 
Turkey to have provided adequate living standards and opportunities to 
their peoples, leading to the masses of population that have resorted to 
migration, or would like to do so, as a means of escape.  
The North African peoples are now insisting on democratic change, 
which is a movement that Europe wants to see succeed. The EU is now 
debating how it can best encourage and help Arab democracy. But if at 
home the EU develops increasingly exclusionary or populist assimilation 
policies towards the diaspora communities of these same countries, it will 
find itself entangled in a dreadful web of political contradictions and 
hypocrisy over its declared values. The promotion of an ‘intercultural’ 
compromise or model, with this term being used as a label for a careful and 
complex blend of policy instruments, is becoming ever more imperative.  
                                                      
7 S. Zizek, “Liberal Multiculturalism Masks an Old Barbarism with a Human Face”, 
Guardian, 3 October 2010.  | 17 
 
 
1.  CONCEPTS OF MULTICULTURALISM 
AND ASSIMILATION 
ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
he aim of this chapter is to offer a brief overview of the scholarly 
literature on multiculturalism and assimilation. In their least refined 
versions these two terms are posited as polar opposites; 
multiculturalism as the defender of an ideal of distinct cultural/religious 
communities living side-by-side, and assimilation as the defender of a 
model society connected as a whole. These are evidently simplified 
accounts that facilitate analytical distinctions. But there is more to both 
concepts. 
While a recent arrival in political theory, multiculturalism as a term 
has become much used in both academic and political milieu. However it 
has different meanings. First, multiculturalism can be understood as a mere 
sociological reality, simply referring to the cultural pluralism of societies, 
which in Europe have often been amplified by migration flows due to the 
retreat of colonial empires or migration due to humanitarian and economic 
causes. Multiculturalism alters the modus operandi of one nation, one 
culture, which Kelly defines as the “context within which the problems 
raised by group differences arise and in which the issues addressed such as 
discrimination by the multiculturalist theorists can be located”.8 The 
acknowledgement of the fact of multiculturalism has led to the two other 
understandings of multiculturalism: as politics and as public philosophy. 
                                                      
8 P. Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2005, p. 3. 
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Multiculturalist public philosophy is more than a simple 
acknowledgement of cultural diversity.9 Rather it is an attempt to address 
inequalities that take place despite the principle of formal equality 
established by the liberal and secularist traditions. Multiculturalism seeks 
to offer a remedy to the imbalances and discriminations that stem from 
diverse ethnic, cultural or national backgrounds,10 given the realization that 
“politics and law depend to some degree on shared ethical assumptions 
and inevitably reflect the norms of the society they are part of”.11 
Multiculturalism thus promotes public ‘recognition of difference’,12 largely 
opposing the liberal distinction between public and private spheres. 
Multiculturalism manifests itself through the intersection of two conceptual 
axes; culture and equality. While its opponents argue that culture and 
equality are inherently incompatible commitments,13 its advocates believe 
in the idea of “a principled dialogue on the interrelated problems of 
                                                      
9 P. Kelly (ed.) (idem) for instance divides its protagonists into two groups; radical 
theorists (i.e. Iris Marion Young, Bhikhu Parekh) who take the social construction 
of the self as a starting point and liberal theorists (i.e. Will Kymlicka) who operate 
from an individual autonomy and choice perspective. A similar differentiation is 
offered by Squires (2005, pp. 117-118): impartiality politics focused on autonomy, 
identity politics focused on authenticity and diversity politics focused on 
transgression. J. Squires, “Culture, Equality and Diversity”, in P. Kelly (ed.), 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.  
10 Initially, the theory was not concerned with religious groups as cultural groups 
per se but recent applications by several authors like Modood and Levey deal 
distinctly with them (particularly with Muslims). See T. Modood, Still not easy being 
British, Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, 2010; G. Levey and T. Modood, 
Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008; T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero, 
Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
11 T. Modood and P. Werbner, The Politics of Multiculturalism in the new Europe, 
London: Zed Books, 1997, p. 17. 
12 C. Taylor, “The politics of recognition”, in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
13 B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, 
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equality  and culture”.14 Multiculturalism is also characterized by the 
principle of equal value of cultures, which has nonetheless been subject to 
stark criticism by liberal theorists like Barry and Joppke, arguing that it is 
logically impossible to recognize all cultures as equal because cultures have 
“propositional content” regarding what may be true and false, or right and 
wrong.15 
Multiculturalist theory was initially developed in the context of the 
new world settler nations, with Will Kymlicka as one of its leading 
advocates. He seeks to reconcile liberal theory with multicultural 
citizenship by underlining the connection between individual freedom and 
cultural membership. Cultures do not have an intrinsic value but they are 
crucial in so far as they provide access to meaningful alternatives in life.16 
Kymlicka’s liberal account relies on two basic distinctions, the first one 
being between multinational states from polyethnic states. Whereas in the 
former case cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of “previously 
self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures”17 into a larger state, in 
the latter it stems from individual immigration. His conception of group-
specific rights also flows from a second distinction between special 
representation rights attributed to national minorities and polyethnic rights 
to multiple immigrant communities.18 The second distinction that is crucial 
to his analysis is between intra-group and inter-group relations. A liberal 
theory of multicultural citizenship attempts to balance the unfairness 
between the groups while contesting any limitation on the group members 
by the group itself. Hence, it seeks to promote external protection while 
opposing internal restrictions.19 
                                                      
14 J. Tully, “The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on 
Multiculturalism”, in P. Kelly (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered, 2nd edition, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 104. 
15 B. Barry, 2001, p. 270. 
16 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 
83; W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and 
Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 228. 
17 Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11. 
18 See T. Modood, Multiculturalism. A civic idea, Cambridge: Polity Press, Chapter 2 
for the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of this distinction, 2007. 
19 Kymlicka, 1995, p. 35. 20 | ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
Several authors within the multicultural school disagree with this 
emphasis on individual autonomy and the value of culture as the provider 
of a context of choice. One of the most prominent voices has been Tariq 
Modood, who has greatly influenced the way multiculturalism is 
understood both normatively and practically in contemporary Europe. 
Modood does not only apply multiculturalism to the context of Europe 
which is characterized by ethnic minorities stemmed from international 
migration or colonial connections rather than indigenous people, he also 
extends the initial frame of the theory to religious groups. His sociological 
departure point is not culture as such but the recognition of difference, also 
posited by Taylor20 and Young.21 Contrary to multiculturalism’s sceptics, 
his idea of cultural differences is to turn “their negative and stigmatic 
status into positive features of the societies they are now part of”.22 He 
recognizes the difference between and within groups and hence ‘multi’. 
Multiculturalism should be seen as “an accommodative form of integration 
which would allow group-based racialized, ethnic, cultural, religious 
identities and practices to be recognized and supported in the public space, 
rather than require them to be privatized.”23 Multiculturalist theorists join 
Modood in his postulation of multiculturalism as a claim of integration 
into, rather than withdrawal from, the majority society. Kymlicka for 
instance holds that multiculturalism seeks to renegotiate the terms of the 
state-imposed integration and to ensure a fairer inclusion.24 Hence, 
contrary to common belief, multiculturalist theory embraces rather than 
rejects the coexistence of “a community of communities with a community 
of citizens”.25 
The first states to embrace an official multicultural form of politics 
were the new-settler nations. Canada became the first state to officially 
                                                      
20 Cf. idem note 5. 
21 I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, New Haven, CT: Princeton 
University Press, 1990. 
22 T. Modood, Multiculturalism. A civic idea, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p. 43. 
23 T. Modood, 2007, p. 61. 
24 W. Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 38. 
25 The Runnymede Trust, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: the Parekh Report, 
London: Profile Books, 2000, p. 47. See also B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: 
Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2nd Edition, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
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enshrine multiculturalism into its constitution, followed by Australia.26 In 
Europe, the cases of the Netherlands and to a certain extent the United 
Kingdom epitomized the multiculturalist trend. The main difference 
between the European multiculturalisms and their trans-oceanic precursors 
is that in Canada or Australia multiculturalism has been offered as a 
national identity option for society as a whole and not as a policy of 
integration.27 Just a decade ago Nathan Glazer’s famous statement “we are 
all multiculturalists now”28 was finding acceptance in large circles. 
However, lately the drift away from multiculturalism that began in popular 
media in the Netherlands has (as noted in Chapter 1) spread into a 
mainstream political discourse in much of Europe.29 While it is too early to 
claim a general retreat from multicultural policies in practice, it is clear that 
there is a widespread move in favour of civic integration measures, 
accompanied by the renewed emphasis on citizenship in European states. It 
is true that citizenship has made a surprising return to the political agenda 
and to the public debate.30 At a time when it was losing its appeal as the 
bearer of rights,31 it has come to be seen as the response to the challenge of 
                                                      
26 P. Kivisto and T. Faist, Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects, 
Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 36-37. 
27 C. Joppke, “The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and 
policy”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2004, pp. 237-257, P. Kivisto and 
T. Faist, 2007. 
28 N. Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997. 
29 For the Netherlands see P. Scheffer, Het Land van Aankomst, Amsterdam: De 
Bezige Bij, 2007, P. Scheffer, “Het multiculturele drama”, NRC Handelsblad, January 
2000 and for Germany see T. Sarrazin, Deutschland schafft sich ab, München: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010.   
30 C .  J o p p k e ,  2 0 0 4 ,  p .  2 4 3 .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  b o r n e  i n  m i n d  t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e s e  
measures are employed differently within each state, therefore what seems like a 
convergence on legislations might not be necessarily the case when implemented. 
See C. Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic integration policies for immigrants 
in Western Europe”, West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007, pp. 1-22 for a pro-
convergence argument and D. Jacobs and A. Rea, “The end of national models? 
Integration courses and citizenship trajectories in Europe”, paper prepared for the 
EUSA-conference, Montréal, 17-19 May 2007 for anti-convergence argument, 2007. 
31 See for the most prominent example Soysal’s postnational membership; Y.N. 
Soysal,  Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.  22 | ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
cultural and ethnic diversity in European states. The frequency of 
amendments made to nationality laws in recent decades clearly reveals this 
trend. These legislative changes are for the most part marked by de-
ethnicizing tendencies and expansion in the use of jus soli (whereby 
citizenship is determined by place of birth) attribution and acquisition of 
nationality (notably with introduction of jus soli measures in the formerly 
descent-based Germany) and an increasing tolerance towards dual 
citizenship.32 Yet the prevalence of integration tests and courses as a sine 
qua non condition for becoming a citizen (or a resident, or even sometimes 
for entering the territory) underscores the idea that nationality has to be 
‘earned’. Bauböck et al. contend that the concept of ‘naturalization as a 
means of integration’ is being replaced by another paradigm of 
naturalization as the “crowning of a completed integration process”.33 This 
is precisely what Joppke points to when he talks about the retreat of 
multiculturalism. He claims that there is a growing sense of ‘when in 
Rome, do as Romans do’ as a maxim of immigrant integration because the 
rules that migrants are expected to adapt to are increasingly procedural 
and universalistic.34  
                                                      
32 C. Joppke and E. Morawska, Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in 
Liberal Nation-States, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 19. See a few other 
examples of comparative studies dealing with nationality legislation; B. Baubock, 
E. Ersboll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch, Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: 
Policies and trends in 15 European countries, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2006; R. De Groot and M. Vink, “Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe: 
International Framework and Domestic Trends”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2010, pp. 713-734; B. De Hart and R. Van Oers, “European 
Trends in Nationality Law”, in R. Baubock et al. (eds), Acquisition and Loss of 
Nationality, Volume I: Comparative Analysis; Policies and Trends in 15 European 
Countries, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006; P. Weil, “Access to 
citizenship: A comparison of twenty five nationality laws”, in T.A. Aleinikoff and 
D. Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
33 R. Ba ub o ck et  al., 2 00 6, p . 24 . Fo r a recen t  edit ed  v o lum e o n  t h e in t egrat io n 
measures in different European states see E. Ersboll, D. Kostakopoulou and R. Van 
Oers, A Re-definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe, Leiden: 
Brill, 2010. 
34 C. Joppke, 2004, p. 255. Joppke further argues that language assimilation asked 
of the immigrants is compatible with liberal values and that elsewhere develops 
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Two further considerations are warranted before concluding too 
quickly on the demise of multiculturalism. First, multiculturalist policies 
that assist immigrants to cherish their cultural, ethnic or religious 
background usually take place at the local level and not at the national 
level. And this practice, as shown in the chapters that follow, has not been 
completely halted and in some cases even remained unchanged or 
furthered despite the rhetoric against it. Second, as Kivisto and Faist rightly 
state “part of the reason for the widely divergent assessments of the short 
history and potential future of multiculturalism, as well as why it has been 
a flashpoint of political contestation, is that the word is often used with 
widely disparate meanings.”35 In their view, multiculturalism in practice – 
either as official state policies or as implicit approaches to ethnic diversity – 
has implied that differences were not only to be tolerated but also valued. 
A certain level of ‘multicultural sensitivity’ is now ingrained in Europe’s 
liberal nation states. Indeed, the fiercest critics of multiculturalism, such as 
Joppke, acknowledged that the very nature of liberal states allows 
immigrants to find recognition and protection for their distinct cultural 
practices through the individual rights and liberties protected by 
constitutions. Similarly, the principle of indirect discrimination comprised 
in the list of illicit discriminations in the EU Race Directive, establishes a de 
facto recognition of groups. This is evidently not to deny the move away 
from treating minorities as groups and the growing emphasis on individual 
autonomy in states’ policies, most apparent in the Netherlands’ spectacular 
reversal from policies of recognition of and support for communities, to 
policies of integration. Nevertheless, one can recognize what Joppke and 
Morawska call a situation of de facto multiculturalism,36 which is different 
from an official multiculturalism that seeks state engagement for the 
recognition of immigrants as distinct ethnic groups. Therefore, depending 
on the definition, multiculturalism as an analytical tool can either represent 
an extreme end of differentialism/communitarianism or a middle way that 
                                                                                                                                       
that there is a general distancing from the old idea of assimilation. See also 
Brubaker on the development of the term ‘assimilation’.  
35 P. Kivisto and T. Faist, 2007, p. 35.  
36 C. Joppke and E. Morawska, 2003, p. 2, 8.  24 | ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
is often re-baptized as interculturalism, interactive37 or attenuated 
pluralism.38  
Assimilation is largely understood to be a utopian end result; a 
desired outcome for a society where members would be culturally 
indistinguishable from one another. By definition it implies a process of 
becoming the ‘same’, hence the absorption of immigrants within the host 
society’s culture. This understanding also relies on the supposition of an 
idealized homogenous society prior to the immigration. While this is a 
common view of ‘assimilation’, this term also deserves further scrutiny.  
Classical assimilation theory, which was given its shape by the early 
Chicago school writings,39 defines assimilation as  
a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and 
groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other 
persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, 
are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.40 
But this classical statement of assimilation theory does not imply a 
uni-directional or forced assimilation process. It is presumed that 
acculturation would happen spontaneously or even unintentionally by the 
very nature of human contact. In this sense assimilation is viewed as an 
inevitable outcome.41  
Another feature of assimilation theory is the interconnectedness of 
the different dimensions of assimilation (i.e. social, structural, cultural, 
cognitive), even though its proponents may disagree on which dimension 
should be of primary importance. The first dissection of the concept came 
from Milton Gordon whose typology includes seven different dimensions 
ranging from cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude-
                                                      
37 D. Hartmann and J. Gerteis, “Dealing with diversity: Mapping multi-culturalism 
in sociological terms”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2005, pp. 218-240.  
38 A. Zolberg and L.W. Long, “Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in 
Europe and the United States”, Politics Society, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1999, pp. 5-38. 
39 R.E. Park and E. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1921 (reprint: 1969). R.E. Park, “Assimilation, Social”, 
in Seligman and Johnson (eds), Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, New York: 
Macmillan, 1930. 
40 R.E. Park and E. Burgess, 1969, p. 735. 
41 R.E. Park, “Human Migration and the Marginal Man”, American Journal of 
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receptional, behaviour-receptional, to civic assimilation.  Even though 
immigrants begin their adaptation to their new country through cultural 
assimilation, it is the structural assimilation that matters the most.42 This 
leads into the central attack on assimilation by the transnationalism thesis, 
which asserts that the relationship between the different dimensions of 
assimilation should be decoupled given the current conditions of 
globalization.43 In particular, it has become hard to maintain the ideal of 
cultural homogeneity as individuals more visibly subscribe to diverse and 
multiple identities. Structurally, socio-economic systems that immigrants 
are integrating into are also multiple and fragmented. Moreover, 
assimilation in the structural sphere does not necessarily lead to a similar 
outcome in the cultural sphere. For instance, immigrants perfectly 
integrated into the labour market may still feel attachment to their culture 
of origin and may want to keep their ties with their country of origin. There 
have been attempts to ‘repair’ this shortcoming from the assimilationists. 
One such approach speaks of ‘segmented assimilation’,44 which 
acknowledges this decoupling and considers the assimilation process to be 
composed of at least three possible multidirectional patterns: the upward 
mobility pattern thus far advocated by assimilation theorists, the 
                                                      
42 For more on this, see M. Gordon, Assimilation in American life: The Role of Race, 
Religion, and National Origins, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, or for a 
brief recap R.D. Alba and V. Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era 
of Immigration”, International Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1997, pp. 826-874. 
43 M. Bommes, “Transnationalism or Assimilation”, Journal of Social Sciences 
Education, 2005 (http://www.jsse.org/2005/2005-1/transnationalism-assimilation-
bommes.htm). 
44 This variant of assimilation theory was first introduced by Portes and Zhou: A. 
Portes and M. Zhou, “The new Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its 
Variants”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 530, 
1993, pp. 74-98.  Ever since there is growing body of literature on segmented 
assimilation see few examples; M. Zhou, “Segmented Assimilation: Issues, 
Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation”, International 
Migration Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1997, pp. 975-1008; R.D. Alba and V. Nee, 1997; A. 
Portes, P. Fernández-Kelly and W. Haller, “Segmented assimilation on the ground: 
The new second generation in early adulthood”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, 
No. 6, 2005, pp. 1000-1040; A. Portes, P. Fernández-Kelly and W. Haller, “The 
Adaptation of the Immigrant Second Generation in America: Theoretical Overview 
and Recent Evidence”,  Princeton University, The Center for Migration and 
Development, Working Paper Series, 2008.  26 | ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
downward-mobility pattern which pushes in the opposite direction and 
thus leads immigrants to integrate into the underclass both culturally and 
economically, and finally economic integration into the mainstream 
alongside a lagged acculturation process with deliberate preservation of the 
immigrant community’s values.45  
On the policy side, assimilation means “encouraging immigrants to 
learn the national language and take on the social and cultural practices of 
the receiving community”.46 Several European states first emphasized 
assimilation when new waves of migration started after the Second World 
War. Nevertheless, to date the historical archetypes of assimiliationist 
policies are considered to be the Americanization movement of the early-
20th century and homogenizing practices of Jacobin Republicanism in 
France.47 This latter did not only consist of repressing internal diversity that 
was already present on French soil, such as different dialects, but also had a 
colonial aspect reminiscent of the idea of the mission civilisatrice. Today, 
such policies and programmes have come to be considered morally and 
politically unacceptable, not to mention ineffective. Moreover, thinking on 
assimilation has been confronted with the realization that communities that 
had developed as a consequence of international migration may wish to 
stress their cultural identity, notwithstanding the fact that their members 
might be fully incorporated into the surrounding society.48 Therefore, 
assimilation as a normative term, presenting a pure ideal type to be 
reached, has generally been abandoned in the literature, and new 
expressions such as incorporation, acculturation, and integration have been 
employed. An exception to this comes from Rogers Brubaker,49 who makes 
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the case for the return of assimilation. For him the core meaning is 
increasing similarity and the accent is on the process, not on some final 
state. Assimilation designates a direction of change, not a particular degree 
of similarity.50  
Notwithstanding this re-positing, assimilation is still used to denote 
an antipode position when assessing state policies. Multiculturalism and 
assimilation both represent typological models standing at the two 
extremes, even though in practice it is hardly possible to observe them in 
their pure forms in contemporary Europe. The notions of assimilation and 
multiculturalism that have become part and parcel of daily life are indeed 
theoretically much more complex. This is important to keep in mind as our 
perception of these concepts significantly contributes to our appraisal of the 
phenomenon in hand and to our classification of the policies.  
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2.  IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: FROM 
MULTICULTURALISM TO ASSIMILATION? 
TINKA M. VELDHUIS & TITIA VAN DER MAAS 
Introduction 
Ever since the first immigrants arrived in the Netherlands in the years 
following the Second World War, the country has undergone a marked 
shift in its approach and attitudes towards minority issues. For years, the 
country had been celebrated for its tolerant approach, in which social and 
cultural diversity among societal groups was recognized and appreciated. 
There was little debate about minority i s s u e s  a n d  o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y  l i n e s  
stressed the preservation of cultural diversity and the emancipation of 
minority groups. It could be said that for a long time the prevailing attitude 
was one of conflict avoidance and compromise.51 However, the last few 
decades have seen drastic changes in both the focus and tone of the debate.  
Gradually, the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s has developed 
into a rather tense climate in which minority issues dominate the political 
and public agenda, and in which tolerance for cultural and religious 
differences appears to be on the wane. There is an increasing demand for 
immigrants to take the responsibility to integrate and adapt to Dutch 
norms and standards, especially over the past decade. Whereas minority 
issues were previously given little political priority, today the debate is 
strongly politicized and appears to be dominated by very public incidents 
and controversies. In all, it has been argued that the Dutch discourse on 
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immigration and integration is now moving towards a perspective of 
assimilation.52 
We take a closer look at this paradigmatic shift in the present chapter, 
and examine how the socio-political dialogue on integration and 
immigration has changed since the 1950s. We aim to shed light on the 
demographic and sociological developments that underlie these changes 
and examine whether and to what extent the changes in public and political 
dialogue are reflected in official policy lines towards immigration and 
integration. To illustrate developments we identify the most relevant 
incidents that have stirred up social and political debate, and examine how 
they have further affected both political discourse and the government’s 
policy strategy. In doing so we focus primarily on issues involving Muslim 
minority groups, mainly because the contemporary debate tends to focus 
on this population and also because most ethnic minority groups in the 
Netherlands have a Muslim background.  
We follow the categorization of integration models that has served as 
a guiding principle throughout the other chapters of the book. Accordingly, 
three different models of integration can be distinguished that encompass 
different expectations and demands from the immigrant and the host 
society. At one end of the spectrum a multicultural communitarian 
perspective can be found, according to which religious and cultural 
differences should be supported. The communitarian model seeks to 
achieve a balanced relationship between society and community on the one 
hand, and the rights and needs of the individual on the other. The 
multicultural communitarian model suggests that integration is best served 
by respect for religious and cultural diversity. At the other end of the 
spectrum an assimilation perspective can be identified, according to which 
differences between the characteristics of immigrant groups and the host 
society should disappear. To a large extent the responsibility to adapt is 
placed upon the immigrant, who is expected to integrate fully and adopt 
the dominant culture. Lastly, in the middle of the spectrum a hybrid-
intercultural perspective can be identified, according to which individuals 
are expected to and aim to fully participate in the host society, while at the 
same time striving to retain elements of distinct cultural or religious 
identity. According to the hybrid model, otherness should be respected 
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without being over-emphasized. In the present chapter we suggest that the 
public and political discourse in the Netherlands has moved away from a 
communitarian perspective towards an assimilation perspective, and that 
minority issues are increasingly politicized and the subject of polarization. 
At the same time however, we argue that this paradigmatic shift towards 
assimilation does not – yet – reflect in official government strategies 
towards immigrants. Although the public and political debate on minority 
issues has intensified over the last years, no drastic policy changes have so 
far materialized.  
To understand how the public and political discourse on immigrant 
issues has changed requires an understanding of the demographic and 
sociological developments in the Netherlands. The chapter therefore starts 
with a brief overview of the history of immigration in the Netherlands 
since World War II and gives an outline of the current state of affairs in 
immigration. Next, we will outline how the public and political discourse 
has evolved in recent decades. We examine the interplay between changing 
socio-demographic realities and policy lines. Subsequently, a series of 
public controversies will be discussed within the context of the integration 
debate, to further examine the development of the public and political 
discourse.  
2.1  Integrating Muslims: Problem definitions and policy lines 
From the time when the first labour migrants arrived in the post-war years 
and migration increased, integration and ethnic diversity have been 
matters of public and political concern. Over recent decades, the 
Netherlands has been home to a wide variety of ethnic and religious 
groups and is still growing in population and diversity. Between 2000 and 
2009, the overall population grew by approximately 622,000 people, to 
reach a figure of almost 16,5 million people in 2009. Almost 1,8 million 
inhabitants (11%) stem from a non-Western background. Turks (378,000) 
and Moroccans (342,500) make up for the largest groups of non-Western 
inhabitants, followed by Surinamese (339,000) and Antilleans (135,000). 
Other ethnic groups are Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans, Chinese, and Somalians. 
Additionally, recent years have seen an increase in immigrants from 
Central and East-European countries like Poland and Hungary. To a large 
extent this rapid increase can be explained by the fact that as of May 2007, 
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no longer needed a special permit to work in the Netherlands 
(tewerkstellingsvergunning).53  
Currently, approximately one million Dutch inhabitants are Muslims, 
accounting for 5.8% of the overall population. The largest subgroups of 
Muslims consist of Moroccans and Turks, who make up almost 75% of the 
Muslim population. The remaining 25% is made up of Muslim Surinamese 
and people seeking asylum from countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, 
Bosnia and Pakistan.  
The rapid demographic changes and their socio-economic 
consequences have affected both the public and political discourse on 
minority issues. In the following sections we describe how this discourse 
developed across decades, and examine the dominant patterns of 
immigration and integration policy. Over time, different phases can be 
distinguished in which both perceived dilemmas and policy paradigms 
regarding immigrants have changed considerably. In the coming sections 
we discuss these phases in detail. First, however, it is important to 
understand the sociological structure of ‘pillarization’ in which the first 
immigrants arrived in the post war years.  
2.1.1  Pillarization 
Since the 19th century, Dutch society has known a tradition of pillarization, a 
unique social arrangement in which society is segmented into different 
social groups, based on moral or religious denomination. Pillarization is 
characterized by the vertical stratification of society in which each pillar has 
its own authority and autonomy with full ‘sphere of sovereignty’.54 For 
decades there was a Catholic pillar, a Protestant pillar, and a Socialist pillar, 
together with some other, less easily defined pillars. Pillarization involved 
a sophisticated form of social organization in which each pillar defined its 
own organizations and institutions, which covered not only politics, but 
aspects of social life in general.  
Each pillar had its own ideological representation by means of 
political parties, newspapers, and broadcasting companies, and could have 
fully or partly state-funded institutions like hospitals, schools, youth 
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movements, and sports clubs.55 This way, pillarization functioned as an 
arrangement that ordered the relationships between different societal 
groups and institutionalized their integration within the national state. It 
allowed different societal groups with incompatible religious doctrines to 
organize their own sub-society while reducing inter-pillar relations and 
conflicts.56 When the first immigrants came to the Netherlands and 
introduced Islam as a ‘new’ religion to society, it seemed logical that 
Muslims would be allowed to create their own pillar. However, although 
pillarization had been successful for decades, this particular system of 
social organization had already started to erode in the post-war years as a 
result of secularization. The arrival of immigrants, which made the Dutch 
population increasingly religiously and ethnically diverse, probably only 
accelerated this process of de-pillarization. The fact that no separate pillar 
for Muslims was created was also partly because it was thought that the 
creation of such a pillar was unnecessary. Immigrants, it was believed, 
were not supposed to stay in the Netherlands.  
2.1.2  The myth of return 
A key feature of the discourse on immigration and integration had always 
been that the Netherlands did not consider itself to be a country of 
immigration. Before the war there had been little immigration to the 
Netherlands so it was practically an unknown phenomenon. The core 
assumption was that the few immigrants who arrived in the Netherlands 
would either stay for a short while and then return to their countries of 
origin, or would assimilate into their new environment.57 Both in public 
and political debate, little attention was paid to immigration issues. From 
the 1950s on however, sociological circumstances started to change rapidly 
as the post-war years brought a growing influx of immigrants to the 
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Netherlands. Three distinct types of immigration streams can be identified 
that resulted in the arrival of different minority groups from various ethnic 
and cultural backgrounds.  
Firstly, the independence of former colonies like Indonesia (in 1949) 
and Suriname (1975) gave rise to a stream of post-colonial immigration. At 
this time most immigrants were from the South Moluccan Islands, where 
they had served in the Dutch Indian Army (KNIL). Due to the political and 
military instability in the Moluccas the Dutch government saw itself forced 
to transport the remaining KNIL-soldiers and their families to the 
Netherlands. In 1951, approximately 12,500 Moluccans moved to the 
Netherlands.58 Both the Dutch government and the immigrants themselves 
expected a return to the Moluccas as soon as the political situation in that 
region had stabilized, and their stay was thought to be only a short one. As 
a result, no measures were taken to integrate the Moluccans into Dutch 
society. They were housed in camps, often former concentration camps 
from WWII, and were not issued with work permits. However, the political 
situation in the Moluccas did not stabilize and for years, the Moluccan 
communities remained isolated and largely unemployed within the 
Netherlands, and feelings of frustration and deprivation mounted.59 Similar 
waves of post-colonial immigration emerged with the independence of 
Suriname, paralleled by influxes from the Dutch Antilles. Unlike the 
Moluccans, however, these immigrants were not perceived as guests but as 
repatriates, and expected to integrate easily into Dutch society.  
Secondly, the Netherlands saw a large influx of labour immigrants. 
The post-war years brought rapid economic growth and an increasing 
shortage of particular workers to the Netherlands. In response the Dutch 
government actively recruited foreign workers from countries around the 
Mediterranean such as Spain, Italy, Morocco and Turkey. Like the 
Moluccans, these so called ‘guest-workers’ were expected to stay in the 
Netherlands temporarily and return to their countries of origin as soon as 
their services were no longer required. Although many Italian and Spanish 
immigrants did indeed return to their home countries in the 60s and 70s, 
large communities of Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants remained in 
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the Netherlands. Subsequently, a process of family reunification unfolded 
in which labour migrants brought their wives and families to the 
Netherlands. At the time, few restrictions were imposed on immigration 
and immigrants could obtain permits without too much trouble. As a 
result, large communities of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants settled in 
the Netherlands, numbering as many as to approximately 77,000 
permanent immigrants in 1977.60  
Thirdly, the 80s and 90s saw a sharp increase in asylum migration. 
The number of asylum migrants that arrived in the Netherlands grew from 
8,000 in 1990 to approximately 20,000 in 1993, and has levelled ever since to 
an annual average of 17,000 individuals. An approximate total of 100,000 
asylum migrants entered the Netherlands between 1990 and 1996.61 
As a consequence of these demographic changes a paradoxical 
situation emerged. On the one hand, the socio-political standard remained 
that the Netherlands should not and would not be an immigration 
country.62 Immigration was seen as a passing historical phenomenon 
dependent on specific contextual factors and therefore of a temporary 
nature. The government aimed to accommodate the basic needs of the 
‘guest’ migrants and to make the return to their countries of origin as 
smooth as possible. Immigrants were granted access to all regular facilities 
of the welfare state, and, special measures were taken to preserve their 
identity. Children could take special classes in their mother tongue and 
social facilities were created to allow for cultural and religious expression. 
In line with the ‘myth of return’, a formal immigration or integration policy 
was for a long time deemed unnecessary, and up until the 1970s, the Dutch 
government remained reluctant to develop policies towards ethnic 
minorities.63  
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On the other hand, however, the sociological reality did not fit the 
non-immigration perception. Minority communities within the 
Netherlands were growing rapidly and created new ethnic and religious 
groups that did not fit within the existing pillars, while no policy was 
implemented that organized the integration of these minorities. In the late 
70s it had become clear that large groups of ethnic minorities would remain 
in the Netherlands. This gave rise to a debate on how the immigration and 
integration of newcomers should be handled. In the years that followed, 
the Dutch government would pursue a prominent multiculturalism 
policy.64  
2.1.3  Multiculturalism 
Even after the realization had sunk in that minority groups had settled 
permanently in the Netherlands, the socio-political norm remained that 
further immigration should be prevented or limited. Within the political 
context of the time, minority issues still had relatively little political priority 
and restrictive immigration criteria were implemented with little political 
debate.65 However, it had become clear that measures had to be taken to 
make sure that those immigrants who had already arrived in the 
Netherlands would be integrated into Dutch society.  
In June 1979, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)66 
published a report on Dutch policy regarding ethnic minorities. The WRR 
pointed out that the Netherlands could no longer sustain the intention to 
remain a non-immigrant country, and urged the government to 
acknowledge that the Netherlands was confronted with a new situation in 
which the existence of large communities of ethnic minorities could no 
longer be denied.67 According to the WRR, the new context of immigration 
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demanded a new set of policy measures that would have to focus on 
improving equality among societal groups. In line with the philosophy of 
pillarization, the best way to do this would be by facilitating the 
sustainability of ethnic minorities and to respect different identities, while 
improving their social, economic, and political participation within society.  
In response to the WRR-report, the government adopted nearly all of 
its recommendations and implemented the so-called Ethnic Minorities 
Policy  (Minderhedenbeleid), which centred on the belief that the cultural 
emancipation of immigrant minorities would be an essential condition of 
their integration. This emancipation was envisaged within state-supported 
ethnic infrastructures. By improving the economic participation of 
immigrants whilst allowing them to maintain their own culture and 
identity, the government attempted to improve the socio-economic position 
and participation of both the individuals within the groups and the groups 
collectively.68 Issues regarding moral and religious beliefs were considered 
to be a private matter. The Ethnic Minority Policy served as a welfare state 
policy for vulnerable groups with a low-socio economic status, which were 
perceived as ethnically and culturally different. It was targeted at specific 
segregated groups, among which Turks, Moroccans, Moluccans, 
Surinamese, Antilleans and refugees.69  
Through rather substantial policy measures, particularly in the legal-
political, socio-economic, and cultural domains, the government aimed at 
promoting and controlling the integration of immigrants. For instance, civil 
equity was addressed by strengthening the anti-discrimination legislation, 
granting non-Dutch citizens both active and passive voting rights in 1985, 
and easing naturalization legislation. In the socio-economic domain, 
measures were taken to embed immigrants in the labour market, decrease 
unemployment rates, raise the level of education among immigrants and 
improve housing conditions.70 Measures were taken to improve the 
disadvantaged position of children in the education system by providing 
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financial assistance to schools with pupils from minority groups, and by 
providing special education that matched the cultural and linguistic 
background of the children. In the cultural domain, groups had the 
autonomy to organize their own cultural and religious emancipation. The 
government facilitated communities to develop their own social, cultural 
and religious institutions.  
The multiculturalist approach of the 80s was a logical extension of the 
pillarized society. As stated above, when Muslim immigrants arrived in the 
Netherlands it seemed natural that they would be allowed to create their 
own ‘Muslim’ pillar and organize their own institutions based on their 
cultural identity.71 The discourse was characterized by a tolerant and 
conflict-avoiding mentality, political correctness and a lack of debate about 
integration and immigration. It was believed that different groups could 
live harmoniously together under a nationally shared roof held up by 
separate pillars. The cultural emancipation of groups was perceived as a 
central tool to integrate ethnic minorities. As such, preserving cultures was 
no longer required to facilitate the return of immigrants to their home 
countries, but was perceived as essential for successful integration.  
Throughout the late 80s the multiculturalist approach became the 
subject of increasing criticism. Concerns started to surface about the socio-
economic conditions of minority communities. It turned out that 
immigrants generally lived in disadvantaged positions. They settled in 
segregated, low socio-economic status neighbourhoods, and 
unemployment rates among immigrants were – and are – significantly 
higher than among the ‘autochthonous’ Dutch.72 It was argued that the 
integration of immigrants had failed and that their socio-economic position 
had barely improved. However, at the time immigrant issues were still on 
the periphery of social-political debate and the concerns about the 
integration of minorities received relatively little attention. It was only in 
the early nineties that the topic became a political priority. Triggered by yet 
another report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 
1989, a rather drastic change occurred within public and political discourse. 
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The discourse now reflected a shift in focus from cultural perseverance to 
integration.  
2.1.4  Integration 
In 1989, the WRR published a second report in which in criticized the 
Ethnic Minorities Policy. The WRR argued that little progress had been 
made on the socio-economic participation of immigrants, while too much 
emphasis had been placed on the preservation of cultural and religious 
identity.73 The WRR warned that liberal policies in the cultural and 
religious domain could hinder integration and individual socio-economic 
participation, and facilitate segmentation and separatism of societal 
groups.74 In the years that followed, the socio-political discourse reflected a 
change in perception of the presence of immigrants and the introduction of 
Islam as a new religion into society. In a speech in 1991, Frits Bolkestein, 
leader of the right-wing Liberal Party (VVD) was the first to suggest 
publicly that Islam posed a threat to liberal democracy and a hindrance to 
the integration of immigrants. Bolkestein warned that Islam and democracy 
might be irreconcilable and he argued that integration should be handled 
with ‘more courage’.  
The government decided that a new policy line was necessary and in 
1994, a new Integration Policy was implemented. This policy included 
drastic changes to the multiculturalist approach of the 80s. In previous 
years the focus had been on cultural preservation, cultural emancipation 
within an individual pillar, and respect for differences in culture, language 
and religion. The new integration policy, however, was based on the idea 
that immigrants should participate in mainstream institutions rather than 
their own, in order to improve their participation in society.75 To be able to 
do so, immigrants would have to adapt to Dutch norms and standards, 
learn the language and participate in the labour market. As part of a 
broader political change, increased emphasis was placed on the duties 
rather than the rights of immigrants. Integration into the host society was 
now seen as the responsibility of the individual rather than the state. 
Policy-wise, attention shifted from the domains of culture and religion to 
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that of socio-economics. Group-level interventions were replaced by area-
based interventions aimed at disadvantaged individuals. The integration 
policy aimed at promoting the educational, employment and residential 
position of minorities, as a tool to facilitate their integration into Dutch 
society.  
Within the Ministry of Home Affairs a special post was created in 
1998 for the Minister of Urban Policy and Integration. In the same year the 
Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, WIN), was 
implemented. Central to this new law was that new non EU-members 
became obliged to take extensive integration courses that were designed to 
prepare immigrants for integration into Dutch society. The curriculum of 
these 12-month courses included language training (600 hours) and 
education on the cultural and historical aspects of Dutch society, as well as 
information about the functioning of important institutions. The courses 
and tests were made mandatory for newcomers and a precondition for 
immigration. Refusal to participate in the course could result in financial 
penalties.76 The WIN illustrates a changing perspective on the expectations 
and demands that were placed on the immigrant. However, as Joppke 
suggests, these first policy changes still reflect a greater focus on 
encouragement and service by the state, than mere coercion.77 The state 
paid for the integration courses, and fines were rarely imposed. In the years 
that followed, however, this service-aspect started to erode as integration 
policy took on an increasingly demanding aspect. More emphasis was 
being placed on Dutch culture and language, and on the ‘good citizenship’ 
of individual migrants. The emergence of populist right-wing elements in 
the political arena led to a renewed and strengthened call for the cultural 
integration efforts of immigrants. From the start of the new millennium, the 
political climate in the Netherlands shifted to the right, which went hand in 
hand with more restrictive policy measures being applied to immigrants. 
As such, the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law marked the first step in what 
is referred to by some as a trend to assimilation, which was further 
advanced in the government’s ‘new style’ integration policy‘. 
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2.1.5  Integration ‘New Style’ 
The turn of the millennium is perceived by many as a turning point in the 
Dutch discourse on immigration.78 The debate about multicultural society 
became a top political priority and for the first time, politicians and 
intellectuals engaged actively in the debate. The multiculturalist approach 
was increasingly criticized for its alleged failure to bring about integration. 
The WRR (1989) had argued that integration policies had not managed to 
prevent the marginalization of minorities. Among the most prominent 
intellectual thinkers who spoke out on the matter was Paul Scheffer, who 
published a widely-debated article about the ‘multicultural tragedy’.79 
According to Scheffer, due to the failing integration policy a new ‘ethnic 
underclass’ had emerged, which was strongly segregated in terms of 
residence and education, and characterized by high levels of 
unemployment and crime. Scheffer blamed what he called ‘cosy 
multiculturalism’ for the failure as it caused insecurity over the Dutch 
‘national’ identity and created a climate of tolerance and political 
correctness regarding the unsolicited effects of migration. In 2002, the 
incoming Prime Minister Balkenende declared publicly that a multicultural 
society offers an inadequate foundation to integration.80 Indeed, the socio-
economic position of non-EU immigrants was much worse than that of 
natives. As Joppke states, “migration into the Netherlands (...) is often a 
direct march into welfare state dependency”.81 Relative to other EU 
countries, non-employment rates for immigrants in the Netherlands was 
exceptionally high, rising to 5.4 times higher than that of natives in 1999. 
Also, immigrants were generally poorly educated and with a higher chance 
of dropping out of school. Residential segregation is also extremely high in 
the Netherlands at this time.82 The new millennium thus began with serious 
concerns about integration and the social position of immigrants in the 
Netherlands.  
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Within this tumultuous socio-political context, the right-wing 
populist Pim Fortuyn entered the political arena and, with strong anti-
immigrant rhetoric, challenged the “Islamification of Dutch culture”.83 
Months after the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001, which further 
accelerated the downfall of intercultural tolerance,84 Fortuyn was 
assassinated by an environmental activist in May 2002. A few days later, 
Fortuyn posthumously became the unmistakable winner of the general 
elections by winning 26 seats in parliament. The centre-right government 
that was instated after these elections imposed restrictive measures on 
immigration and the integration of newcomers. Considerable focus was 
placed on the duties of the immigrant to adapt to Dutch ‘norms and 
values’; a term coined by Prime Minister Balkenende and which became a 
guiding principle in the integration debate in the years that followed.  
Generally, since the millennium the integration debate has become 
increasingly politicized and polarized. In addition to Pim Fortuyn, a 
number of public-political figures have emerged to shape the discourse in 
this area.  
The first was Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh, who was 
known for his anti-Islam statements and provocative manner, was brutally 
murdered in Amsterdam in 2004. His assassin, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a 
Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent who  w a s  b o r n  a n d  g r e w  u p  i n  t h e  
Netherlands. His killing of Van Gogh was perceived as the ultimate proof 
that integration policies and the integration of immigrants had failed. This 
was thought to be the case for Muslims in particular who, facilitated by 
Islamic schools and social institutions, were accused of segregating 
themselves from mainstream society.85  
Second, the Somali-born Member of Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali took 
a prominent stance in the integration debate. Van Gogh’s murderer had 
pinned a letter to his victim’s chest enclosing a death threat to Hirsi Ali. She 
was a member of the Liberal Party (VVD) and had been known for her 
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campaign against the intolerant aspects of Islam, cooperating with Van 
Gogh on a movie called ‘Submission’, in which concerns were expressed 
about women’s rights in Islam. In 2006, Hirsi Ali found herself involved in 
a public dispute with her party member and Minister of Integration, Rita 
Verdonk. The outcome of this dispute was that Hirsi Ali left Dutch politics 
and moved to the United States in 2007.  
Third, Rita Verdonk herself has been one of the main actors in the 
post-millennium integration debate. Verdonk, who had been instated as 
Minister of Integration since 2003, was known for her tough stance on 
immigration issues, earning her the nickname ‘Iron Rita’. Verdonk clearly 
shaped the political discourse on immigration issues. In 2004, she was the 
initiator of the ‘Integration Policy New Style’, by which a new system of 
obligatory and demanding integration policies was implemented.86 
Strongly influenced by Verdonk, the atmosphere of political correctness 
was replaced by an open and politicized debate on immigration and 
integration issues. After being expelled from the Liberal Party in 2007, 
Verdonk started her own political movement, which lost its last seat in the 
parliament after the general elections of June 2010. 
Fourth, following both Hirsi Ali and Verdonk, Geert Wilders is 
another former member of the Liberal Party who has been known for his 
populist and right-wing point of view regarding immigrant issues. After 
leaving the Liberal Party, Wilders founded his own party in 2006 under the 
name of the ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid’ (Party for Freedom, PVV). In 2010 he 
won the general elections by securing 24 seats in parliament. Wilders is 
known as a populist politician with a strong anti-Islam agenda. In 2009 he 
proposed a tax on veils, which he provocatively termed ‘kopvoddentax’,87 
suggesting that Muslim women should obtain a permit to wear a veil for an 
annual fee of one thousand euro. Wilders further advocates a cessation of 
immigration from non-Western countries, the banning of the burka, and 
the closing of all Islamic schools.88 At the time of writing, Wilders’ party 
has agreed to give parliamentary support to a minority cabinet consisting 
of the Liberal Party (VVD) and the Christian Democrats (CDA).  
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In sum, the cultural emancipation that had been valued and 
encouraged for years was now perceived to be a threat to integration. 
Rather than facilitating individual and collective integration, the focus on 
cultural diversity came to be thought to hinder integration and lay the 
foundations of political and socio-economic segregation. This new 
perception of minority issues went hand in hand with growing 
expectations of responsibility of immigrants, and an increasing demand for 
proof of loyalty to Dutch culture and identity.  
2.2  Discourse and controversies 
Especially over the last decade, the dialogue on minority issues seems to 
have been dominated by public controversies that illustrate the different 
political, ideological, religious or social positions of the government and 
other relevant actors. As such, these controversies illustrate the intensity as 
well as the focus and tone of the debate as it evolves. 
In the coming sections we seek to illustrate the developments in the 
in public discourse and official policy lines. In doing so, we can determine 
the positions of a wide variety of actors, namely the Tweede Kamer (House 
of Representatives), the Parliament and the media, and examine whether 
and how these debates affected official policy lines.  
2.2.1  Citizenship and participation 
The domain of citizenship and participation has probably seen more drastic 
policy changes than any other. It is in this area that subsequent 
governments have installed new and increasingly restrictive measures on 
immigration and integration.  
A shift in approach towards the integration of immigrants can be 
illustrated by the new law on inburgering.89 In 2005, the Minister for 
Immigration and Integration (Rita Verdonk) initiated a law to make the 
existing integration trajectory mandatory for immigrants outside the EU. 
The law caused public and political discussion, gaining support in the 
House of Representatives, although the Raad van State (Council of State) 
advised negatively on its first draft. The Council of State has two functions, 
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first, an advisory function towards the government and the parliament on 
legislation and governance, second, its Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
is the highest administrative court in the Netherlands.90 According to the 
Council of State, the proposed law discriminated between autochtone 
(native) and allochtone (non-native) Dutch passport holders, by obliging 
only the latter to take integration courses.91  
In 2007 the Wet Inburgering (WI) (law on the integration of 
immigrants) was introduced. Its objective is “to enhance the position of the 
autochthonous working population with a minimum amount of skills”.92 
Effective as of January 2010, it obliges non-EU immigrants who legally 
reside in the Netherlands and aspire to settle permanently to complete a 
course on inburgering. This integration trajectory has to be completed 
within a few years. Immigrants who do not comply are excluded from the 
right to a permanent visa and can be given financial penalties.93  
A different but related law, the Wet Inburgering Buiteland (WIB) (law 
on the integration in foreign countries), specifies that non-EU immigrants 
who apply for a visa from their home countries are obliged to take a test at 
the Dutch Embassy in their homeland as a precondition for entering the 
Netherlands. The test fee amounts to € 350, is carried out by telephone and 
can be requested as often as desired. The main focus of the course is 
listening and speaking skills in Dutch and topics regarding Dutch society 
such as history, state constitution, education and employment.94  
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The  Wet Inburgering and its related laws sparked much debate. In 
2008, the Court of Amsterdam decided that in the case of family 
reunification, the government cannot oblige immigrants applying for a visa 
to take and pass the basic course on inburgering  in their countries of 
origin.95 However, when the case went to appeal, the Council of State 
judged that the test on inburgering was lawful and that the demand to pass 
it can remain obligatory in the case of family reunification.  
At the time of writing, a renewed debate on integration courses has 
emerged in the Netherlands. During the talks to form the new government, 
it became clear that the outgoing cabinet intended to pursue further 
limitations on the budget for integration courses, which would imply that 
immigrants could become solely responsible for the costs of their courses.96 
The issue of dual citizenship has also come under the spotlight. In 
2007, Geert Wilders’ PVV initiated a vote of no-confidence in two 
secretaries of state who held dual-nationality passports. Wilders cast doubt 
on their loyalty to the Netherlands and demanded their resignation.97 The 
House of Representatives was appalled by the statement. Nevertheless, the 
official stance of the Cabinet was that dual citizenship needs to be limited, 
for reasons of loyalty and integration. Under pressure from the Cabinet, the 
Minister of Justice (who was a member of the Christian Democrats – CDA) 
drew up a law to limit dual citizenship. In a letter to the House of 
Representatives, the Minister emphasized that having Dutch nationality 
encompassed certain rights but also certain duties, and that loyalty and 
‘good citizenship’ were expected of every Dutch citizen.98  
As part of the same debate, in 2007 the WRR published a report 
entitled “Identification with the Netherlands”. It concluded that 
identification with the Netherlands cannot be forced upon immigrants by 
obliging them to obtain a Dutch passport and dismiss their former 
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identity.99 Notably, Princess Maxima, herself an owner of both a Dutch and 
an Argentinean passport, was invited to give a brief introductory speech at 
the presentation of the report. In the speech Maxima claimed that during 
her stay in the Netherlands she had not found ‘one Dutch identity’. 
Although her statement did cause some discussion, it was dismissed along 
with the WRR report with the argument that “regardless of multiformity, 
there is a collective history and [there are] national symbols connecting the 
Dutch”.100 
2.2.2  Education 
A predominant issue in the current debate on Muslims in Dutch society 
concerns Islamic schools. The Dutch constitution includes the much 
disputed Freedom of Education Act.101 This unique equality of private and 
public schools in law is among the most influential achievements of the era 
of pillarization. Article 23 of the constitution guarantees the right to 
establish denominated schools and receive governmental subsidies. At the 
time, it was held firm that each pillar would be allowed to establish their 
schools and be protected from the undesired influence of the state. As such 
it made sense that Muslims were allowed to create their own Islamic 
schools. The focus of the debate has since changed, however, and today 
questions are raised about the potentially negative impact that Islamic 
schools might have on integration. One of the main concerns is whether 
such schools provide a sufficient cultural and socio-economic foundation to 
prepare their pupils for participation in Dutch society.  
The debate on state funding of Islamic schools was revived by the 
2002 report of the Dutch National Security Service on undesired foreign 
influence and anti-integrative tendencies in Islamic schools.102 The National 
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Security Service recommended to ‘systematically analyse’ the religious 
curricula at Islamic schools.103 Despite the separation of church and state, 
the Ministry of Education adhered to the request. The educational audit 
services concluded after inspection that “nearly all [Islamic] schools have 
an open attitude towards Dutch society and fulfil a positive role in 
enhancing conditions which promote social cohesion”.104  
As a result of recurring incidents within Islamic school boards and 
questions about them in the House of Representatives, a new educational 
audit was completed in 2008 on board practices in Islamic schools. The 
outcome was shocking. The report showed that 65% of the boards had 
unlawfully appointed members. Also, unlawful claims for funding had 
been made and with 25% of the boards there was a serious lack of 
(parental) participation; an essential condition of government subsidies.105 
Additionally, the report showed that the quality of education was ‘weak’ at 
35,9% of the Islamic schools (as compared to the national average of 9,2%), 
and ‘very weak’ in 12,8% of the cases (compared to the national average of 
1,4%).106 The report triggered a debate on state funding and the limits of 
state interference in private and religious schools. In this debate, the PVV 
was again strident in its demand that all Islamic schools in the Netherlands 
be closed. The lawful grounds for this abolishment would be that ‘Islam’ is 
not a religion but a political ideology, and as such should not be subsidized 
by the Dutch government.107 Another remarkable plea came from the then 
Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA) who suggested the abolition of the 
‘Islamic pillar’. He warned that this could create a “prison of 
underdevelopment” within this pillar.108 As a result of the public debate, 
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for the first time in Dutch history, the Secretary of State of Education 
introduced a policy of intensified improvement trajectories for weaker 
schools. Despite these measures, the Dutch cabinet remains very reticent 
over interference in confessional schools. 
2.2.3  Housing 
In 2007, Minister Ella Vogelaar of Housing, Neighbourhoods and 
Integration identified forty ‘problem neighbourhoods’ and proposed a 
grand urban renewal project for these areas. Over €250 million were 
invested to improve housing, employment, education, integration and 
security matters in these neighbourhoods. From the start the project had 
been dogged by controversy and financial problems. The list of selected 
neighbourhoods was heavily criticized for being biased and based on old 
and incomplete information. Moreover, partly due to the economic crisis, 
Minister Vogelaar failed to attract housing companies to sponsor the 
project and received harsh criticism for failing to achieve results. The affair 
was extensively discussed in the media and in November 2008, Minister 
Vogelaar resigned when her Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) formally 
withdrew its confidence in her.109 
2.2.4  Employment 
In the employment sector, measures have been taken to facilitate the 
integration and participation of minorities in the labour market. In order to 
enhance equal opportunities the Dutch governmental and semi-
governmental services maintained a policy of ‘positive discrimination’ in 
the employment of underrepresented social groups. This policy aimed at 
promoting access to the political process and to increase the influence of 
these groups on policy-making. In this way, women, disabled people and 
allochtonen (non-Dutch citizens) were considered to have equal access to 
work and influential positions. In the case of job vacancies within the civil 
service an explicit call was made to these social groups to apply and, in the 
case of equal suitability, their appointment was preferred.  
These efforts at positive discrimination have come in for considerable 
criticism. Studies have shown that such measures can also have adverse 
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effects, in that members of ethnic minorities feel that their accomplishments 
are devalued and ascribed to general characteristics (gender, ethnicity) 
rather than personal achievements.110 Half of the target group of minorities, 
especially Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans, are put off once a vacancy 
explicitly calls for ‘allochtonen’ to apply.111  
Recently, the policy of positive discrimination towards these groups 
has changed to a wider policy of diversity. The policy is no longer solely 
targeted at ethnic minorities, but now also includes both socio-
economically disadvantaged and other underrepresented groups in the 
labour market. As such, a policy of broader diversity is pursued by 
encouraging the participation of people of different ages, sexual 
orientation, and different educational levels.112  
2.2.5  Policing 
Over the last few years, a few notable local incidents related to interethnic 
tensions have stirred up political and public debate at the national level. 
Although structural tensions between different ethnic or minority groups 
are present, the scale is limited. Anti-Semitism by means of name-calling, 
for instance by Moroccan or right-wing youths, are recurring events. So is 
the vandalism of synagogues.113 Additionally, some neighbourhoods are 
under special police scrutiny for potential conflict between different local 
groups. One rare example in which riots became a fact is that of the 
neighbourhood Terweijde in the relatively small city of Culemborg. This 
quarter is peopled by large groups of Dutch citizens of Moluccan and 
Moroccan descent. During 2008 and at the end of 2009, clashes between 
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these two groups occurred and resulted in fights and vandalism directed at 
each other and each other’s property. These incidents were taken seriously 
by both media and politicians and again sparked further debate on the state 
of affairs concerning integration. 
However, incidents like these are rare in the Netherlands. In fact, 
research has been carried out as to why these kinds of riots only occur 
incidentally and why potential interethnic conflicts rarely escalate. The 
study concluded that an important factor is that the government’s close 
cooperation with ‘first-line’ services, like partners in the field of social work 
and the police force. Additionally, the de-escalating approach of the Dutch 
police force, combined with prevention, repression, empathy and 
enforcement is decisive.114 In sum, it appears that the government’s policy 
and the police force’s negotiating and understanding attitude towards 
ethnic groups is effective in preventing riots.  
2.2.6  Islamic practices 
An extensive debate has been held in the domain of religious practices. One 
of the questions to attract considerable attention is whether and to what 
extent Muslims should be allowed to wear religious clothing that covers 
the body and/or the face. In mid-2007, Geert Wilders’ party, the PVV, 
initiated a law on the banning of burkas and niqabs in public areas. The 
proposed law received majority support in Parliament. However, before it 
was made law the cabinet fell. In the new government the post of the 
Minister of Integration, which was previously occupied by the right-wing 
Liberal Party (VVD), was now assigned to the Labour Party (PvdA). In her 
first hours as Minister of Integration, Vogelaar declared that “wearing a 
burka in public should very well be possible”.115 With this statement she 
contradicted the PvdA’s support for the burka ban. Part of the new 
coalition agreement had been to enforce a ban on face covering clothes for 
purposes of public order and safety.116 It had been agreed that a general 
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ban on headscarves and burkas would be prepared by the Ministry of 
Education, and that negotiations on a ban in the public transport would be 
discussed.117 However, the PvdA’s Minister of Education was wary of this 
ban and never delivered the bill.118 Also, the public transport sector 
regarded the ban as redundant.119 It was this hesitation on the part of 
public and political bodies that deferred enforcement of the ban during the 
last cabinet of Balkenende (2007–10). 
At the local level, dilemmas arise from this new cabinet stance against 
wearing headscarves or burkas. Some municipalities deny the right to 
social services to women wearing a burka.120 When such a case went to 
court, the Court in Amsterdam judged in favour of the veiled women.121 In 
the case of a swimming pool refusing women wearing covering swim wear, 
the Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (Commission for Equal Treatment, CGB), 
an independent commission overseeing the implementation of the law on 
equal treatment, judged objections to this case as just.122 In public are as  
such as schools and public transport, discussions have arisen about the 
wearing of headscarves or religious crosses on necklaces, and on placing 
Christmas trees in public schools. On some occasions these discussions 
have resulted in house rules banning all kinds of religious symbols.  
In 2004, the VVD Minister of Immigration and Integration (Rita 
Verdonk) visited a meeting of imams when one of the imams refused to 
shake hands with her. According to Imam Ahmad Salam, his religion did 
not allow him to shake hands with women.123 Furthermore he argued that 
Verdonk aimed at coercing Muslims to abandon their religion by telling 
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them how they should experience Islam.124 The incident drew much media 
attention and resurfaced in every debate regarding Muslims, integration or 
non-discrimination. Political parties felt the need to express their point of 
view on the matter and were outspoken in their opinions regarding the 
relationship between Islamic practices and integration. In a particular case 
the Commission for Equal Treatment said that a female Islamic teacher 
should be free to decide whether or not she wants to shake hands with her 
male colleagues. The statement was not met with unanimous agreement 
among the political parties, and the VVD, CDA and PvdA distanced 
themselves from the commission’s statement.125  
A case with comparable characteristics is that of the orthodox Muslim 
lawyer Mohammed Enait, who refused to stand up once the judge entered 
the courtroom. He was reprimanded by the Raad van Discipline, the 
disciplinary council, who considered his behaviour unacceptable.126 In 
response, the PvdA Secretary of State of Justice suggested exploring the 
possibilities to make this an issue of common law – standing up for the 
judge in the courtroom – into formal, written law.127 Both cases regarding 
the tolerance towards Islamic practices reveal the contemporary conflict 
between religious rights and anti-discrimination law versus the hardening 
standpoints of the political parties.  
2.2.7  Freedom of speech 
The changing tone in the discussion on Muslim practices and Muslim 
integration is clearly illustrated by the court case against Wilders (PVV). 
Wilders makes his core business his firm stance against what he refers to as 
the ‘Islamification’ of the Netherlands. In past years, many charges have 
been made against him by groups and individuals who feel discriminated 
against by his statements. In 2008, the Public Prosecutor (Openbaar 
Ministerie (OM)), decided not to prosecute Wilders and to dismiss the 40 
charges against him, on the basis that European law allows public and 
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political debates considerable scope of expression. In this context, the 
Public Prosecutor declared that Wilders had not crossed this line, since his 
remarks concerned Islam as a religion, not Muslims as such.128 In early 
2009, as a result of complaints about the first OM statement, the Court of 
Amsterdam called for the prosecution of Wilders for incitement to hate and 
discrimination against Muslims and their religion, which is forbidden 
under the first article of the Constitution.129 Among other things, Wilders 
was prosecuted for insulting a group and spreading hate.130  
Wilders objected and declared that he considered his statements to be 
“within the context of the public debate”.131 This argument was dismissed 
and the first hearing took place in January 2010. Wilders continuously 
appeals to the freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, referring to 
these as virtues of the Dutch Constitution. The case against Wilders is 
perceived by many as the ultimate test of whether the current freedom of 
speech law in the Netherlands should operate within certain boundaries. 
The court case is ongoing. 
2.3  Concluding remarks 
Generally, two main trends became visible in the Dutch approach towards 
immigrants since the first immigrants arrived after World War II.  
First, Dutch public and political discourse underwent a drastic shift 
in its attitudes towards immigrants. It can be said that the focus and tone of 
the dialogue moved from one end of the spectrum to the other. Up until the 
eighties, the Netherlands pursued a multiculturalist (communitarian) 
approach by which cultural and religious differences were encouraged and 
institutionalized. The climate was characterized by tolerance and respect 
for diversity. Over time however, this multiculturalist model became 
perceived as a threat to social cohesion within society. It so happened that 
this tolerant and conflict-avoiding approach failed to bring about 
integration and widened rather than narrowed the gap between minority 
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groups on the one hand and the dominant culture on the other. During the 
nineties, the focus moved away from the preservation of cultural and 
religious differences towards a demand for integration. Immigrants were 
expected to prove their loyalty to the Netherlands by adopting its culture 
and standards. This trend towards a demand for integration – by some 
perceived as a demand for assimilation – was further accelerated by the 
killings of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004. To a large 
extent, these events changed the debate on immigration into a debate on 
Islam which is increasingly taking on symbolic connotations. Today, the 
right-wing populist agenda dominates political discourse and as a result, 
the social status of Islam in society has become a high priority. Geert 
Wilders has played an important role in advancing this movement towards 
an assimilation perspective, especially in recent years. A tendency towards 
polarization is visible, in which both ends of the spectrum find themselves 
locked in a public confrontation that might well last for a few more years. 
Interestingly, the official policy strategies do not yet reflect the trend 
towards assimilation. Changes have been made, particularly during the 90s 
when the government decided to drastically change its strategy to prevent 
the perceived damage that the multiculturalist model of the 80s had 
inflicted on society. These changes however do not occur with the speed 
and intensity of the public discourse. The current state of policy affairs can 
probably be best described as a hybrid-interculturalist approach by which 
immigrants are expected to integrate but are at the same time allowed to 
maintain elements of their cultural and religious identity. Predominantly, 
policy changes have occurred within the domain of integration and 
citizenship, where increasingly coercive measures can be found that aim to 
integrate immigrants into Dutch society. These measures take the form of 
integration courses and preconditions for immigrants to be allowed to 
become a Dutch citizen. In other domains, few changes have been made. 
To conclude, it can be said that although the debate has toughened 
considerably over the last few years, to a certain extent it appears that the 
Dutch government has been able to withstand populist, right-wing 
demands to delineate the boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The tone of public debate on Muslim integration sometimes offers a 
gloomy outlook for the freedom and rights of Muslims in the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, policy measures on these issues do not mirror the present-
day debate; and continue to reflect a more tolerant attitude. | 55  
 
 
3.  THE COMPLEX COMMUNITY MOSAIC 
IN BELGIUM 
THEODOROS KOUTROUBAS, BENOÎT RIHOUX, 
WARD VLOEBERGHS AND ZEYNEP YANASMAYAN 
Introduction 
The Muslim presence in Belgium dates back to the bilateral labour 
agreements concluded in the 1960s, notably with Morocco and Turkey. 
Even though Belgium ceased these agreements in the 1970s owing to the 
global economic crisis, migration from countries with predominantly 
Muslim populations was sustained through other channels, such as family 
reunification and asylum-seeking.  
The residential distribution of today’s Belgian Muslim communities 
reflects an uneven pattern throughout the country, mostly in former 
industrial zones (Limburg and Charleroi) and large urban areas (Brussels, 
Antwerp, Ghent and Liège). Initially allocated residential housing by the 
state, they gradually moved to other apartments with their families and 
soon enough their own neighbourhoods emerged with a network of 
services, ranging from halal shops to mosques with Koranic schools.132 
Today, various sources estimate that the Muslim communities in 
Belgium number between 400,000 and 600,000 members plus and thus 
constitute approximately 4–6%% of the population of Belgium. These 
estimations are seriously lacking in scientific credibility, however, since the 
country does not include religious affiliation in its official statistics. Most of 
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the figures currently suggested tend to regard all persons with origins in a 
country with a Muslim majority as ‘Muslims’, ignoring the obvious right of 
each person to choose and change his or her religion. Furthermore, citizens 
of Belgian origin having converted to Islam along with children of 
naturalized parents and other categories are not taken into consideration in 
these numbers.133 The same can be said of the great diversity characterizing 
the practice of and the faith in Islam in Belgium. In this chapter, we have 
chosen to use the term ‘Muslim communities’ rather than ‘Muslim 
community’ to underline the importance of that diversity. 
In the following pages we proceed to discuss the institutional context 
relating to the integration of immigrants and to recognition of the Islamic 
religion in Belgium. We then report on the general situation of the Muslim 
communities in Belgium, commenting on a number of policies that are 
important to their general wellbeing and on areas of tension directly related 
to religious practices.  
3.1  Federal legal framework 
3.1.1  Regarding nationality and integration 
Under Belgium’s federal system, the federate entities (communities and 
regions) have many prerogatives, but the constitution has left decision-
making on naturalization to the federal government and parliament. 
According to the Belgian Nationality Code promulgated in 1984 and 
revised several times, a foreign citizen can acquire Belgian nationality after 
just three years of residence in the country – the shortest period of 
residence required for naturalization among the EU member states.  
Belgian naturalization policy has been extremely liberal, and 
citizenship by ‘declaration’ is also extended to anyone who has stayed 
lawfully on Belgian territory for seven years.134 The procedure does not 
involve state discretion: after a foreigner declares him/herself to be 
Belgian, the only public authority involved is the public prosecutor 
(procureur), who needs to issue an opinion within four months. A negative 
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decision needs to be duly justified and be based on the specific case of the 
individual applicant.135 This declaration procedure is currently the most 
frequently used method by foreigners acquiring Belgian nationality.136 The 
issue of dual nationality has never featured in public debate, in contrast to 
the condition of integration. The legislation does not specifically entail an 
integration condition, as this is presumed to be satisfied from the years of 
residence and from the mere fact of applying for naturalization. Prior to the 
amendments introduced by the legislation of 2000,137 proof of the 
‘willingness to integrate’ was sought as a condition for naturalization. In 
practice, this meant proof of sufficient knowledge of one of the three 
official languages (French, Dutch or German). Nevertheless, it was 
criticized for its vagueness and for the contradictory decisions to which it 
led.138 The legislative changes of 2000 can also be explained by 
disagreements between Flemish- and French-speaking parties, in 
connection with the debate on the extension of political rights to non-EU 
nationals. Eventually, the facilitation of naturalization ended the 
deadlock.139  
Yet there is now debate about revoking the reforms of 2000 and 
toughening the conditions for naturalization, in particular by reintroducing 
the requirement for proof of willingness to integrate.140 But the failure of 
subsequent federal governments to stay in power for a full term, as well as 
continuing disagreements between Flemish- and French-speaking parties 
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on these issues, has so far impeded any substantial reform. Even in the 
absence of a government some political parties are advocating tightening 
the conditions for naturalization. 
Since 1994, integration policy has been administered through the 
federal regions.141 The latter have consequently developed different 
measures but more importantly have endorsed different philosophies of 
integration throughout the years. 
The region of Wallonia, which is closer to the French understanding 
of a ‘republican’ order, conceives society more in politico-civil terms and 
avoids addressing immigrants as ethnic communities. Its policies target 
social exclusion without addressing ethnic or religious groups specifically. 
In contrast, Flanders has long acknowledged the existence of ethnic 
minorities and their right to retain their culture. Since the early 1990s, 
Flanders has embraced a minorities’ policy that provides funds for 
integration-specific measures and interest representation by the groups 
themselves. Recently the minorities’ policy has been re-baptized as a 
diversity policy and it has been complemented by measures like those 
found in the Flemish inburgering  [becoming citizens] policy, which puts 
more emphasis on learning the values and language of Flanders.142  
As for the Brussels-Capital region, local authorities are striving to 
develop their own approach by combining elements from all of the 
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available models.143 This prompts the immigrants to go for different forms 
of collective mobilization – stressing either ethnic identity or neutral 
methods of social inclusion.144 The situation in Brussels is also 
interconnected with strategies used by “the political establishment of both 
linguistic groups as contenders in the political field of Brussels”.145 
The region of Flanders thus appears to be the only governance level 
that has a mandatory integration measure, through its policy of inburgering. 
The aim of this policy is to contribute to the recognition of individuals as 
fully-fledged members of society by means of integration trajectories.146 
Newly arrived immigrants in Flanders are entitled (and some are obliged) 
to follow an integration programme, which is composed of language 
courses (Dutch), social orientation and vocational guidance. The 
programme is also complemented by an individual counselling system. The 
target group obliged to take these courses is quite diverse, including 
asylum seekers who submitted their asylum applications over four months 
previously, religious ministers, migrants coming through the channel of 
family reunification and sometimes established residents who depend on 
social assistance.  
Unlike the practice in several other European countries, in Belgium 
there is no official test to assess the knowledge of the participants. The 
immigrants are expected to attend 80% of the courses and are granted their 
certificates accordingly. Failure to attend would result in an administrative 
fine or in the worst case scenario lead to the withdrawal of some social 
benefits, but in spite of some pressures in that direction (e.g. by some local 
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authorities), this does not have any impact on the acquisition of nationality 
or any residence status for that matter.147 
3.1.2  Regarding organized religious communities  
As is the case for the majority of EU member states, Belgium has no 
established or official religion, and “[f]reedom of worship, its public 
practice and freedom to demonstrate one’s opinions on all matters are 
guaranteed”, according to Art. 19 of the Belgian constitution.148 Although 
the separation between church and state is not specifically mentioned in the 
constitution, Art. 21 does stipulate that “[t]he State does not have the right 
to intervene either in the appointment or in the installation of ministers of 
any religion whatsoever or to forbid these ministers from corresponding 
with their superiors [or] from publishing the acts of these superiors”. With 
regard to marriage, the same article makes it compulsory for a civil 
wedding to “always” precede the blessing of the marriage, but not without 
leaving a door open for “exceptions to be established by the law if needed”.  
Because of its political history, however,149 and particularly because 
of the existence of a deep denominational divide (historically the Catholic 
church versus free-thinkers and secularists) that had to be settled by 
successive ‘consociational’ agreements,150 the constitution does have a 
number of provisions relating to faith and ideology that are rather 
uncommon in the fundamental texts of European nations. Thus, Art. 11 
guarantees the “rights and freedoms of ideological and philosophical 
minorities”, but Art. 19 clarifies that “offenses committed when using this 
freedom [of worship]” will be punished, and a special article, Art. 20, is 
there to underline that “[n]o one can be obliged to contribute in any way 
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whatsoever to the acts and ceremonies of a religion or to observe the days 
of rest”.  
In matters of education, also as part of the consociational agreements 
(and unlike neighbouring France), Belgian fundamental law makes clear 
that the “neutral” schooling organized by the community respects the 
“philosophical, ideological or religious conceptions of parents and pupils”. 
It requires that “[s]chools run by the public authorities offer, until the end 
of compulsory education, the choice between the teaching of one of the 
recognized religions and non-denominational moral teaching” (Art. 24). To 
strengthen this even further, another paragraph in the same article 
unequivocally establishes that “[a]ll pupils of school age have the right to 
moral or religious education at the community’s expense”(Art. 24§3).  
Following the same rationale, the remuneration (salaries and 
pensions) of ministers of religion is paid for by the state (Art. 181), as is the 
case in several other EU member states. Less common though is the 
establishment of equality of treatment between religious and “secular” 
ministers in that field, with the latter being defined as “representatives of 
organizations recognized by the law as providing moral assistance 
according to a non-denominational philosophical concept” (Art. 181). 
3.1.3  The representation and rights of the Muslim communities as an organized 
faith 
When Belgium gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1830, the 
majority of the new country’s population was Roman Catholic. Small but 
significant Protestant and Jewish communities were also present along 
with a liberal, secular movement close to Free Masonry and very active at 
the political and academic levels. Hence Roman Catholicism, Protestantism 
and Judaism were the first religions to be recognized by the state, with 
Anglicanism being the fourth one to achieve that status and the privileges it 
entailed in 1870. Indeed, a core element of the Belgian consociational ‘pacts’ 
is that they allow each community (in this case defined in religious or 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t e r m s )  t o  b e  r e c o g n i z e d  a n d  f u n d e d  a s  s u c h ,  o n  t h e  
imperative condition that it be driven by leaders who are conferred the 
legitimacy to represent their fellow believers through a stable organization 
(e.g. a church hierarchy).151 
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Afterwards, Belgium’s religious–philosophical map remained pretty 
much unchanged until the 1960s, with the influx of Muslim immigrants. 
Official recognition of this new and organized religious community 
happened relatively quickly, in 1974, albeit for reasons dictated much more 
by concerns related to the nation’s international relations and to the global 
economic context (the oil crisis of the 1970s).152 
The absence of a central hierarchical authority within the Muslim 
communities was nonetheless a challenge for the administration. For this 
reason, and probably also for considerations linked to diplomacy, the 
government decided to confer to the Centre Islamique et Culturel de 
Belgique153 [Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium], founded by Saudi 
Arabia, the responsibility of being the representative of Islam and of the 
Muslims in Belgium. Financed since 1982 by the Muslim World League, the 
Centre more or less maintained this status until 1990, when successive 
federal administrations launched a number of initiatives with the aim of 
setting up a (totally or partially) elected body to take over from it.  
This eventually led to the establishment of an Exécutif des 
Musulmans de Belgique [Executive Body of the Muslims of Belgium, EMB], 
granted by ministerial decision (1994) and then by royal decree (1998 and 
2005) all competencies normally attributed in the country to the leadership 
of a religious community. These include (among many others) the 
representation of the Muslim communities of Belgium vis-à-vis the Belgian 
authorities and third parties in general, the ‘recognition’ of the new 
mosques and the organization of Muslim religion classes in public schools. 
It should be noted that the concept of recognition only extends to the 
worldly (temporal) aspects of a faith. The objective is obviously to give the 
state an interlocutor rather than to establish a theological authority. The 
governing council (general assembly) of this Muslim executive was elected 
for the first time in December 1998 by a college composed of all persons 
over age 18 who had declared themselves to be Muslim, could prove to 
have resided in Belgium for at least one year and had registered themselves 
to vote. Among them, eligible persons were those who had reached age 25, 
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had been living in Belgium for at least five years, could speak one of the 
national languages of the country (Dutch, French or German), had 
completed secondary education and were not in possession of a diplomatic 
passport. A declaration of loyalty to the constitution and the laws of 
Belgium was also requested of all candidates.  
Yet the division of the EMB into colleges on the basis of ethnic origin 
(Moroccan, Turkish, other nationalities and ‘converted’ persons) has 
compromised the success of the EMB. So too has the role of the ministry 
responsible for religions and of the National Security Office in the process 
of candidature validation, and the lack of consideration for issues such as 
the differences among various schools of thought and traditions (Shia, 
Sunni, Wahhabi, Sufi, etc.).154 
Elections for the renewal of its governing council took place again in 
March 2005, amid accusations of excessive state interference and boycotting 
by a segment of the communities in Brussels. The results reflected the 
success of the mobilization of the Turkish community, achieved with the 
help of Turkey’s diplomatic authorities. They took 40 seats out of 68, with 
the rest divided among the Moroccans (20 seats), the converted (2 seats) 
and those having other national origins (6 seats) – a situation hardly 
representative of the real ‘ethnic’ composition of Belgian Islam, largely 
dominated by Moroccan immigrants and their offspring.155 Among the 
persons of Muslim background in Belgium, only 43,000 voted, a figure that 
is slightly lower than that for the 1998 elections and far from close to the 
real number of those professing the Islamic religion in the country. Most of 
those participating in the elections came from Flanders and Wallonia, while 
the region of Brussels-Capital, where the majority of Belgium’s Muslim 
population is established, was largely underrepresented.  
Facing legitimacy-related challenges, the EMB presidium that came 
out of the 2005 elections had to resign in 2008 following serious allegations 
of financial mismanagement.156 A new president was named by the general 
assembly but the EMB seems to have been too weakened to survive the 
crisis. At the time of writing a number of proposals to the state authorities 
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for a fundamental reorganization of Muslim communities’ representation 
are being studied by the federal minister responsible for religious affairs 
and a debate is underway on this issue within the communities 
themselves.157 
The difficulties of setting up a functional body to act as an official 
porte-parole of the Muslim communities in Belgium has delayed the 
enactment of a number of rights linked to the status of a recognized 
religion, such as the nomination of (state-paid) Muslim chaplains for 
prisons. There are still no Muslim chaplains in the Belgian army, while 
chaplaincies for hospitals and the police are just being organized. With 
regard to Muslim higher education, the Université catholique de Louvain 
has run a programme for the intensive training of future cadres of Muslim 
institutions since 2006, albeit without the approval of the EMB, which was 
actually rather negative about the initiative.158 The Faculty of Islamic 
Sciences of Brussels159 also opened its doors in 2007, proposing a Master’s 
programme recognized by the Islamic University of Rotterdam (private) 
and having a reputation of supporting a rather conservative approach of 
Islam.160 Since there is no federal ministry of education in Belgium, Islamic 
classes at the level of secondary education are the responsibility of the 
federate entities and the municipalities. After a period of some tension in 
the late 1980s, when a number of municipal administrations that had been 
reluctant to provide courses on the Muslim religion in their schools had 
subsequently been forced to do so following irrevocable court judgments,161 
the situation has since normalized everywhere. Even so, while Christian 
and Jewish schools have been functioning for decades, official Islamic 
schools are non-existent and the possibility of opening any remains 
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controversial despite recognition of the need for substantive education at 
both the community and the local authority levels. 
With an officially recognized religion, the Muslim communities in 
Belgium are also entitled to a number of privileges relating to their places 
of worship. According to the latest data provided by the EMB, there are 
currently 328 mosques officially operating in Belgium (162 in Flanders, 89 
in Wallonia and 77 in Brussels-Capital).162 The status of official recognition 
entails the provincial budget taking charge of the imam’s accommodation 
and other material costs (such as building maintenance). Official mosques 
have the obligation to elect a ‘management committee’ and submit their 
budget and annual accounts to the supervision of the local authorities. The 
delay in all things practical concerning the communities’ status has affected 
this aspect as well. Hence, management committees for Walloon mosques 
were only elected in December 2009, and as a consequence Islamic places of 
worship in the territory of this federate entity did not receive any state 
subsidies in 2010.163 
It is interesting to note that Belgium recognizes – and hence 
financially supports – six organized religions: Roman Catholicism, Judaism, 
Protestantism, Anglicanism, Islam and the Orthodox Church (the latter 
since 1985). Organized secularism is also officially recognized and enjoys 
the privileges linked to this status.164 
3.2  The situation of the Muslim communities  
When one talks about Muslim communities in Belgium there seems to be 
an inevitable association with a ‘repli identitaire’, a concept that is best 
translated into English as community withdrawal: a close interaction 
within their own communities and a reluctance to integrate into the 
majority society, or even an opposition to the latter. Residential segregation 
combined with the poor social and cultural capital of the newcomers and 
the economically precarious situation from which they currently suffer is 
believed to be behind this ‘withdrawal’. It is true that these communities 
are heavily marked by the cultural and religious customs of their countries 
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of origin. For instance, in Brussels, where the majority of the Muslim 
communities live, there are neighbourhoods that can be tagged as Turkish 
or Moroccan. Taking the example of the Turkish community, it is safe to 
claim that the attachments to Turkey and to the Turkish neighbourhood in 
which they live remain strong for successive generations and do not 
diminish with the length of residence or with the internal diversity of the 
community.165 This does not impede them from feeling equally close to 
their country of residence, however.166 Kaya and Kentel (2007) also observe 
a transition in the new generations that predisposes moves to transcend the 
boundaries of the community.  
Hence, summing up the Belgian situation in terms of community 
withdrawal would be an oversimplification. As De Changy, Dassetto and 
Maréchal (2006) demonstrate, there is an overall feeling of unease in 
society, emanating from the lack of interaction and the influence of 
misconstructions and stereotyping.167 Different studies conducted at the 
level of individuals draw attention to the need of Muslim communities for 
recognition, a demand that is often identified in the literature by the 
multicultural theorists.168 A number of Belgians of foreign origin reclaim 
their “Belgianness” but report not being treated as such.169 
Foblets et al. (2004),170 looking at three different groups of immigrants 
or Belgians of different ethnic origins (Sub-Saharans, Turks and 
Moroccans), conclude that Belgium is generally perceived to be a 
multicultural society. On the other hand, these three groups also all agree 
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that there is a prevailing understanding in Belgium that confines the 
development of cultural identity to the private sphere. Cultural identity is 
seen as being maintained primarily through non-institutional channels, 
such as family members back in the country of origin (transnational links).  
Muslim communities in Belgium are predominantly urban – 39% of 
all Muslims in Belgium live in Brussels.171 Almost half the entire Moroccan 
population in Belgium is concentrated in only seven municipalities of the 
Brussels-Capital region.172 These communities also face a vulnerable socio-
economic situation: half of Belgian Moroccans, for instance, are estimated 
to be living below the poverty level.173 This is the most important issue that 
needs to be dealt with at a policy level, among other things by facilitating 
more successful education trajectories. 
There are serious indications that these difficult socio-economic living 
conditions, rather than the religious or cultural background, are the main 
explanation for socially deviant behaviour – an issue that remains 
problematic, especially in the cities. At the same time, a perceived 
Islamophobia – more pronounced in Flanders than in other parts of the 
country – increases the impression among Muslim communities that they 
are being systematically tagged and targeted in a negative or racist way.174  
The difficulties engendered by this kind of stigmatization should not 
be underestimated, especially since this feeling is perhaps more 
pronounced among Moroccans born in Belgium (i.e. the second and third 
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generations) than among citizens born in Morocco.175 Moreover, it is a 
phenomenon that transcends the boundaries of Belgium.176 
Disturbingly, having Belgian nationality (roughly 90% of the 250,000 
Moroccans living in Belgium hold a Belgian passport)177 does not seem to 
coincide with increased confidence in Belgian state institutions. In any case, 
only a minority trusts grass roots and civil society associations, even if they 
are staffed by Moroccans or Belgians of Moroccan background. Worse, the 
divide with Belgian society remains considerable for numerous citizens of 
Moroccan background, since about a quarter of respondents residing in 
Flanders declare that they never meet Belgian fellow citizens.178 Belgian-
Turks do not offer a much brighter picture in terms of trust measurements. 
The media, political parties and police rank as the least trusted institutions 
respectively, whereas health and social security institutions emerge as the 
most trusted ones.179 What is more alarming is the rise in the levels of 
perceived discrimination and racism.180  
Notwithstanding such serious ills, as reflected by consistent Human 
Development Index scores, Belgium does have convincing assets that 
appeal to (potential) immigrants. There is still some way to go with regard 
to Belgian Muslims having the sense that they are respected stakeholders of 
Belgian society and its future. This can be facilitated through a range of 
measures, from policies combating unemployment among Belgians of 
ethnic origin to non-discriminatory access to decent housing. Furthermore, 
the positive identification of immigrants from an Islamic cultural 
background with Belgium – currently hindered by a certain opportunism 
and ambiguity181 – can be enhanced by tackling a number of problems 
rigorously. 
Probably the single most important field of action is education, since 
the levels of attainment of higher education are still extremely low for both 
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Turkish and Moroccan communities. In this respect, ensuring the 
availability of and access to high quality education, increasing the chances 
for successful learning and acknowledging the supportive role of parents 
should be(come) top priorities. A focus on education also includes 
strengthening the credibility of schools among Moroccan and Turkish 
communities,182 participation from the kindergarten level onwards (not 
compulsory under Belgian law) and a plurality of cultures in the school 
curricula. 
Notably, among all EU member states, Belgium has the highest 
unemployment figures for non-EU citizens.183 It is particularly worrying 
that naturalization does not help to improve the situation, which hints that 
the problems may be more structural in nature. Launching ‘target figures’ 
and neutral recruitment policies, perhaps in collaboration with empowered 
grass roots organizations, has been advanced as a possible remedy. 
Simultaneously, the public sector has to set an example by increasing the 
number of persons it employs from ethnic minority groups184 and in 
particular Belgian Moroccan women.185 
Finally, since all these aspects are interrelated, measures addressing 
unemployment and housing as well as education and purchasing power 
should be enacted through an integrated approach at a local 
(neighbourhood or commune) level, but needs to be coordinated within a 
corresponding framework that is supported at a broader regional or 
national level (or both). The identification of the most appropriate channels 
to deliver the message needs to take place across all institutions: indeed 
schools and social security services matter much more in everyday life than 
integration policies.  
3.3  Key policy sectors  
3.3.1  Health care 
Generally speaking, health care institutions have to prepare for a growing 
influx of older patients with particular linguistic and religious (including 
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culinary) needs and preferences. An extra effort could be made in this 
respect within hospitals.186 Especially among the elder immigrants, 
language can prove to be a barrier when interacting with doctors and 
nurses. More psychologists of foreign background may also be needed.187 It 
seems that Muslims do not want facilities of their own but rather prefer 
that the existing health care system be inclusive of patients regardless of 
faith. This may also apply to other policy fields.  
3.3.2  Housing 
While Brussels has long attracted a large number of nationalities, the dense 
ethnic ghettos are exceptions. These exceptions nevertheless tend to be 
highly problematic and often make (inter)national news. Yet generally 
speaking, urban planning and growth has generated a surprisingly diverse 
population in the Belgian capital with many nationalities sharing limited 
public space. In addition, there are concentrations of ethnic minorities in 
some cities in Limburg and in some neighbourhoods of large cities such as 
Ghent and Antwerp.188 Implementing a sustained policy favouring 
residential blending189 therefore remains an important effort, if only to 
combat discriminatory practices in the housing market – which have 
surfaced in Flanders vis-à-vis immigrants who do not speak Dutch. 
Gentrification policies are now actively applied, mostly in major cities such 
as Ghent, Antwerp and Brussels, so as to (re)shape urbanization in 
‘difficult’ city areas. 
3.3.3  Employment 
The most intractable unemployment problems in the country concern low-
skilled labourers and the long-term unemployed. Structural weaknesses in 
these respects overshadow the high unemployment rates among some 
ethnic groups in some urban centres. As a consequence, affirmative action 
is concentrated on the unemployed, be they ethnic minorities or not. 
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among persons from non-EU countries 
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is five times higher than that of EU citizens,190 with the highest figures for 
youth of foreign backgrounds (among whom are young Muslims) in 
Brussels.191 
Authorities at various levels are committed to reflecting the 
proportion of immigrants in the body of civil servants they employ 
(through a diversity policy), and quite progressive anti-discrimination laws 
do exist. But the facilitation of the naturalization procedure (as discussed 
above) makes it much more difficult for ‘new’ Belgian citizens to have their 
complaints registered, and no stringent quota can be imposed in the private 
sector. Still, the (state-funded) Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism192 has been active as an advocacy group with a strong 
impact on policy issues. 
3.4  Current tensions 
We now turn to survey several issues that have stirred the most 
controversy. 
3.4.1  Islamic headscarf  
Wearing the Islamic head covering during school hours or while working 
in the public sector is currently the most controversial issue relating to 
Belgium’s Muslim communities. In Brussels and Wallonia, the absence of 
coordination or sometimes agreement between municipal and regional 
authorities on a clear policy concerning the right of pupils and teachers to 
wear visible symbols of their religious or ideological beliefs in class has 
somehow aggravated the existing tension between advocates and 
opponents of the hijab. 
For instance, when a maths teacher decided to teach her classes while 
wearing an Islamic headscarf, the municipality in turn decided to forbid 
her from doing so and consequently fired her when she refused to follow 
this rule. The municipality’s actions were found to be illegal by the court, 
on the grounds that such a prohibition could only derive from a general 
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policy adopted by the ministry of education of the French-speaking 
community. The teacher thus returned to her school, only to be fired again 
once a consensus was reached among Walloon political parties to ban the 
wearing of religious symbols by school staff during working hours. Such a 
prohibition had already been applied in Flanders. At the time of writing, a 
number of municipalities, in both Brussels and Flanders, forbid members of 
their staffs who are in contact with the population from wearing religious 
symbols.193 
A more prominent case was that of Mahinur Özdemir, a young 
female candidate of Turkish origin in the Brussels regional elections in June 
2009. Wearing an Islamic headscarf on the campaign posters and in all her 
public appearances, she was elected as a regional MP for the CDH party 
(formerly the French-speaking Christian Democrats). There was some 
controversy over the fact that photographs of her on posters and other 
campaign material made her religious headscarf less visible.194 The new 
rules of the assembly, requiring Ms Özdemir to co-chair the first session as 
the youngest female member alongside a veteran, female French-speaking 
MP (Antoinette Spaak), a vocal opponent of religious symbols in public 
functions, brought further heated discussions. Eventually, the argument 
that an MP cannot, by definition, be asked to be neutral in matters of 
religion prevailed and – in a typically Belgian way – it was Ms Spaak’s 
insistence on addressing the (bilingual) house solely in French rather than 
Ms Özdemir’s covered head that was criticized the most.195 In the months 
that followed, the young Muslim MP remained largely unnoticed by the 
media, with the exception of a debate during which her strong anti-
homosexual views where actively challenged by a female colleague (of 
Moroccan origin).  
3.4.2  The proposed ‘burka’ law 
In April 2010, the Belgian federal parliament (lower house) almost 
unanimously adopted a bill aimed at prohibiting the public wearing of 
clothes that make impossible the identification of the person. At the time of 
writing, this proposal has yet to be approved by the senate and 
promulgated by the king in order to become legally binding. The collapse 
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of the federal government, which triggered new general elections in June 
2010, has considerably delayed that process. This situation has also given 
rise to doubts about the final realization of the bill, since opinions differ on 
whether the newly elected parliament should vote again on the issue before 
the transfer of the proposal to the senate.196 
Covering one’s face in a way that makes it unidentifiable was already 
prohibited by most municipalities in Belgium (but without being a criminal 
offence) with the exception of the period of carnival festivities. Measures to 
clarify that this prohibition explicitly includes Islamic women’s clothing 
completely covering a person were requested by a municipal councillor in 
the city of Brussels. Besides a demonstration called by the ‘Muslim Rise’ 
association and not authorized by the city of Brussels because of a high risk 
of counter-demonstration and a long-scheduled, annual outdoors event 
taking place the same day,197 no great tension has been observed among the 
different components of Belgium’s intercultural mosaic on the issue, except 
some threats by an obscure fundamentalist group.198 
3.4.3  Ritual sacrifices 
Most of the municipalities with a significant Muslim population are putting 
their abattoirs at the disposal of the Islamic community. In addition, in 
those areas with large Muslim communities, ad hoc abattoirs are set up for 
the occasion of Eid al-Adha, along with provisional markets for lambs. In 
general, during the last five years the ‘feast of the sacrifice’ has taken place 
in a rather orderly way everywhere in the country.199 The decision of some 
municipal councils to put special containers at the disposal of the 
population in neighbourhoods with a significant North African or Turkish 
presence continues to cause controversy, however, as several 
environmentally minded associations point out that this encourages the old 
(and unlawful) habit of slaughtering an animal in private homes.200 
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3.4.4  Mosques, minarets and calls to prayer 
Only 16 of the 328 mosques officially operating in Belgium have a minaret 
(8 in Wallonia, 2 in Brussels and 6 in Flanders).201 According to an online 
opinion poll202 carried out almost immediately after the referendum on the 
prohibition of the construction of new minarets in Switzerland, 59.3% of 
Belgians would support a ban on minaret building. Another 56.7% of 
Belgians would oppose the building of new mosques in their vicinity (and 
the country in general). Among the 38% of those who would not have a 
problem seeing new minarets being erected, 44% are Walloons, 34.3% 
Flemings and 40.3% live in the Brussels-Capital region. In addition, 55.4% 
affirmed that the “Islamic religion is not well integrated in Belgium”.  
On the ground, despite occasional controversies over plans for the 
construction of mosques, minarets or the installation of megaphones for the 
calls to prayer, both the Muslim communities concerned and the parties 
opposed to their projects peacefully use legal routes to advance their 
arguments and respect the final decisions of the authorities. The latter 
usually try to give fair consideration to the positions of all sides. Such has 
been the case, for instance, in a highly salient (though local) controversy 
over the construction of a mosque in Bastogne (Wallonia), where the 
Walloon minister in charge validated a compromise proposal submitted by 
the architect selected by the Turkish community: building a mosque, but no 
minaret. In several other Walloon municipalities, for some years the 
muezzin’s calls to prayer from the top of the minaret have seemed to 
constitute an integral part of everyday life, making the mayors proud of 
their town’s exemplary spirit of tolerance and coexistence.203 
In that context, it is interesting to recall that those opposed to the 
construction of minarets at the local level are not necessarily ‘Islamophobic’ 
or supporters of extreme right-wing ideas. Indeed, some prominent Belgian 
Muslims, including some converts to Islam, have publicly taken a position 
against the erection of minarets for the new mosques, as they view this as 
an obstacle to the effort of making people understand the universality and 
openness they feel is at the centre of their religion.204 
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3.5  Concluding remarks: Muslim communities at the margins of 
a segmented society 
The wave of Muslim immigration of the 1960s and 1970s has since become 
an enduring and well-identified component of Belgian society – mostly 
concentrated in urban areas. Two generations later, Muslim communities in 
Belgium still face many challenges, and in many ways have a long way to 
go to be fully accepted in Belgian society as well as in the country’s 
institutions. In summarizing these difficulties, they can be grouped into 
three core dimensions. 
First, with regard to the country’s divided structure and institutional 
practices, even before the arrival of Muslim populations Belgium was a 
complex and ‘segmented’ society. Each major societal cleavage has 
crystallized in durable organizations and institutions, particularly the 
ethno-linguistic divide (between Dutch and French speakers), the 
denominational split (mainly Catholics versus ‘free thinkers’) and the 
strong divisions among political parties, with each major party (Socialists, 
Christian Democrats and Liberals) developing its own ‘pillar’ consisting of 
various powerful organizations. Therefore, Belgians of Muslim background 
are asked to choose sides and to fully integrate. For instance, given the high 
saliency of the language issue in Flemish society, the acquisition of 
language skills is viewed as a central element in the integration policy205 
(hence those ‘new Belgians’ who do not become proficient in Dutch are 
perceived as being responsible for their own lack of integration and lower 
socio-economic status).206 Yet this is much less the case on the Francophone 
side.  
Second, in terms of the institutional recognition of religions or 
confessional communities, Islam still lies at the periphery. It has 
encountered a ‘fixed menu’, which has been established since the 19th 
century to accommodate the conflicting interests of the powerful Catholic 
church, the broad atheist and secularist circles, as well as smaller religious 
communities (Jewish, Protestant, Orthodox and Anglican). This 
institutional formula has forced Islam to institutionalize following rigid 
rules, so that it could eventually be ‘co-opted’ as a recognized religion – 
and then gain access to various state benefits and considerations. This 
process has proved very problematic, however, not least because of the 
                                                      
205 Clycq (2010), op. cit., p. 57. 
206 Casier and Zemni (2010), op. cit., p. 14. 76 | KOUTROUBAS, RIHOUX, VLOEBERGHS & YANASMAYAN 
fragmented nature of Muslim communities in terms of national origin (e.g. 
Turks versus Moroccans) and traditions of observance (Shia, Sunni, 
Wahhabi, Sufi, etc.).  
Third and finally, Muslim communities in Belgium (as well as 
individuals of Muslim descent who, even if secularized, are still identified 
as Muslim) are still doubly marginalized, in both socio-cultural and socio-
economic terms. Concerning identity, while a majority of Belgian Muslims 
feels ‘Belgian’, a predominance of non-Muslim Belgians still perceives them 
as ‘alien’. There are also deep prejudices against Islam in general, 
reinforced by radical populist parties (especially in Flanders). Muslims also 
score much lower in educational achievements and socio-economic status, 
resulting in a ‘ghettoization’ of some city areas. Naturally, various policy 
responses have been launched, especially in larger cities, but so far the 
results have not met expectations. An additional structural problem is that 
the policy packages differ a great deal among Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels. 
Indeed, Belgian society comprises many cultures and communities, 
but they co-exist in a mosaic in which each community is guaranteed some 
basic rights as well as some share of public resources. There are actually 
very few historical examples of ‘integration’ – the notable exception being 
Italians in Wallonia, but the latter were either practising Catholics or active 
atheists close to left-wing circles, and therefore they could swiftly be 
absorbed by the respective societal ‘pillars’.  
Hence, today’s Belgian Muslims are still very much on the societal 
margins, in many ways: socio-economically, culturally, politically and 
institutionally. To bring about change, some suggest that there is a need for 
an emerging group of young critical Muslims, as indeed younger 
generations born in Belgium do not always share the opinions of the imams 
and representatives speaking for ‘them’. Others stress the need to foster the 
development of a group of youngsters of Muslim background with 
successful school achievements, who subsequently could go on to occupy 
important positions in the labour market and constitute role models. Apart 
from the imperative of increased opportunities for employment and social 
mobility, it is also essential for these communities to go beyond some 
traditional views and practices that, among many other factors, contribute 
to keeping them largely segregated from the ever more secularized 
‘mainstream’ of Belgian society.   | 77  
 
 
4.  HAS MULTICULTURALISM COMPLETELY 
FAILED IN GERMANY? 
NINA MÜHE AND ANDREAS HIERONYMUS 
Introduction 
This chapter about Muslims in Germany is based on data from the “At 
Home in Europe” project of the Open Society Institute (OSI). It reflects 
findings of the two city reports on Hamburg and Berlin,207 compares the 
respective situations of the Muslim community together with the specific 
policy measures for integration and situates them within the overall 
German context. 
A study that places its focus on Muslims as a group faces the 
challenge that Muslims are not a fixed group with defined boundaries, but 
rather a diverse set of individuals with different religious practices, ethnic 
attachments, and linguistic and cultural backgrounds.208  
                                                      
207 See A. Hieronymus, At Home in Europe, Muslims in Hamburg, Open Society 
Institute (OSI), New York, London, Budapest, 2010; see also N. Mühe (2010), At 
Home in Europe, Muslims in Berlin, Open Society Institute, New York, London, 
Budapest, 2010. 
208 The terms ‘background’ and ‘migrant background’ are used consistently 
throughout this chapter, as these are officially used terms for data collection in the 
context of the migration of parents or grandparents to the respondents’ country of 
birth or current residence. The authors are nonetheless aware of the danger of a 
continuous marking of the migrant population as ‘others’ through these terms, and 
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In contrast to other recently published studies209 on migrants and 
Muslims, the OSI study focuses on their everyday life experiences, as well 
as the policy implications in two urban settings in Germany – Berlin–
Kreuzberg and Hamburg–Mitte. These two districts have undergone 
fundamental changes and are home to large shares of the Muslim 
communities in Berlin and Hamburg.  
Berlin, with 3.34 million inhabitants, and Hamburg, with 1.72 million, 
are the largest cities in Germany. The population holding a foreign 
passport is slightly higher in Hamburg (14.3%)210 than in Berlin (13.9%).211 
Compared with other German cities, Hamburg and Berlin have a medium-
sized foreign population.212 Public data up to 2005 only distinguished 
between inhabitants with German citizenship (Germans) and those without 
it (foreigners). In 2005 the Federal Statistical Office changed the method of 
counting the population in the micro-census,213 introducing the concept of a 
                                                      
209 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), Religion Monitor 2008, Muslim Religiousness in 
Germany, Overview of Religious Attitudes and Practices, Gütersloh, 2008; see also S. 
Beck and T. Perry, “Migranten-Milieus. Erste Erkenntnisse über Lebenswelten und 
wohnungsmarktspezifische Präferenzen von Personen mit Migrationshintergrund 
in Deutschland” [Migrants’ milieu. Initial findings on specific lifestyles and house 
preferences of persons with migrant backgrounds in Germany], vhw FW 4, July–
September 2007. 
210 Derived from the Hamburg Action Plan on Integration (HHAP), p. 10. For more 
basic information about Hamburg, see the website of the Statistical Office of 
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (http://www.statistik-nord.de/uploads/ 
tx_standocuments/Stadtportrait_2009_Englisch_01.pdf).  
211 Derived from Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg [State Statistical Institute 
Berlin-Brandenburg] (http://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de); situation as of 
30 June 2007. 
212 See the journal Hamburger Abendblatt, 2 July 2008. When comparing cities in 
Germany, the German federal structure has to be taken into consideration. 
Hamburg and Berlin are both cities and federal states (Stadtstaaten). Compared 
with other federal states, the share of foreigners is high. When compared with 
cities in other states (Länder), however, it is low. 
213 In comparison with a full census, the micro-census surveys are only a 
representative sample of 1% of the households in Germany, covering 390,000 
households with 830,000 persons (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikrozensus, in 
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‘migrant background’.214 Using this new methodology, the micro-census 
revealed that 26.8% of the population in Hamburg and 24% of that in Berlin 
has a migrant background.215  
4.1  Muslims in Berlin and Hamburg – Basic facts 
Migration has always played an important role in shaping the faces of both 
Berlin and Hamburg. The city of Hamburg and its evolution over an 
extensive period have been inseparably connected to migration movements 
long before guest-worker recruitment started at the end of the 1950s. In the 
19th century, the nearby harbour was a main point of emigration from 
Europe.  
Before the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Berlin was especially 
marked by internal German migration from the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR).216 The growing German economy, owing to the 
reconstruction of large parts of the worn-torn country and the lack of 
skilled workers from the GDR after the wall was built, led to labour 
recruitment contracts with Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, 
Tunisia and Yugoslavia. This new immigration phase was dominated by 
working people from countries with Muslim-majority populations and it 
officially lasted until 1973.  
After the building of the Berlin Wall, many firms and their personnel 
migrated out of Berlin to West Germany. Berlin’s return to being the capital 
                                                      
214 For the definition of this new concept, the official statistical information 
available on the time of immigration, citizenship and naturalization of the 
interviewee and his or her parents is used. There is only a distinction between the 
first and second generations because of the apparent difficulty of making an exact 
statistical distinction between the second and the third generations. Lastly, the 
Federal Statistical Office assumes that all foreigners and all those who are 
naturalized, as well as their children, have a migrant background. See Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005 
[Population with an immigrant background – Results of the 2005 micro-census 
2005], Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2 [Specialist Series 1, Series 2.2], p. 5. 
215 See the Hamburg Action Plan on Integration, p. 10 and Amt für Statistik Berlin-
Brandenburg, Press Release No. 297, 15 September 2009 (http://www.statistik-
berlin-brandenburg.de/pms/2009/09-09-15c.pdf). 
216 R. Ohliger and U. Raiser, Integration und Migration in Berlin. Zahlen-Daten-Fakten, 
Commissioner of the Berlin Senate for Integration and Migration, Berlin, 2005, p. 
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of Germany after the fall of the wall in 1989 did not lead to a reversal of this 
process. From the 1960s onwards the population of Hamburg also 
continually decreased, to the point that its size in the middle of the 1980s 
was similar to that of the 1950s. Immigration was therefore needed to 
stabilize the cities’ populations.  
In the 1990s immigration was dominated by asylum seekers from 
E a s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  f r o m  w a r - t o r n  c o u n t r i e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  f o r m e r  
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. Together with the 
immigration of German resettlers (Aussiedler) from the former Soviet Union 
and inner-German migration from East to West after the reunification, the 
populations of Hamburg and Berlin, and especially the Muslim segment, 
increased considerably.  
A combination of policies pursued by city planning, cheaper rents 
and the growing structures of ethnic economies (supplying specific food as 
well as religious and cultural infrastructure) facilitated the settlement of 
immigrants in West Berlin. This was particularly so in the inner city 
districts of Kreuzberg, Wedding and Neukölln.217  
There are no official statistics on the number of Muslims in Berlin and 
Hamburg, but there is a wide range of proxies – for instance nationality, 
name or place of birth – that are unofficially used to obtain ethnic or 
religious information.218 The largest group within the overall Muslim 
                                                      
217 For a differentiated discussion of the advantages and challenges of ethnically 
segregated districts and quarters, see A. Kapphan, “Migration und 
Stadtentwicklung. Die Entstehung ethnischer Konzentrationen und ihre 
Auswirkungen” [Migration and city development. The emergence of ethnic 
concentration and its effects], in F. Gesemann (ed.), Migration und Integration in 
Berlin. Wissenschaftliche Analysen und politische Perspektiven [Migration and 
integration in Berlin. Scientific analyses and political perspectives], Opladen: Leske 
+ Budrich, 2001, pp. 89–108. 
218 A 2009 survey published on Muslim life in Germany, commissioned by the 
German Islam Conference and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF), comes to the conclusion that looking only at countries of origin of 
migrants to detect their religion might be misleading. It compared the numbers 
given by the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The 2008 World 
Factbook, CIA, Langley, VA, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
download/download-2008/index.html), which takes the national religious 
composition of Muslim countries to calculate the size of the Muslim population, 
with the figures of its own study and concluded that the religious composition in 
the country of origin does not reflect the religious composition in Germany 
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population of Germany is composed of migrants from Turkey or their 
families, who are estimated to make up one-third of all German Muslims.219  
The Afghan diaspora in Germany is the largest in Europe,220 and 
there is also a significant number of Pakistani immigrants to the country, as 
well as Indonesians and refugees from the former Yugoslavia and the 
Balkans. Most of the latter are Muslims arriving from Albania and the 
former Yugoslav republics. In 2002, the German-Arab population was 
approximately 290,000, of whom 60,000 were Palestinians. Beyond the 
group of labour migrants from Morocco and Tunisia, most of the Arab 
immigrants arrived in Germany as refugees or asylum seekers.221  
According to a survey about Turks in Germany from 2001,222 the 
differences within the Muslim community can be described as follows: 63% 
are Sunni Muslims,223 12% are Alevi,224 2% are Shia Muslims and 7% are 
Yezidi, Assyrian or Armenian Christians.  
                                                                                                                                       
because the migration pattern of the religious groups is often very different. See S. 
Haug, A. Stichs and S. Müssig, “Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland”, in Auftrag 
der Deutschen Islam Konferenz. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Bundesamt 
für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Nürnberg, 2009, p. 85. This hints at the problem of 
the lack of religious and ethnic data. 
219 J. Blaschke, “Tolerated but Marginalised – Muslims in Germany”, in M. Anwar, 
J. Blaschke and A. Sander (eds), State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities: Sweden, 
Great Britain and Germany,  Edition Parabolis Verlagsabteilung im Europäischen 
Migrationszentrum (EMZ), Kempten, 2004, p. 78. 
220 Ibid., p. 88. 
221 E. Schmidt-Fink, “Schwerpunkt: Araber in Deutschland” [Focal point: Arabs in 
Germany], Ausländer in Deutschland [Foreigners in Germany], Jg. 17, Nr. 2, 2001. 
222 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Türken in Deutschland – Einstellungen zu Staat 
und Gesellschaft [Turks in Germany – Attitudes towards state and society], Working 
Paper, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, 2001, p. 3. 
223 Notably, Haug et al. (2009, op. cit., p. 97) count 74.1% Sunnis. 
224 Alevis are a cultural and religious minority in Turkey, who, because of their 
heterodox tenets, have been persecuted from the time of Ottoman rule until today. 
Therefore, Alevis did not outwardly identify themselves as such. Since the 1960s, 
Alevis have been coming to Germany as working migrants, like other Turks. After 
an era of dissimulation, Alevis started a revival of their identity in both Turkey and 
Germany. See M. Sökefeld, “Einleitung: Aleviten in Deutschland – von takiye zur 
alevitischen Bewegung”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland. 
Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora, Transkript, Bielefeld, 
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The number of Muslims in Berlin was estimated at 212,723 in January 
2005, representing about 6% of the population, while Muslims in Hamburg 
were estimated at more than 90,000. The Muslim population makes up 
around a third of the population in the districts in both Berlin and 
Hamburg where the OSI research was carried out, the large majority 
having a Turkish background, followed by considerable numbers of people 
from Arab countries, Afghanistan and Bosnia.  
The majority of the Muslim religious centres in Germany are 
organized along national lines and about half of the communities in Berlin 
are members of one of the national or local umbrella organizations.225 
Hamburg has a reputation as a refuge for religious minorities. One of 
the oldest Muslim organizations in Germany, the Islamic Centre of 
Hamburg, was founded there. The shura, a council of Muslim communities 
in Hamburg, was established in 1999 and survived the hard times in the 
aftermath of 9/11. 
Outside the media and public discourse, everyday contact between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the cities seems to be quite good. Muslims 
tend to feel safer and more comfortable in the inner city districts under 
study, Wilhelmsburg, Veddel and St. Pauli in Hamburg and Kreuzberg in 
Berlin, where a high percentage of the inhabitants are immigrants and the 
non-immigrant population is perceived to be tolerant. Fear of encountering 
far-right extremism and violence in general, and Islamophobic attitudes in 
particular, is much higher in other parts of the town, notably in the former 
eastern quarters of Berlin.226  
The following section analyses the similarities and differences 
between the two cities in relation to the social situation of the Muslim 
communities, as well as the local policy sets concerned with it and how 
these differences and similarities relate to the rest of Germany.  
                                                                                                                                       
2008, p. 7; see also in the same work, B. Hendrich, “Alevitische Geschichte erinnern 
– in Deutschland”, p. 37. 
225 R. Spielhaus, “Organisationsstrukturen islamischer Gemeinden” 
[Organizational structures of Islamic communities], in F. Spielhaus, Islamic 
Community Life in Berlin, Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt–
Universität zu Berlin, 2007, pp. 12-17. 
226 OSI held focus groups and completed questionnaires with Muslim participants 
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4.2  Policy regimes in Berlin and Hamburg 
4.2.1  Civic status: Residence, naturalization and citizenship  
Considerable changes were made to the national citizenship law in 1999, 
when the first aspects of jus soli were introduced to the understanding of 
nationality and Germany was officially recognized as being an immigration 
country. Consequently, the children who are born in Germany to 
immigrant parents can become German citizens. This was an important 
legal step away from a purely ethnic understanding of nationality and 
towards the equality of all inhabitants before the law. The conditions for 
naturalization and other political regulations on migration and integration 
make it evident, however, that national politics are still very much 
dominated by an assimilationist approach.  
In Hamburg and Berlin, local initiatives and policy measures can be 
found that aim at the inclusion of Muslims and individuals with migrant 
backgrounds in spite of the barriers of naturalization rules and laws. It can 
thus be stated that at the local level, where the question of citizenship can 
become an important issue of democratic legitimization in elections, if the 
non-German population reaches high percentages, politics attempts to 
move away from assimilationist and towards hybrid intercultural policies. 
According to estimates of the ministry of the interior, 480,000 of the 
3.2 million persons of Muslim background living in Germany have German 
citizenship227 and approximately 1 million of Turkish origin hold a German 
passport.228  
Since 1999–2000, the children of non-German citizens born in 
Germany have had access to German citizenship, subject to fulfilling 
certain requirements.229 Yet for those born before 2000, access to citizenship 
                                                      
227 Blaschke (2004), op. cit., p. 74. 
228 See the speech by Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in Ankara 
on 4 February 2008, on the website of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – Turkey Office 
(http://www.kas.de/proj/home/events/44/1/veranstaltung_id-29262/ 
index.html). 
229 A precondition for the children’s naturalization by birth is a legal and unlimited 
residence permit being held by at least one of the parents for at least eight years. 
When aged 18–23, the child has to decide whether to adopt German or another 
nationality. This requirement is challenged by several jurists, however, who doubt 
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remains more difficult, because new rules and regulations increasingly 
stress the economic potential of those aspiring to immigration and 
naturalization.230  
Other barriers to naturalization are local and national integration 
tests, like the one in Baden–Württemburg,231 which reportedly excludes 
Muslims. Even the national test, which is applied in Hamburg and Berlin, is 
viewed as reflecting certain preconceived attitudes towards Muslims.232 
Germany has also introduced language proficiency tests for spouses 
wishing to join their partners. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary 
language skills in rural areas of Turkey, combined with the fact that such 
requirements are not applicable to citizens from the US or Japan, have 
increased perceptions that the test is aimed at preventing family reunion 
and migration from Turkey. 
This perception of exclusionary treatment is also one of several 
possible explanations for the decline since 2000 in the numbers of migrants 
seeking naturalization, particularly among those with a Muslim 
background. The number of naturalizations could be doubled if the 
regulations allowed dual citizenship.233 In 2008, around 94,500 foreigners 
                                                                                                                                       
its compatibility with the German constitution, which generally does not allow the 
deprivation of citizenship in Art. 16 GG. 
230 Those born before 2000 had the possibility for one year to additionally choose 
German nationality if they were under ten years old. 
231 For a detailed critique of the naturalization test, see C. Joppke, “Beyond national 
models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, West 
European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, Routledge, 2007, p. 15.  
232 Question 295 of the test asks: Which religion has informed the European and 
German culture? (Welche Religion hat die europäische und deutsche Kultur geprägt?). 
Only one answer can be selected among the following: 1) Hinduism, 2) 
Christianity, 3) Buddhism, and 4) Islam. For a general catalogue of all examination 
questions permitted for use within the national naturalization test, see the 




233 S. Worbs, “Die Einbürgerung von Ausländern in Deutschland” [Naturalization 
of foreigners in Germany], BAMF Working Paper No. 17, Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Nürnberg, 2008 (http://www.bamf.de/cln_180/ 
nn_432740/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Migration/Publikationen/Forschung/ 
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were naturalized nationwide. This is a decrease of 16% in comparison with 
2007.  
In Berlin, the naturalization rates for immigrants show an extreme 
drop – from over 12,000 naturalizations per year in 1998 and 1999 to 6,730 
in the year 2000.234, 235 Even if there has been an increase in the rate since 
2005, which is partially ascribed to Berlin’s naturalization campaign, the 
numbers of former Turkish nationals becoming German citizens dropped 
from 7,398 in 1999 to 2,350 in 2006, which can mainly be attributed to the 
abolition of dual citizenship.236 
In Hamburg, the decrease compared with 2007 was even higher than 
the national one, at 31%.237 The number of naturalizations has declined 
since 2002, after peaking at the end of Hamburg’s first ‘Red–Green’ 
government238 in 2000, which had run a naturalization campaign at that 
time. In 2006 the numbers increased slightly.239 
The Hamburg Action Plan on Integration (HHAP) states that 
comprehensive legal and political equality can only be achieved through 
naturalization,240 which is seen as a meaningful step in the process of 
integration. It is in the interest not only of the individual migrant but also 
                                                                                                                                       
WorkingPapers/wp17-einbuergerung,templateId=raw,property= 
publicationFile.pdf/wp17-einbuergerung.pdf).  
234 Derived from Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (http://www.statistik-berlin.de).  
235 The large drop in the number of naturalizations can also be attributed to the fact 
that from August 1999 onwards Aussiedler [ethnic German ‘resettlers’ from Eastern 
Europe] were no longer counted in these statistics but were automatically granted 
citizenship with their immigration and recognition as Aussiedler.  
236 S .  S t a l i n s k i ,  “ N u r  w e n i g e  T ü r k e n  wollen deutschen Pass – Piening erwartet 
weiter sinkende Einbürgerungen” [Only a few Turks want a German passport – 
Piening counts on dropping naturalization numbers], Der Tagespiegel, 11 July 2007 
(http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/;art270,2337881).  
237 Federal Statistical Office, Press Release No. 223, Wiesbaden, 12 June 2009.  
238 The ‘Red–Green’ government was comprised of Social Democrats (SPD – Social 
Democratic Party of Germany) and the Hamburg Green Party (GAL – Green 
Alternative List). 
239 See the Hamburg Action Plan on Integration, 2007, p. 42. 
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of the state to achieve a high degree of congruence between individuals 
(Staatsvolk) and the population, according to the German constitution.241 
Nevertheless, national politics are sometimes perceived to represent 
an opposing perspective. Instead of acknowledging naturalization as the 
necessary requirement for integration, it is seen by conservatives as the last 
step of successful integration.242 
In an effort to reduce the inherent conflict between these two political 
positions – naturalization as a prerequisite versus a reward for integration 
– in Hamburg there has been a political attempt to at least symbolically 
increase the value of naturalization. Since November 2006, naturalization 
has no longer been solely an administrative act, but an official ceremony 
that takes place in the town hall each year.243 
4.2.2  Consultative structures 
At the national level the dialogue with and inclusion of Muslim 
organizations is still only beginning. The German Islam Conference 
(Deutsche Islamkonferenz, DIK), introduced by the federal minister of the 
interior in 2007, has not yet led to official acknowledgement of the religion 
of Islam in Germany. While the first steps have been taken to reach this 
aim, it is the government that determines the invitees of the conference as 
well as the issues to be discussed. 
Although great hopes were raised when the DIK was launched, it has 
not been able to define an equal status for Islam, thus leading to a new 
social contract and eventually a new representative body for German 
Muslims.  
One area of criticism centres on the government’s top-down approach 
and the lack of transparency and genuine dialogue with organizations 
represented at the DIK. The federal ministry of the interior decides not only 
who participates and the issues discussed, but also selects chairpersons for 
the working groups and finalizes all protocols. The selection of participants 
                                                      
241 See Art. 20, Abs. 2, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [German 
constitution] (http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/ 
grundgesetz/gg_02.html). 
242 See “Lammert-wirbt-bei-Migranten-fuer-Einbuergerung”,  Welt-online, 14 
February 2010 (http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6390232/ 
Lammert-wirbt-bei-Migranten-fuer-Einbuergerung.html). 
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representing German Muslims has been particularly controversial. In the 
first round, half the delegates and in the second round one-third were 
representatives of the main Muslim organizations in Germany. The other 
half or two-thirds respectively consisted of government-selected ‘experts’, 
who were meant to represent the non-organized part of the Muslim 
population and which included a large number of former Muslims with 
strongly critical views towards Islam.  
More resentment has been provoked by the decision of the new 
federal minister of the interior to exclude a large organization of Turkish 
origin, Milli Görüsm, along with its umbrella organization Islamrat [Islamic 
Council], one of the member organizations of the KRM [Coordination 
Council of Muslims], the latter being the major umbrella of Muslim 
organizations in Germany. The minister justified this exclusion on the 
grounds of preliminary investigations by the public prosecution of 
suspicions of tax fraud, forming a criminal organization and money 
laundering. Following this exclusion, another large umbrella organization – 
the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland [Central Council of Muslims in 
Germany], also a member of the KRM – refused to continue participating in 
the conference, which left the second round of the DIK quite imbalanced in 
relation to the presence of Muslim representatives.244 
At the local level the city administrations in both Hamburg and 
Berlin have made significant efforts to include Muslims and Muslim 
organizations in policy debates and to support their participation in society 
and its institutions. Hamburg is emphasizing the positive contribution of 
migrant communities to city life and the importance of policies that are 
mutually inclusive and reinforcing.  
Hamburg has also fostered dialogue with the chief Muslim 
representatives from the shura on the creation of a legal instrument that 
gives Islam equal status to other religions – something that has not yet been 
achieved at the national level. The shura has established an annual Iftar 
reception, where representatives of the city council, civil society, senior 
                                                      
244 O. Schoeller, “Zentralrat boykottiert Islamkonferenz”, Berliner Zeitung, 14 May 
2010 (http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/ 
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politicians, Muslim leaders and organizations meet and dine together 
during the fasting month of Ramadan.245 
Although national security policies also affect interactions in Berlin 
and Kreuzberg, a certain rapprochement between Muslim organizations 
and communities on the one hand, and public officials on the other can be 
observed within recent years. In 2005 Berlin established the Islamforum, 
which provides an opportunity for representatives of most Muslim 
organizations to meet with city officials four times a year. These include the 
senator of the interior and the commissioner on integration, and even 
representatives of the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Verfassungsschutz). Participants appreciate this opportunity for contact 
and communication. Some members have contrasted the approach taken in 
Berlin’s Islamforum with the national DIK. In particular, they have noted 
that while critics of Islam have also been invited to Berlin’s Islamforum, 
unlike the case of the DIK the critics have not been viewed as 
representatives of the religion.  
4.2.3  Labour market  
Muslims face a range of problems related to employment in Germany. The 
available data in Hamburg and Berlin indicate that Muslims are more 
threatened by unemployment and are less likely to be employed as full or 
part-time workers. The labour market is not open to non-EU citizens. 
Muslims and migrants with no legal status or a very weak legal status, 
Duldung [toleration],246 such as asylum seekers or refugees, live in difficult 
circumstances with no access to the labour market. Until the end of 2009, 
those who had Duldung s t a t u s  c o u l d  b e  g r a n t e d  a  p e r m i t  t o  s t a y  
(Bleiberecht) if they were able to obtain a job.247 
                                                      
245 Iftar is the evening meal eaten after sunset for breaking the fast in the month of 
Ramadan. 
246 Toleration is a status of a refugee or an asylum seeker, which gives the 
individual a minimum legal status to stay where s/he is, if deportation or 
repatriation is not yet possible. 
247 See “Ausbildung und Beschäftigung von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern mit 
einer Duldung” [Hamburg refuge, training and employment of foreigners with a 
toleration status], Fluchtort Hamburg (http://www.equal-asyl.de/fileadmin/ 
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Therefore, the general policy approaches to labour market issues can 
be classified as assimilationist according to the framework applied here. 
Labour market issues related to anti-discrimination are slowly being raised 
since the implementation of the EU Directive 2000/78/EC248 as the 
Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [General Equal Treatment Act] in 2006. 
Initial court decisions have challenged the new legislation, but it does not 
play an important role yet. For Hamburg and Berlin, a slight shift towards 
a hybrid intercultural policy is taking place, where affirmative action hiring 
and training programmes are being developed, intercultural competencies 
are valued and intercultural training is offered. Articulation of the political 
will by the conservative mayor of Hamburg to increase the percentage of 
migrants in Hamburg’s administration to 20% in the coming year is another 
sign that this shift is occurring at the local level. 
Berlin–Kreuzberg is one of the poorest districts of Berlin, with an 
overall unemployment rate of 41%. In comparison with Berlin, Hamburg is 
a rich city, with the highest number of millionaires in Germany. The areas 
under study in Hamburg–Mitte form part of the cluster of the most 
disadvantaged areas in Hamburg. The higher unemployment rates in these 
areas (up to 18%) correlate with the large proportion of Muslims making 
up the population there.  
Economic integration requires opportunities for employment and 
jobs that are commensurate with an individual’s skills and qualifications. 
Hamburg attributes employment problems to the lack of or low-grade 
educational qualifications, the poor language competencies of young 
persons and the lack of parental awareness about the ‘dual vocational 
training system’, where training is undertaken in businesses and vocational 
schools. Children, parents and teachers often do not know about all the 
possible paths within the complex system for an educational or vocational 
career.249  
The difficulties of migrant youths with the same educational 
qualifications as native-born Germans in finding an enterprise where they 
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can do vocational training250 indicates that there are discriminatory 
practices in recruitment. A majority of Muslim women in Berlin and 
Hamburg have experienced discrimination based on religion. The 
headscarf issue combines various aspects of gender, ethnic and religious 
discrimination.251  
In relation to the headscarf in public employment, the two cities show 
alternative approaches. In the course of a young teacher’s plea against her 
prohibition to work with the headscarf in the federal state of Baden–
Württemberg, the Bundesverfassungsgericht [Constitutional Court] stated 
that there was no legal basis for the ban but that individual Länder [federal 
states] had  to create their own laws and regulations in this area. Berlin 
responded to this by passing the Neutralitätsgesetz [Law of Neutrality], 
which prohibits the exposure of visible religious symbols by teachers in 
public schools as well as employees of the police and the judiciary, while 
Hamburg took no action on this topic. Yet even in Hamburg there are 
indications that visible forms of faith can be barriers to employment in 
public professional careers, including teaching and policing. Muslim 
women with headscarves seem not to be excluded when employed in 
administrative and low-skilled jobs but are underrepresented in leading 
and senior positions, which require higher qualifications and visibility. In 
large firms where there is a workers’ council, religions and customs are 
more often respected. The strong position of these councils is due to the 
longstanding anti-discrimination clauses of the Industrial Relations Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), which is a federal law applicable throughout 
Germany.252  
The introduction of the Equal Treatment Act in 2006 strengthened the 
legal basis for anti-discrimination work by public bodies at the local level. 
This includes the creation of federal and regional Equal Treatment and 
Anti-Discrimination Offices (the Antidiskriminierunggstelle des Bundes in 
Berlin, the Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung – gegen Diskriminierung for 
Berlin and the Arbeitsstelle Vielfalt for Hamburg). The offices work on a 
broad range of equality matters, with the discrimination faced by Muslims 
also being an issue in Berlin.253 The office in Berlin has established a broad 
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network of NGOs and other partners to provide support and advice in 
relation to specific reasons for discrimination. Hamburg is way behind 
here. An anti-discrimination and gender-equality body (the Arbeitsstelle 
Vielfalt) has only recently been established at the Department of Justice (in 
2009), but is already expected to face dramatic downsizing because of 
severe budget cuts. 
It is estimated that between 1985 and 2005 the number of self-
employed Turks in Germany increased from 22,000 to 61,000. One in ten 
Turkish-owned businesses is to be found in Berlin. The large proportion of 
highly educated persons in self-employment is partly a result of the 
difficulties they face in securing mainstream employment. 
The rising number of small- and medium-sized enterprises has in 
turn created a significant number of new jobs in Berlin since the late 1990s, 
especially in the service sector. In Hamburg, several migrant self-help 
organizations exist, which support migrants becoming entrepreneurs or 
which specialize in getting migrant enterprises to take trainees for 
vocational training.  
4.2.4  Schools  
Education, especially in schools, is said to be one of the most important 
pillars of integration. The educational system provides individuals with the 
skills and qualifications for participation in the labour market and also 
plays a formative role in the socialization of young people with the 
unspoken rules and values of society.254 The ways in which schools 
respond to and respect the needs of Muslim pupils is therefore likely to 
shape their feelings of acceptance and belonging to wider German society. 
Schools also contribute to integration by providing opportunities for 
interaction among pupils, parents and teachers of different ethnic and 
religious backgrounds.  
The educational policies in Germany and in Berlin and Hamburg can 
generally be classified as following an assimilationist policy approach, 
where ‘otherness’ should disappear. But a shift in policy towards a hybrid 
intercultural approach, where otherness is not over-emphasized, can be 
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noticed at a local level in Berlin and Hamburg. There is a high degree of 
segregation in the school systems and the focus is on learning the national 
language in many schools, but some schools provide both national 
language and home language tuition.  
In Berlin, Islamic religious education at public schools has been 
introduced by the local umbrella organization, Islamic Federation 
(Islamische Föderation), which was accepted as a religious community for 
this purpose after 20 years in court.  
Among the controversial issues concerning education in Germany is 
the role of pre-schools in preparing children for primary school and 
whether the existing three-track school system is still adequate. With the 
OECD Pisa255 studies in 2000, it became obvious that the educational 
system in Germany was expensive, inefficient and highly selective. This 
was a catalyst for numerous changes and approaches in Berlin and 
Hamburg. Since then the educational system in Hamburg has undergone 
several reforms. In Berlin, primary school – unlike that in other federal 
states – already encompasses six classes of Grundschule. A similar system 
was recently put to a vote in a referendum in Hamburg, but the majority 
voted against it.  
A key element in the policy of Berlin and Hamburg is the 
development of Scandinavian-style ‘common’ or ‘comprehensive’ schools 
(Gemeinschaftsschulen),256 where pupils are kept together until they take the 
Abitur exam. The new schools ensure that various educational routes 
remain open for longer. They also provide an opportunity for 
disadvantaged children to overcome language difficulties before being 
locked into a certain type of educational career or drop out of the 
educational system. 
Education is highly valued by Muslims257 and is a core aspect in the 
lives of 94% of Muslims in Germany.258 The experiences and concerns of 
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Muslims in relation to the educational sector suggest that obstacles 
stemming from real and perceived discrimination, which are hampering 
academic achievement, are directly related to their experiences as Muslims 
and their ethnic group. Alongside reportedly questionable quality and 
selection processes within the educational sector, the impact includes low 
levels of educational attainment among Muslim pupils, the effects of racism 
on self-esteem and aspirations, and the role that a lack of recognition of a 
person’s faith can play in ensuring that an individual cannot fully 
participate in society.  
This importance of education and the experiences of stereotyping, 
discrimination and even racism may account for the growing number of 
Muslim parents seeking to enrol their children into the only Muslim 
Grundschule in Berlin–Kreuzberg. The school argues that it is making efforts 
to support integration through its emphasis on teaching the German 
language and employing a range of teachers (including many non-
Muslims). The educational attainment in the school has improved over 
time.259 Hamburg focuses on language acquisition and language support. 
Multilingualism is valued positively.260  
4.2.5  Policing and security  
Since 9/11, Muslims have come under increased police surveillance and at 
the same time have faced higher levels of hate crimes and violence directed 
at them. The issue of policing is quite central for Muslims in Berlin–
Kreuzberg and Hamburg–Mitte. Parents worry about the effect on their 
children’s future of the district’s reputation as a high crime area, while 
many young persons have felt that they have been the targets of police 
attention and discriminatory treatment because of their ethnic and religious 
background. 
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Looking at the federal level, the policies at work in the area of 
policing can again be classified as assimilationist, characterized by an area-
based policing system. This is true for Hamburg and Berlin as well, 
although shifts from an assimilationist to a hybrid intercultural policy can 
be observed. The local policies are ever more concerned with interreligious 
relations, like the close cooperation between some of the local police and 
mosques in Hamburg and Berlin.  
According to the OSI study, in Berlin, only half of Muslims and non-
Muslims trusted the police, while in Hamburg the majority of Muslims 
were satisfied with policing and trusted the police and courts. One 
explanation is the view that key political institutions, such as the 
government and parliament, can change policies and sway opinions but the 
police and law courts have to act according to rules and evidence; despite 
the conduct of individual police officers, general trust has not been 
undermined. This entails trust in the system, rather than in the individual 
representative. For many migrants, the image of a police officer is not 
someone who will discuss problems, but an authority figure who may even 
use physical force. 
This image is sometimes reinforced by the behaviour of individual 
police officers. Even if the local police in Berlin and Hamburg have 
introduced intercultural training and other measures to prevent 
stereotyping, police violence – especially against persons with immigrant 
backgrounds – has been repeatedly reported by Amnesty International. In 
their report of July 2010, the human rights organization cited 15 cases of 
police violence in Germany and requested mandatory identification for 
police officers, which is supported by the Berlin senator of the interior.261 
Muslims in Hamburg report crime less frequently than non-Muslims. 
Muslims had less contact with the police than non-Muslims. Some Muslims 
in Berlin had the impression of unfair treatment of foreign children and 
that specific groups were being more rigorously checked. 
Another significant concern of Muslims in Berlin — especially 
parents — was the prevalence of drugs in their area and the risk this posed 
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for young persons and children.262 There was some demand for more 
community outreach by the police with identifiable police officers 
developing trust by building relationships with local residents. 
Muslims in Hamburg reported positive experiences with visible 
neighbourhood police (Bünabe).263 But currently there are not enough well-
trained multilingual Bünabe available.264 A representative of the Hamburg 
police stressed that the lack of visible police officers of Muslim or migrant 
backgrounds is a problem for Muslims, especially women. 
Instead of highlighting the positive outcomes of a diverse police force 
(creating a safe environment for all, providing ethnic minorities with 
positive role models), Germany’s idea in recruiting ethnic minorities has 
been for specific tasks alone, utilizing them to target migrant 
populations.265  
While other departments are increasing migrant trainees in 
Hamburg, the police have underperformed in this area. Migrants often do 
not pass the tests necessary to start police training.266 Berlin has sought to 
increase the recruitment of employees from minority groups despite 
considerable protest from the police union, which has viewed this policy as 
a breach of neutrality. 
 Since 9/11, police in Germany have conducted mass identity checks 
on numerous occasions outside mosques, including those with the largest 
attendance in Germany.267 Before 9/11, the police in Hamburg were 
obliged to keep in contact with mosques and Muslims, but this was 
abandoned after 9/11.268 The agency now has closer contacts with Muslim 
communities again, because it is important for the police to understand 
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what happens in the communities. A committee of imams is counselling 
the police and they work together with a network of Muslim organizations 
to prevent crime and Islamic extremism.269  
4.2.6  Minority religious institutions 
Nowadays Muslims make up the third largest religious group in Germany 
– after Catholics and Protestants – but Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist and a 
variety of other religious groups can be found among Germans and 
migrants. Since 9/11 and other international terrorist attacks, Muslims have 
come to occupy centre stage in public debate; they are widely perceived as 
a potential security threat and to a much lesser extent as a religious 
minority group like others. Not inter-religious dialogue but secret service 
methods are increasingly used for the surveillance of Muslim citizens.  
More studies on Muslims and their religious institutions are 
emerging in Germany. These studies conclude that while ethnic belonging, 
religion and migration history influence the subjects’ everyday lives and 
cultural background, these factors are not central to their milieus and 
identity.270 
In the city of Hamburg, two distinct aspects of the perception of 
Muslims and their organizations can be observed. On the one hand, there is 
the image of the events of 9/11 and the Hamburg cells around Mohammed 
Atta, one of the terrorists involved. On the other hand, there is the liberal 
image of Hamburg, home to one of the oldest mosques in Germany, and its 
reputation as a refuge for religious minorities. 
Migrant organizations in Berlin have argued that even if 
organizations were willing to cooperate with Muslim associations (which 
have been stigmatized by the Verfassungsschutz), because the associations’ 
work was appreciated at the local level, withdrawals of public funding 
have become a common means of preventing such cooperation.271 Muslim 
organizations in Hamburg have similar problems. Until now none of the 
investigations has led to formal legal action by any state authority, but they 
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make cooperation difficult.272 This results in severe structural 
discrimination and might be one of the reasons Muslims do not play an 
active role in politics, are not active in criminal justice and turn away from 
participation and public debate. Even if the civic participation of Muslim 
and migrant associations/organizations seems to be increasing in Hamburg 
and Berlin, Muslims who had a political opinion or were engaged in some 
cause felt negatively stamped as extremist or fundamentalist,273 because of 
a lack of differentiation between a radical fundamentalist and an ordinary 
Muslim.274 
4.2.7  Public awareness 
Recent studies and surveys suggest a deterioration in public attitudes 
towards Islam and Muslims in Germany. The number of those associating 
Islam with discrimination against women, fanaticism and radicalism and a 
disposition towards violence and revenge is increasing.275 The 
representation of Muslims and Islam in the German media also shows a 
high prevalence of stories linking Islam and Muslims to terrorism, violence 
and other social problems. The role of religion in the public sphere is still 
an area where there is a struggle to find a common understanding, in 
which Muslims face choices between religious expression and integration.  
I n  G e r m a n y ,  t h e  p o l i c y  i s  s t i l l  m o r e  o r i e n t e d  t o w a r d s  a n  
assimilationist approach and anti-racism is rarely an issue, let alone anti-
Muslim racism (Islamophobia). In both Hamburg and Berlin, shifts from 
this assimilationist policy (solely emphasizing the fight against right-wing 
extremism) towards a more hybrid intercultural policy (stressing anti-
racism and the new anti-discrimination legislation) can be observed. 
Intercultural projects are progressively supported. 
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A study on media coverage of Islam revealed that the predominant 
topic covered was Muslims as terrorists.276 This negative atmosphere 
towards Islam is not only a product of media coverage, but also reflects the 
public discourse presented by politics. Parliamentary debates connected 
with Islam in the same period increased and discussion about equality and 
the positive features of Islam became less frequent.277 There has also been a 
significant change in the political discourse over the last few years. 
Whereas discrimination against Muslims on the basis of their religious 
affiliation was one of the major topics between 2000 and 2001, the main 
debates of 2003 and 2004 concerned security – strongly linking Islam with 
terrorism and giving far less attention to issues of tolerance and anti-
discrimination.  
The effect of this change in the public discourse on Muslims in 
Germany is the reduction of the relatively high levels of acceptance and 
tolerance of Islam by the majority society. The positive feeling of trust 
towards their co-citizens was weaker in 2004 than in 2000. 
The murder in July 2009 in a Dresden courtroom of the pregnant, 31-
year-old Egyptian pharmacist, Marwa El-Sherbini, who had taken legal 
action against a man who had insulted her at a playground, is the latest 
Islamophobic event. The fact that this murder happened almost a week 
before it was reported in the mainstream media as a minor event was a sign 
that the media and society had a blind spot regarding hostility and racism 
towards Muslims.278  
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Other turning points for Muslims and migrants include the period 
before 9/11 and the unification of Germany, which brought the entire 
population of one state into the Federal Republic of Germany with the 
argument of having the same ethnicity.279 Germany has since been going 
through several trends in discourses on migrants, beginning with the ‘guest 
worker problem’, then the ‘foreigner problem’, followed a couple of years 
later by a ‘Turk problem’ and nowadays it is a ‘Muslim problem’. The racist 
and discriminatory attitudes have remained the same; the enemy has just 
been defined differently.280 
4.2.8  Urbanization 
The housing situation of Muslims in Germany’s urban areas is largely 
shaped by the inner-city locations of their dwellings. Migrant communities 
have a strong tendency to stay and invest in their districts in order to 
improve their neighbourhoods even after climbing up the social ladder. In 
many ways, this pattern corresponds with a general lack of mobility and a 
strong identification with the local districts, the Kiezkultur [neighbourhood 
culture], found mainly in northern German cities.  
For Germany and the two cities studied here, the policy approach in 
general can be described as assimilationist. Enclaves are usually considered 
a problem and in urban planning measures to disperse the inhabitants of 
such enclaves are applied. In Hamburg, a shift towards a more hybrid 
intercultural policy can be observed. There is an attempt to promote an 
ethnic mix and to safeguard existing residents. Notably, the effects of 
gentrification in certain renewed areas have led to a discussion of measures 
to enhance the safety of the existing population.  
In the case of Muslim and migrant groups, the identification with 
their neighbourhood may be reinforced by feelings of exclusion from the 
wider society and experiences of discrimination in accessing housing in 
wealthier districts. There has been a feeling that the distribution of social 
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h o u s i n g  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  b y  p o l i c y - m a k e r s  t o  r e s t r i c t  M u s l i m s  t o  c e r t a i n  
districts and neighbourhoods. In part, this is grounded in earlier 
experiences of the official housing policies during the initial period of 
migration, when immigrants were restricted to particular areas of cities. In 
Berlin, the majority of OSI interviewees wished to live in ethnically mixed 
areas. Muslims valued the ethnically and socially diverse character of the 
district they lived in and many wished for ethnic Germans to stay and 
regretted them leaving their district. The attitude of those who particularly 
appreciated the ethnic familiarity, as well as of those who valued cultural 
diversity, appears to be strongly shaped by concerns about safety and fears 
of being ‘otherized’ or viewed as different in less ethnically mixed areas. 
Many Muslims feared that in other districts they could attract unwanted 
attention for being too loud, having too many children or visiting each 
other too much with too many people, or simply by looking different.  
Also in Hamburg Muslim women wearing headscarves attracted 
stares when walking in wealthy neighbourhoods, the city centre or 
shopping malls. Many Muslims therefore felt uncomfortable and 
unwelcome.281 Areas that are not culturally diverse are seen as problematic, 
as it is hard for non-native Germans or immigrants to feel a sense of 
belonging. Such areas are located at the fringes but also in some pockets in 
the centre of Hamburg, where there is no cultural diversity. 
Muslims in Hamburg and Berlin live in social housing, while the 
majority of non-Muslims live in houses belonging to private landlords. 
Social housing is publicly financed housing, where rent increases are 
restricted. Private landlords have fewer restrictions, but they have to watch 
the local average rents. Muslims are also more likely than non-Muslims to 
live with their families, because of stronger family ties as well as greater 
difficulty in finding rental accommodation. Discrimination leads higher 
percentages of migrants and their families to live in overcrowded 
accommodation, which is in a worse condition and at the same time more 
expensive than that available to ethnic Germans. 
While the framework for the whole of Germany can be considered 
assimilationist, Hamburg and Berlin are shifting to a hybrid intercultural 
policy. The assimilationist framework guarantees equal access, but ignores 
ethnic aspects. But ethnicity often plays a role in considerations, for 
instance on who shall be moving to a housing estate. Under the surface 
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there seems to be a change in practice. To guarantee equal access, large 
housing companies have introduced measures to monitor inter-ethnic 
aspects in housing. 
Discrimination is manifest in various ways, ranging from direct 
verbal comments to the lack of explanation for a refusal to provide 
accommodation, or more intense scrutiny of a person’s creditworthiness or 
social status. The introduction of anti-discrimination legislation (the Equal 
Treatment Act) sent a strong signal about the unacceptability of 
discrimination on a range of grounds, including religion and ethnicity. 
There remain gaps in relation to housing, however. Property management 
companies can still refuse to rent rooms in cases where they perceive such 
discrimination is necessary to ensure a balanced socio-cultural mix.282 
In Hamburg, rents have increased following the redevelopment of 
central areas of the district. This has led to a movement of poorer and larger 
families into the more affordable outer fringes of the district, where larger 
flats are still available.283 In Hamburg, the housing market has the effect of 
creating residential segregation. Foreign and Muslim residents are being 
replaced by a new middle class. Neighbourhoods are evolving to the 
benefit of the more affluent, destroying existing diversity and tolerance. 
There are two different approaches in Hamburg. One favours the 
intensified use of urban space to stimulate economic growth,284 while the 
other seeks to activate the potential of the population in order to increase 
economic growth.285 Both recognize the importance of a diverse population 
for creativity, but still stress the needs of the new middle classes.286 
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4.2.9  Symbols 
The German approach towards the religious symbols of non-Christian 
religions can be regarded as assimilationist. Several federal states have 
introduced laws banning headscarves for Muslim teachers in public 
schools, supported by the argument of school neutrality, while the keeping 
of crucifixes in certain public schools is supported by the federal 
government with an argument about the Christian roots of society. The 
handling of religious symbols nonetheless varies among the federal states.  
The Law of Neutrality (Neutralitätsgesetz) applies this type of 
assimilationist policy to Berlin and excludes Muslim women with 
headscarves from several professions in public services, among them 
schools. In Hamburg, there is a greater tendency towards a hybrid 
intercultural policy concerning symbols. The intercultural meaning of 
symbols is stressed, there is no general approach towards religious or other 
symbols, and no legal ban has been adopted in relation to Muslim 
headscarves.  
In the OSI study, more than 50% of the Muslims in Hamburg and 
30% in Berlin were carrying visible signs. More than 80% in both cities were 
actively practising their religion. These numbers are in line with the 
findings of Religion Monitor 2008.287  
Those Muslims actively practising demonstrate a diversity of 
practices and observances. Visible signs, such as dark skin, black hair, 
Islamic dress or headscarves, function as markers of difference. Many non-
Muslims read these markers as signs that certain people do not belong to 
Germany. Such markers are not only related to appearance, but also to 
lifestyle.  
Although no legal banning of religious dress in public service 
professions exists in Hamburg, in the private sector the acceptance of 
religious symbols depends on the firm and its activities. In Berlin, Muslims 
hold the opinion that employers do not respect other religious practices, 
and that they have difficulties in securing time during the workday for 
daily prayer. 
In Berlin, schools are now allowed to forbid Muslim pupils to pray at 
school, after a Muslim boy went to court. The court ruling in May 2010 
enables all public schools in Berlin to ban prayers.  
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4.3  Conclusions 
At the time of finalizing this chapter, there has been a significant debate in 
the media and public institutions about a newly published book288 by Thilo 
Sarrazin, a board member of the German Federal Bank. In this book the 
author openly declares that Muslims (mainly ethnic Turks and Arabs) are 
less intelligent than the average German population, and through higher 
reproduction rates they are endangering the intelligence level of the entire 
country in the future. Meanwhile, the world has been shocked by the 
statement of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, that multiculturalism “has 
failed, absolutely failed”. At the same time, the Chancellor has endorsed 
the recent statement by Federal President Christian Wulff about Islam 
being a part of Germany, which was made on the anniversary of German 
reunification – a statement that was widely criticized by different public 
officials, especially those from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). But 
this endorsement has gone unheard in the attention given to Chancellor 
Merkel’s earlier statement.  
The Chancellor’s statement follows the political method of 
attempting to keep the public vote from moving further in a far right-wing 
and even racist direction by partially following these ideas. It is similar to 
the logic of fighting right-wing extremism by partially giving in to its 
demands that the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) applied in 1992, 
when he tightened the asylum laws after the republic had been shaken by 
violent attacks and even the murder of asylum seekers by right-wing 
extremists in the aftermath of reunification.  
The outcome and effects of this debate, which is somehow caught 
between a ‘natural racism’ reminiscent of Nazism and a ‘cultural racism’289 
targeting Muslims as an inferior culture, cannot be fully foreseen. Yet it can 
already be said that these assumptions are not only feeding traditional, 
right-wing populist opinions, but also that their content – even if not their 
presentation – is not being rejected by the majority of the population. 
Political analysts speak of a high proportion of the electorate that would be 
prepared to support a modernized, openly racist party defending 
‘European values’ against the ‘Muslim invasion’. A recent survey by the 
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Friedrich-Ebert Foundation290 revealed not only a far-reaching 
Islamophobia, with more than 50% of the entire population and in some 
parts of Germany up to 75% desiring a considerable restriction of the right 
of freedom of religion for Muslims – thus giving up a basic human right 
and one of the most important principles of the German constitution. The 
researchers were also convinced that these findings would be even worse if 
the survey were repeated today, amid the heated debate about Thilo 
Sarrazin’s book. Still, it remains to be seen whether the rejections of his and 
other similar statements will gain strength and bring a more positive 
change in the tone of attitudes towards Muslims and public perceptions, or 
if the opposite happens and racist, anti-Muslim stereotypes, which have 
already claimed one Muslim female victim in the Egyptian Marwa El-
Sherbini, are heightened even more.  
In Hamburg and Berlin, the politics and civil engagement at the local 
level show a very different picture from what can be observed nationally. 
In their distinct ways, both have long histories and familiarity with 
diversity. Even if the attempts to encourage the participation of all social 
groups – including the various Muslim groups and organizations – differ 
among German cities and even the individual districts of one city, a general 
tendency towards more pragmatic and even inclusive policies at the local 
level can be observed. Hamburg has made substantial efforts to include 
Muslims and Muslim organizations in policy debates and to support their 
participation in society and its institutions. In this city one can observe a 
switch in perspectives, from looking at migrants’ deficiencies to their 
potential and their intercultural competencies, and to stressing the need for 
mutual intercultural learning across all o f  s o c i e t y .  E v e n  i f  i n  b o t h  c i t i e s  
concrete projects and policy measurements still have to be implemented on 
a broad scale, this change in vocabulary marks an important point of 
conceptual change. In Berlin, a new law on integration and participation is 
being put in place against the strong resentment of some parts of the 
political class.291 Inter alia this city aims at a better representation of 
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migrants within the city administration and enables Muslims to bury their 
dead according to religious traditions. 
The opening of an anti-discrimination office specializing in anti-
Muslim discrimination and filling the gap of tackling discrimination on 
religious grounds had been recommended by the OSI survey and is 
actually the subject of serious consideration by the Berlin senate. Although 
in Hamburg issues of discrimination are still not openly articulated, the 
presence of the anti-discrimination body (Arbeitsstelle Vielfalt) has led to 
sensitivity on the equality issue within the administration. 
The stigmatization of many Muslim organizations as extremists by 
German intelligence services is being dealt with in a different way by many 
local politicians compared with those at the national level. Nevertheless, 
the national practice of (non-)cooperation with many Muslim organizations 
hampers trust and many productive projects. At the local and individual 
levels, political participation and identification are hindered for many 
Muslims and persons with an immigrant background by the lack of voting 
rights for non-EU nationals, endangering the democratic legitimacy of 
entire districts where the non-German population reaches high 
percentages. Introduction of the right to vote in local elections for non-EU 
nationals as well as facilitated naturalization procedures and the possibility 
to hold dual nationality would be other important political steps towards 
greater participation and social cohesion. 
Not least the high tendency292 of educated young Germans with a 
Turkish background to emigrate to Turkey because of better job 
opportunities and civic participation shows the urgent need to strengthen 
equal treatment and anti-discrimination efforts. A change in the 
understanding of nationality is urgently needed, which is still very much 
ethnically determined.  
The real challenge of contemporary German politics thus becomes 
evident. It is obviously not the repeatedly stated lack of will on the part of 
Muslims to integrate, but the heavily xenophobic and even anti-democratic 
trends at the core of society. The responsibility of Chancellor Merkel and 
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other public actors lies not in confirming xenophobic and anti-Muslim 
trends by declaring multiculturalism to be defeated or dead. On the 
contrary, the challenge is to find ways of enhancing an understanding of 
national identity that includes all members of an ever more diversified 
society, supports a positive view towards this diversity, and takes a stand 
against rising racism and Islamophobia. In the words of the Federal 
President, it means the Federal Chancellor acting for all residents, 
including Muslims. 
 | 107  
 
 
5.  EVOLVING MODELS OF 
MULTICULTURALISM IN  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
TUFYAL CHOUDHURY 
Introduction  
This chapter explores how integration policy has developed in recent years, 
as Muslims have become the focus of discussions on integration and 
multiculturalism. It begins with a brief overview of the key characteristics 
of the Muslim population in the UK, which provides the background 
context for this discussion. It then sets out the foundations for the British 
model of integration that were laid down in the 1960s in response to 
increased migration of black and ‘coloured’ workers from the 
Commonwealth. It explores how the central pillars of this framework – 
protection from discrimination and violence, data collection, immigration 
control and community relations – have underpinned multiculturalism and 
informed the approach taken to questions of integration of Muslim 
communities that have been at the forefront of public discussion in the past 
decade. The urban riots in 2001 and growing concerns about ‘home-grown’ 
terrorism have created a political backlash against multiculturalism and an 
apparent shift in policy towards ‘community cohesion’, with a focus on 
shared and common values. This chapter examines the extent to which this 
change in language has been accompanied by changes in important policy 
sets.  
Most Muslims in Britain today are post-war migrants or their 
descendents. Yet the presence of Muslims in Britain can be traced back over 
300 years. Early settlers included South Asian and Yemeni sailors working 108 | TUFYAL CHOUDHURY 
in the merchant navy and for the British East India Company.293 Prominent 
Muslims in Victorian Britain included William Quilliam, founder of 
England’s first mosque (in Liverpool in 1889), and Marmaduke Pickthall, 
an Islamic scholar and translator of the Koran.294 Hundreds of thousands of 
Muslims volunteered for the Indian Army to fight for Britain during the 
First and Second World Wars.  
In the post-war period, migrants from the new Commonwealth came 
to fill shortages in the labour market. Muslim men arrived mainly from 
South Asia. Utilizing the moral economy of their kinship and village 
networks to find jobs and accommodation, these men survived in an 
unfamiliar environment. Increasing restrictions on opportunities for 
immigration in the 1970s ended chain migration, leading those who were 
here to settle and be joined by their families. The kinship networks through 
which chain migration operated meant that the communities the migrants 
left were sometimes reconstructed in the neighbourhoods of British cities 
where they settled.  
One group for whom the migration pattern and integration context 
differed from their Commonwealth contemporaries during this period is 
East African Asians. They began arriving in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
under pressure from the ‘Africanization’ policies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
and in the case of Uganda, as a result of forced expulsion.295 Many were 
skilled, urban middle-class professionals and entrepreneurs. Their 
experience of living in urban centres combined with their business and 
professional backgrounds ensured faster integration into economic and 
social structures. It is estimated that 20,000 of the group of 150,000 East 
African Asians were Muslims, mainly Ismaili Shias, with family roots in 
Pakistan or the Indian state of Gujarat.296  
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Around two-thirds of Muslims in the UK have ties to South Asia. The 
remaining third represent a wide range of communities from across the 
Muslim world. For example, there are an estimated 120,000 Turkish 
Cypriots and 80,000 mainland Turks and Kurds in the UK.297 Oil wealth 
combined with political instability in the Middle East attracted investors 
and professionals from the Middle East from the 1970s onwards. During 
the course of the 1990s, increasing numbers of Muslims arrived in the UK 
as asylum seekers. These included Bosnians, Somalis, Kurds, Afghans and 
Iraqis. A recent estimate suggests that the size of the Somali population 
increased in the UK from 40,000 in 1999 to over 100,000 by 2009.298  
The 2001 census counted the number of Muslims in the UK at 1.6 
million. On this basis they constitute 3% of the total population of Great 
Britain (57.1 million) and are the largest minority faith group. This figure 
does not take into account the significant migration flows, particularly of 
skilled migrants from outside the EU that have occurred in the past decade. 
Recent estimates suggest that the Muslim population increased to over 2.5 
million by 2010.299  
The 2001 census finds that approximately half of Muslims living in 
Britain were born in the UK. They have a diverse range of ethnic 
backgrounds, however. Three-quarters of Muslims (74%) have an Asian 
ethnic background, predominantly Pakistani (43%), Bangladeshi (16%), 
Indian (8%) and other Asian (6%). One in ten Muslims (11%) are from a 
white ethnic group, 4% are of white British origin and 7% from another 
white background, including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab and Eastern 
European. A further 6% of Muslims are of black African origin.  
The settlement patterns of Muslims reflect the nature of their initial 
migration. Coming largely as unskilled workers they settled in Britain’s 
urban industrial conurbations. Around two-fifths of Muslims (38%) live in 
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London, where they make up 8.5% of the population. After London, the 
regions with the largest share of the Muslim population are the West 
Midlands (14%), North West (13%), and Yorkshire and Humber (12%). 
Even within these regions, Muslims are highly concentrated spatially, and 
disproportionately represented in the most deprived urban communities. 
One-third of the Muslim population lives in the 10% most deprived 
neighbourhoods.300  
5.1   Societal models  
5.1.1  Integration and multiculturalism 
The growing Muslim presence in the UK is part of a wider process of 
increasing ethnic and religious diversity in Britain shaped by processes of 
migration that have intensified in the past 60 years. By the 2001 census, 
almost 8% of the UK population, 4.5 million persons, were from a minority 
ethnic group.  
Post-war migration began with the arrival of the Empire Windrush 
ship, bringing to England black workers from Jamaica. During the early 
period of post-war migration, public policy initially operated under a 
laissez-faire assumption of assimilation. Furthermore, most who arrived did 
not come with an intention of settling in Britain for the long term. And 
many, even after decades in the UK, maintained the ‘myth of return’.  
Antagonism against ‘coloured’ immigration was never far from the 
surface. It emerged into full public view in 1958 when ‘race riots’ took place 
in Nottingham and London’s Notting Hill. These tensions were also played 
out in politics, the most infamous examples arising from Enoch Powell’s 
1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech and the rise of the National Front as a 
political force in the 1970s.  
Unlike most other European countries, the UK developed its 
integration policy in the 1960s in response to such tensions. Integration was 
defined in 1968 by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, “as cultural diversity, 
coupled with equality of opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual 
tolerance”. Jenkins emphasized that integration was not a “flattening 
process of uniformity”. The policy framework created in this period 
continues to shape the British approach to integration today.  
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Four central pillars to integration policy have evolved from the policy 
response of the 1960s: protection from discrimination and violence, data 
collection, controls on immigration and legal duties to promote good 
community relations. Together these four pillars have shaped the core of 
‘integration’ policy and have in effect underpinned multiculturalism. All 
have remained a consistent feature of overall integration policy although 
each has also developed and changed over time.  
Local level responsibility for the implementation of key aspects of 
integration policies ensured the survival of multiculturalism during the 
1980s and early 1990s, when the national Conservative government was 
largely hostile to multiculturalism.  
The Labour government elected in 1997 was viewed as being far 
more comfortable and at ease with Britain’s multicultural and diverse 
society than the Conservative government of the 1980s and 1990s. During 
this period, Labour was the only party with MPs of black and minority 
ethnic backgrounds; several of its MPs were prominent activists in the anti-
racist and anti-apartheid movements and most of the large multiethnic 
urban constituencies returned Labour MPs.  
The Labour Party won three elections in the period 1997–2010. 
Policies towards integration and multiculturalism shifted in significant 
ways during each of these terms. The first term was marked by a 
celebration of Britain’s ethnic and cultural diversity, the period of ‘cool 
Britannia’ when the Foreign Secretary identified chicken tikka massala as 
the new national dish. There was also recognition of the need to tackle 
institutional racism and religious discrimination. The start of the second 
term in 2001, marked by civic disturbances in the mosque and mill towns in 
northern England, led to a questioning of multiculturalism. It was argued 
that this approach to integration had contributed to a fractured society in 
which different ethnic and religious groups lived ‘parallel lives’ apart from 
one another. Reports on the causes of the unrest “identified segregation 
along racial lines as a growing problem and a significant contributory 
factor”.301 The 2001 Cantle report was “particularly struck by the depth of 
polarization in our towns and cities. Separate educational arrangements, 
community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, 
language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities 
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operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives”. 302 The need to promote 
‘community cohesion’ emerged as a central part of the policy response to 
the disorders and signalled a shift away from multiculturalism. It placed 
emphasis on the need for more explicitly articulated ‘shared values’ and 
‘active citizenship’. The new policy was to have the greatest impact on the 
pillar of good relations and citizenship. Celebrations of Labour’s historic, 
third election victory in June 2005 were soon punctured by the terrorist 
attacks of 7/7. For some, the involvement of British citizens in the attacks 
appeared to vindicate the increasing focus on the shared identity and 
values of the community cohesion policy. At the same time, the imperatives 
of national security and counter-terrorism policies following 7/7 and the 
need to prevent future attacks soon overrode objections to funding single 
groups and led to increased work with and funding for Muslim 
communities.  
Indeed, engaging and strengthening cultural identities is seen by 
many service providers as important to effective service delivery. For 
example, research on engaging effectively with black and minority ethnic 
parents in children’s and parental programmes found that engagement and 
attendance improved where there were “culturally specific programmes 
which strengthen cultural identity and aim at raising parents’ confidence in 
their cultural heritage”.303 Strengthening cultural identity and raising 
confidence in their cultural heritage has been found to be critically 
important for asylum seeker families accessing preventative services.304  
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the Sure Start programme305 in 
engaging parents in the design and delivery of the programme criticized 
the initial ‘colour-blind’ approach to service delivery, for failing to take the 
specific needs of minority ethnic groups into account and to see the 
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additional barriers to accessing services that particular groups may face.306 
It suggests that effective outreach, culturally sensitive and tailored services, 
and ethnic matching of staff to reflect the local service-user population are 
crucial for the success of the Sure Start programmes in reaching minority 
ethnic communities. It found that getting minority ethnic groups to use 
these services “required a combination of ensuring that ‘generalist’ 
mainstream services are accessible to these communities, but also 
providing specialist and targeted services, often depending initially on a 
variety of forms of outreach work”.307  
5.1.2  Accommodation of religion and religious practice  
A key feature of the evolving model of multiculturalism in the UK has been 
the increasing recognition of religion and religious identity, particularly in 
relation to Muslims.  
The existence of an established church has played an important role 
in maintaining space for religious organizations to participate in public life. 
In contrast to many European states, however, such participation is not 
contingent on an official recognition of minority faith communities. The 
Church of England is the established church in England. The sovereign, 
who must be in communion with the Church of England, is supreme 
governor. In Scotland there is no official established church, but the Church 
of Scotland is the national church; its position is guaranteed by the Acts of 
Union. There is no established church in Wales or Northern Ireland. The 
special position of the Church of England is also reflected in other ways. 
The monarch is identified as ‘defender of the faith’ and some bishops from 
the church sit as part of the upper legislative chamber, the House of Lords.  
The accommodation of the rituals and practices of minority faiths is 
not new. As far back as 1764, Muslims were permitted to take an oath on 
the Koran in giving evidence before an English court. Laws allowing ritual 
slaughter, which already existed for kosher meat, were easily extended to 
allow for the requirements of halal meat. The existence of Christian 
chaplaincies in prisons, hospitals and universities has provided the basis 
for securing such services for Muslims. In general, the hijab has not 
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provoked controversies in the UK, in either education or public 
employment, equivalent to that found in other European countries. The UK 
Foreign Office, in partnership with British Muslim communities (through 
the Hajj Advisory Group), established the British Hajj Delegation to 
provide consular and medial support to British citizens undertaking the 
hajj.  
The need to incorporate religion into the multicultural model has 
been strengthened by developments in critical features of integration policy 
in the last decade. Key among these are the extension of anti-discrimination 
law to religious discrimination and inclusion of religion in the 2001 census. 
Analysis of the census and other datasets has made it possible to identify 
specific areas of disadvantage that Muslims experience in employment, 
education and housing.  
The census also made local authorities aware of the size of their 
Muslim populations. At the local level, municipal authorities with 
significant Muslim populations have developed initiatives recognizing that 
engagement with faith identities can be important in reaching parts of the 
community that may not otherwise be accessible to mainstream service 
providers. For example, Tower Hamlets Council in east London worked 
with local imams on the issue of truancy from school. Messages about the 
importance of ensuring children attend school were delivered by imams 
during Friday sermons. The local health service body also commissioned a 
local voluntary-sector organization, Maslaha, to produce videos about 
diabetes, which nurses and doctors could use with Muslim patients in 
discussions on managing diabetes. The videos featured local imams 
emphasizing the importance of moderation in eating through religious 
texts and stories. In another east London borough, Waltham Forest, the 
local hospital includes a Muslim chaplain, and leaders from across different 
faith communities have been trained to be ‘health preachers’ and provide 
advice on healthy living.  
While opportunities for Muslims to participate and engage with 
institutions on the basis of their faith identity have increased, Muslim 
responses to these opportunities have also produced a backlash against 
identity-based social and political mobilization. Much of this has been 
based on the assumption that engaging Muslims on the basis of their faith 
identity reinforces strong Muslim identities, which in turn are viewed by 
some as a threat to social cohesion. Robert Furbey and Mary Macey are 
critical of the development of policies for engaging with faith communities 
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ethnic relations of an association between religion and ethnicity”.308 This 
concern was echoed in the government’s public consultation on extending 
the duties of public bodies to eliminate discrimination and promote 
equality – which existed for the grounds of race, gender and disability – to 
religion and belief. The government noted that there were concerns that 
“extending the coverage of a single public sector duty to religion or belief 
might lead to particular groups being given too strong a voice in 
determining how public services are designed and delivered, which have a 
negative impact on public service provision generally and on community 
cohesion”.309   
At the national level, the government was criticized for failing to pay 
sufficient attention to the values of the Muslim organizations with which it 
engaged.310 It was within this context that the government announced that 
it was “fundamentally rebalancing” its relationship with Muslim civil 
society to direct resources towards those that “uphold shared values and 
reject and condemn violent extremism”.311 The debate on extremism after 
7/7 brought the views and positions of Muslim organizations to greater 
prominence and into sharper focus. New organizations were formed in 
response to the limited range of Muslim voices in the public sphere and 
helped by the government’s commitment to broaden the range of 
organizations that it worked with to reach “those voices which too often 
have been excluded”.312 Some, such as the Sufi Muslim Council and British 
Muslim Forum, were created as alternative ‘representative bodies’ to the 
Muslim Council of Britain; others, such as the Progressive British Muslims 
(launched in November 2005) and the British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy (created in 2006), aligned themselves with particular values. 
Neither claim nor aspire to be representative bodies. 
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5.2  Pillars of the policy set 
5.2.1  Protection from discrimination and violence  
The fundamental pillar of integration policy is the prohibition on 
discrimination. English common law does not prohibit discrimination by 
private individuals. The 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts began to 
remedy this by outlawing direct racial discrimination in public places such 
as restaurants and hotels as well as in employment and housing. Direct 
discrimination was deemed to have occurred in cases where “on the 
grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins”, a person is treated 
less favourably than others.  
In 1976 a new Race Relations Act (replacing previous legislation) 
introduced the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’ into the law. This was a 
significant step forward, as it covered any provision, criteria or practice 
that, while on its face treats everyone the same, has the effect of 
disadvantaging individuals who belong to a particular racial group. 
Measures having such an effect would be unlawful if they could not be 
justified. The concept of indirect discrimination established a legal tool that 
could be used for addressing structural or systemic discrimination, as it 
concerned the adverse impact on a particular racial group of an otherwise 
neutral provision, criteria or practice.  
Two steps taken in the first months of the 1997 Labour government 
reshaped the British approach to tackling discrimination. The first was the 
decision to order a public inquiry into the police handling of the 
investigation into the racist murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. 
The second was to sign the Amsterdam Treaty, which paved the way for 
European anti-discrimination laws.  
The report on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry concluded that the 
failure of the police investigation into the teenager’s death stemmed in part 
from “institutional racism”.313 This was identified as “the collective failure 
of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to 
people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or 
detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to 
discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness 
and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.”  
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The report recognized that such institutional racism could be found 
in other public institutions. In response to the findings of the report the 
government amended the 1976 Race Relations Act in two important ways. 
First, it extended the scope of the law to ensure that it covered the public 
acts of public bodies. Second, it imposed a duty on public bodies to tackle 
unlawful discrimination. This marked an important move towards shifting 
the responsibility for tackling discrimination away from those who suffered 
or experienced discrimination towards placing a duty on public bodies to 
ensure that their policies, practices and procedures did not discriminate in 
the first place. As a consequence of the new duty to tackle racial 
discrimination and promote racial equality, public bodies were required to 
undertake impact assessments on racial equality and to publish racial 
equality schemes and action plans.314 The idea of positive duties on public 
bodies requiring them to take proactive measures to tackle discrimination 
was soon extended to gender and then disability.  
When Labour was elected in 1997, with the exception of Northern 
Ireland, there was no prohibition on religious discrimination in the UK. The 
absence of legal protection against such discrimination became a focal point 
for campaigning by Muslim community and civil society organizations. 
The absence of legal protection was particularly jarring, because Sikhs and 
Jews received protection from discrimination under the Race Relations Act, 
as they were held to constitute a ‘racial group’. In June 1997, the UK, along 
with other European countries, concluded agreement on the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which amended the Treaty of Rome. It paved the way for a 
European directive requiring member states to prohibit discrimination on 
the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
(hereinafter the ‘Framework Directive’).315 Although limited to 
employment, the new regulations implementing the Framework Directive 
were significant in that they showed it was possible to overcome the 
technical difficulties often raised in response to the demands of legal 
regulation in this area. Muslim community and civil society organizations 
continued to campaign for extending the law to other areas to ensure that 
protection from religious discrimination was equal to the protection given 
to racial and ethnic discrimination. The Equality Act 2006 extended the 
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prohibition on religious discrimination to the provision of goods, services 
and facilities and to the public functions of public bodies. Finally, the 
Equality Act 2010 extended the duty of public bodies to tackle 
discrimination to all grounds on which discrimination was prohibited, 
including religion and belief. Religious discrimination now received the 
same protection as racial discrimination.  
The duty to tackle discrimination and promote equal opportunities 
entailed a requirement for public bodies to adopt racial equality strategies. 
The government’s racial equality strategy identified its overarching 
objective as one of “reducing race inequalities”.316 There were specific 
government targets to diminish perceptions of discrimination in a wide 
range of public services, reduce employment inequalities and monitor the 
progress of minority ethnic communities across major public services, from 
education to health. The strategy also acknowledged that “generic 
programmes of support are important but not always sufficient” and that 
“focused support is often appropriate in helping disadvantaged black and 
minority ethnic groups”.317 The Labour government’s 2010 race equality 
strategy noted that “where groups face particular issues” the government 
will “initiate specific projects to work with communities to identify 
solutions”.318   
A further element of the integration framework is the provision of 
specific protection from violence directed at an individual because of 
his/her membership of certain types of groups, namely racial or religious 
groups. The Public Order Act 1986 makes it an offence to incite racial 
hatred. The extension of this law to cover incitement of religious hatred 
proved more controversial and faced resistance from many who argued 
that religion is different from race and that legislation in this area was an 
undue interference with freedom of expression. In the end, legislation was 
passed but differed in its scope to the law on racial hatred in order to give 
greater protection to freedom of expression. A further layer of protection 
from violence directed at a person because of his/her ethnic or religious 
background has been provided by the specification of racially and 
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religiously aggravated offences. These allow existing criminal offences, 
such as assault, to be given more severe punishment where a victim’s race 
or religion was a factor in the crime directed towards them.  
5.2.2  Data collection  
Data collection is the second pillar of integration policy. A recommendation 
to compile ethnic data was first made by a government report into housing 
in 1969.319 Yet it was the introduction of the concept of indirect 
discrimination and its focus on the effect of any provision, criteria or 
practice that gave a real impetus to monitoring. Data collection, in the form 
of ethnic monitoring, is vital to identifying structural disadvantage, 
systemic discrimination and the discriminatory effect of a neutral 
provision. Codes of practice, issued by the Commission for Racial Equality 
to promote compliance with the legislation, emphasized the importance of 
ethnic monitoring. This was done initially by some local authorities in 
employment, but was soon extended to housing, education and other areas.  
Monitoring was further embedded in the policy framework by the 
inclusion of a question on ethnic identity in the 1991 population census. 
The census asked respondents to choose from one of nine options in 
identifying their ethnicity. The categories, conflating ethnicity and race, 
were white, black Caribbean, black African, black other, Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese, and any other ethnic group. The ethnic question in 
the 1991 census largely established the categories and data that shaped 
public policy and debate on integration and multiculturalism. These ethnic 
categories found their way into other public surveys, including the Labour 
Force Survey, the British Crime Survey and many local authority surveys.  
Policy-makers were soon analyzing this data to identify disadvantage 
and discrimination. For example, ethnic data from the Labour Force Survey 
allowed policy-makers to examine whether black and minority ethnic 
groups experienced an ‘ethnic penalty’ in the labour market. The categories 
used in the 1991 census were controversial. They homogenized large and 
diverse groups (black Africans) while rendering others largely invisible 
(Arabs, Irish and Turks). And of course it provided no account of the 
experiences of those from different religious groups. Policy inevitably 
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centred on those groups that were counted and often ignored those that 
were not.  
The 2001 census for England and Wales continued with a question on 
ethnicity, but with 16 ethnic categories from which to choose. The main 
changes were an expansion of the ‘white’ category to cover white British, 
Irish and other, as well as four options within the mixed categories. More 
importantly, for Muslims, the 2001 census included a question on religious 
identity. As with the inclusion of a question on ethnicity in the 1991 census, 
the inclusion of the question on religion in the 2001 census paved the way 
for questions on religion to be asked in a wide range of other public 
surveys and questionnaires. Questions on religion were soon included in 
the British Social Attitudes Survey, the Labour Force Survey, the British 
Crime Survey and the Home Office Citizenship Survey. It also led other 
public bodies to supplement ethnic monitoring forms with questions on 
religion. Furthermore, the baseline data provided by the census allowed 
polling companies to undertake opinion polls of Muslim communities that 
could take the sample characteristics and demographics into account.  
The importance of the inclusion of a question on religion in the 2001 
census and subsequent data collection cannot be underestimated. Evidence-
based policy requires data. Data that reveal structural disadvantage or 
systemic discrimination provide the basis for arguments for targeted 
interventions. The question on religion has significantly shaped public 
policy towards Muslims. For the first time it was possible to examine the 
situation and experiences of Muslims in the UK compared with other faith 
groups. Analysis of these data, for example, has allowed researchers to find 
“some evidence that, controlling for other factors, Muslims have lower 
employment rates than individuals with another, or indeed no, religion”.320  
5.2.3  Good relations and community cohesion  
Promoting harmonious community relations is the third pillar of 
integration policy. From the beginning, integration policy assumed that 
good community relations did not emerge from the ether of good 
intentions but needed to be developed through support and appropriate 
public policy interventions. The 1968 Race Relations Act created a 
Community Relations Commission (CRC), with a duty to “encourage the 
                                                      
320 K. Clarke and S. Drinkwater, Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: Dynamics and 
Diversity, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 2007, p. 48. EVOLVING MODELS OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM | 121 
establishment of harmonious community relations”, defined in this context 
as “relations within the community between people of different colour, race 
or ethnic or national origins”. The CRC was empowered to provide 
training, hold conferences and collect information on community relations. 
The Race Relations Act 1976 replaced the CRC with a Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE). This act also extended the duty to promote good 
race relations to local authorities and then in 2000 to all public bodies. 
While the duty existed in law, it lay largely dormant. The CRE nevertheless 
failed to interpret its duty “in a positive and proactive way” and local 
authorities “focused entirely on the ‘rights agenda’ and the tackling of 
discrimination and inequality, rather than attempting to change the 
attitudes and values of the white community”.321 Despite remaining largely 
dormant, a duty on public bodies to “foster good relations” among people 
of differing characteristics, including differences of religion or belief, was 
included in the Equality Act 2010.  
Still, the most significant change in the area of good relations arose 
from the new emphasis on community cohesion. Ted Cantle, an influential 
figure in the development of community cohesion policy, distinguishes it 
from the broader notion of social cohesion. While the latter covers a range 
of socio-economic factors that affect groups or individuals defined by their 
social class and economic position, ‘community cohesion’ was concerned 
more directly with relationships between communities defined by ethnicity 
or religion.322 Community cohesion also fitted in with the wider, New 
Labour social-capital thesis and approach to social exclusion, which 
focused on the characteristics of the individual and the capital s/he 
possesses rather than on structural inequalities.323 I t  s o u g h t  t o  p r o m o t e  
‘shared values’ and suggested a move away from funding for organizations 
that work with single ethnic or religious groups towards support for those 
working across different communities.  
Cohesion policy was developed through the Community Cohesion 
Pathfinder Programme, which funded programmes that explored “the best 
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means of exploring the ways of increasing community cohesion”.324 
Community cohesion was embedded further in the policy framework by 
imposing a specific legal “duty to promote community cohesion” on 
schools. 
A notable line of criticism challenged the extent to which the accent 
on social capital in community cohesion policies turned attention away 
from the role of social and economic deprivation as well as that of 
inequality. Derek McGhee finds that  
the overwhelming emphasis on the failure of inter-community 
communication and the concern over the absence of established 
common values in cultural disharmonious areas in these 
documents de-emphasizes contributory factors such as poverty, 
exclusion from the workforce, exclusion from consumption. 
Perceived and actual material deprivation was acknowledged in 
places…[but] the overwhelming emphasis is firmly focused on 
cultural recognition and cultural respect and the opening up of the 
channels of communication between cultural groups rather than 
dealing with perceived and actual material deprivation.325 
5.2.4  Immigration and citizenship  
Immigration and citizenship form the fourth pillar of integration policy. 
For Britain, issues of race, nationality and immigration were closely tied to 
its role as a colonial state headed by a monarch. Individuals within the 
British Empire were subjects of the Crown. The 1948 British Nationality Act 
was the first to draw a distinction between two types of British subjects, 
citizens of the Commonwealth and citizens of the UK. Nevertheless, all 
British subjects, whether Commonwealth or UK citizens, were free to enter 
and settle in Britain. Despite this apparently open policy, the arrival in 
post-war Britain of the first black Commonwealth citizens led politicians 
and policy-makers to look at a way of limiting such migration – initially 
through administrative measures and eventually through changing the 
rules. The first formal measures of control were introduced through the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962. Further restrictions on 
Commonwealth immigration to the UK were introduced in 1968. Most 
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notoriously, the 1971 Immigration Act deprived UK citizens of the right to 
enter the UK free of any immigration controls unless they or their parents 
or grandparents were born, naturalized, adopted or registered as a UK 
citizen in the UK. This so-called ‘patriality’ rule, was “a polite way of 
allowing whites in and keeping ‘coloureds’ out”.326 In particular, the 
measure removed the right of entry to the UK from UK citizens of Asian 
origin living in East Africa. Primary immigration from the Commonwealth 
largely ended with the 1971 Immigration Act.  
Restrictions on immigration were argued as necessary in allowing 
new immigrants to be ‘absorbed’ or ‘assimilated’ into the host society. 
Black immigration from the Commonwealth was viewed as giving rise to 
tensions in relations between those of different ‘racial’ groups. Measures 
controlling or restricting immigration were therefore justified as a 
prerequisite to measures supporting integration. This policy was most 
aptly described at the time by the Labour MP Roy Hattersley: “Integration 
without control is impossible, but control without integration is 
indefensible”. Importantly, Commonwealth citizens who did make it into 
the UK had the right to vote in local and national elections. They were also 
eligible to apply for British citizenship after a period of time settled in the 
UK.  
Nationality laws and (non-EU) immigration remain the parts of 
integration policy over which the central government has greatest control. 
This makes it an attractive policy area for government to show that it is 
taking effective action. The shift away from multiculturalism towards 
community cohesion after 2001 meant that the traditional liberal approach 
to citizenship – on the basis of time spent in the UK – was replaced by the 
use of citizenship as a policy tool for developing “a sense of civic identity 
and shared values”.327 Initial measures introduced to achieve this included 
civic ceremonies for new citizens, involving an oath of allegiance and a test 
on language and knowledge of life in the UK. In 2008 the concept of 
‘earned citizenship’ was introduced. Underpinning this was the concern 
that “British citizenship is a privilege that must be earned” and that new 
migrants must earn this “by proving their commitment to the community 
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and the country”.328 To support this, a status of “probationary citizenship” 
was created as a bridge between temporary immigration status and either 
full citizenship or permanent residency rights.329 Crucially, the length of 
this period could be reduced by two years in cases where a person 
demonstrated that they were contributing to the community through 
‘active citizenship’. This could be achieved through ‘formal volunteering’ 
or ‘civic activism’. The idea of taking this further and developing a points-
based system of citizenship was put forward in 2009. This included the 
prospect of “deducting points or applying penalties for not integrating into 
the British way of life, for criminal or anti-social behaviour, or in 
circumstances where an active disregard for UK values is demonstrated”.330 
5.2.5  Education and employment  
Education is largely plural and multicultural. The existence of state-funded 
Roman Catholic and Jewish schools, alongside Protestant Church of 
England schools, allowed Muslims to argue for the state funding of Muslim 
faith schools. In 2010 there were only 11 state-funded Muslim schools in the 
UK.331 The vast majority of Muslim pupils are therefore educated in the 
non-Muslim state schools; this includes both Christian schools and non-
religious schools.  
The impact of faith schools on social cohesion remains controversial. 
In 2005, David Bell, the head of the Office for Standards in Education 
(Ofsted) said,  
[f]aith should not be blind. I worry that many young people are 
being educated in faith-based schools, with little appreciation of 
their wider responsibilities and obligations to British society. This 
growth in faith schools needs to be carefully but sensitively 
monitored by government to ensure that pupils receive an 
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understanding of not only their own faith but of other faiths and 
the wider tenets of British society.332  
Furthermore, Islamic schools in particular, were said to be a “threat to 
national identity”.  
The state regulates aspects of education relating to religion. State 
schools must provide religious education for all registered pupils, although 
parents can choose to withdraw their children from these lessons. In 
England and Wales, schools other than voluntary-aided schools and those 
of a religious character must teach religious education according to the 
locally agreed syllabus. Each agreed syllabus must reflect the fact that the 
religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian, while taking 
account of the teachings and practices of the other principal religions 
represented in Great Britain.  
Pupils in state schools are also required to take part in daily collective 
worship, which shall be “wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian 
character”, although parents have the right to withdraw their children from 
attending collective acts of worship. Furthermore, schools can seek an 
exemption from the requirement for broadly Christian worship, for the 
school or for some pupils within the school where it is inappropriate 
because of the pupils’ faith background. This approach to school prayers 
highlights how national policy frameworks have to be implemented locally, 
taking into account local contexts.  
There are several aspects of education policy that reflect a 
multicultural approach. First, there is specific funding targeting the needs 
of pupils from minority ethnic groups. Additional funding for schools with 
pupils from minority ethnic backgrounds has been in place since 1968. 
Initially used to fund additional language support, in 1998 its scope was 
extended to include action to support achievement across all minority 
ethnic groups. The funding was renamed the Ethnic Minority Achievement 
Grant. Second, there is a distinct government strategy for raising 
achievement among ethnic minority pupils.333 Third, there is recognition of 
the need for supporting and respecting different cultural identities. 
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“Aiming High”, the strategy for increasing ethnic minority achievement, 
emphasizes the need for teachers to reflect diversity throughout their 
lessons. Nevertheless, a government-commissioned review of the approach 
to the education curriculum for diversity and citizenship found a lack of 
buy-in with respect to the importance of diversity in some schools and 
insufficient clarity about flexibility in the curriculum. It also found that 
pupils are not given a strong enough voice, and that “[t]he notion of racial 
hierarchies has not altogether disappeared and stereotypes still abound in 
society”.334 Fourth, racial equality targets are used to monitor and measure 
progress. Since 2009, schools have been required to set targets for raising 
the attainment of underperforming groups, including pupils from minority 
ethnic groups. Finally, action on racial equality is monitored and enforced 
through existing mechanisms that inspect the performance of public 
bodies. In the case of education, Ofsted, the body responsible for inspecting 
standards in schools, looks at the effectiveness with which the school 
promotes equal opportunity and tackles discrimination. Racial equality is 
likely to be taken seriously, as any school found to be inadequate in its 
equalities assessment will be rated inadequate overall.  
Meanwhile, the shift in policy from multiculturalism to community 
cohesion and its focus on shared values and identity had a particular 
impact on education. For example, citizenship education was made a 
compulsory part of the national curriculum for students aged 11-16 in 2002. 
Concerns about the impact of de facto ethnic segregation in schools in some 
areas were also expressed in the reports on the 2001 ‘riots’. One response to 
this was to impose a legal duty on schools to promote community 
cohesion.335  
Policy interventions targeted at particular communities were 
embedded in the implementation of social inclusion policies, including 
employment policies. Following a government review of the labour market 
position of ethnic minorities, an Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce 
was created by the Department for Work and Pensions to address the 
specific barriers to labour market participation faced by individuals from 
different minority groups. The needs of ethnic minorities were also 
identified in policies on skills training. A strategy on skills development 
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acknowledged that “raising participation in training and employment by 
ethnic minority groups will be a major element of the reviews of skills 
supply which we are commissioning from the Sector Skills Councils”.336 
The document notes that the National Employer Training Programme 
would take into account the needs of ethnic minorities, and that two new 
Centres of Vocational Excellence for Entrepreneurship would focus 
specifically on black and ethnic minority entrepreneurs.  
5.2.6  Urban regeneration  
The opportunities for Muslims to participate in the public sphere on the 
basis of their faith identity also expanded in the area of urban regeneration 
policy. This was supported by an increasing emphasis on the importance of 
consultation and engagement with communities in developing effective 
government policy interventions, and a move towards a neighbourhood- 
based regeneration strategy. In its national strategy for neighbourhood 
renewal, the Labour government stated that “communities need to be 
consulted and listened to, and the most effective interventions are often 
those where communities are actively involved in their design and 
delivery, and where possible in the driving seat. This applies as much to 
c o m m u n i t i e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  a s  i t  d o es to geographical communities”.337 It 
recognized that faith communities are able to draw upon significant 
resources in terms of people, networks, organizations and buildings. 
Furthermore, government guidance for the initiatives on Local Strategic 
Partnerships, Neighbourhood Management, Community Empowerment 
Networks and the New Deal for Communities, mention the need to engage 
with faith communities.338 
Within the context of engaging with faith communities, the needs of 
minority faith communities may be significantly different from those of the 
majority faith community. The 2002 Local Government Association report 
on the relationship between faith-based organizations and the government 
recognized that minority faith communities “have particular difficulty 
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engaging with existing consultation processes and accessing funds, yet they 
are likely to be in particular need of help: they are often concentrated in 
areas of severe deprivation, they coincide with minority ethnic 
communities and they may lack the skills required to engage with wider 
structures”.339 Faith community organizations may be the only community 
organizations in neighbourhoods where the social infrastructure has been 
eroded. Furthermore, “in terms of active membership churches, mosques, 
temples, synagogues and gurdwaras are often among the most substantial 
local community-based organizations, with as much right to be involved in 
discussion on neighbourhood renewal as, for example, residents’ or 
tenants’ organizations”.340 It is recognized that faith community groups 
may be the best means of reaching those in need within their faith 
community and sometimes those in the wider community.341 
Within central government the role of engaging with faith 
communities was initially given to the Cohesion and Faith Unit in the 
Home Office. In 2004 the Home Office published a report that reviewed 
government engagement with faith communities. The review contains 
recommendations for national and local consultations by public authorities 
as well as advice to faith communities themselves. The government 
acknowledges that its recognition of the significant role faith communities 
can play in neighbourhood renewal and social inclusion “has yet to be 
reflected fully in local practice. The broad picture is still patchy, with 
enthusiasm in some areas matched by apparent reluctance to involve faith 
communities in others.” They note that “there is a low level of involvement 
of faith communities other than the main Christian Churches…the 
principle that faith communities are valuable partners in regeneration is 
widely promoted, but the practice in translating this into substantial 
outcomes is ‘work in progress’”.342  
The Labour government also enhanced its role in developing the 
capabilities of the faith community sector, principally through a capacity-
building fund for faith communities launched in 2005. The fund has two 
main goals: capacity building and interfaith activity. The former 
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encourages leadership, mentorship and good relationships with 
government bodies, while the latter promotes activities among faith 
communities, including implementing services and activities through a 
partnership approach. Almost 100 Muslim community groups and 
organizations are identified as having received grants from the first round 
of this fund and 46 from the second round.343 The need for working across 
different groups was emphasized by the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion, led the Communities and Local Government department in 2008 
to shift its focus to cross-community work, as outlined in the document 
entitled Face to Face and Side by Side: A framework for partnership in our multi-
faith society.344 The framework sought to “create more local opportunities 
for both face-to-face dialogue, which supports a greater understanding of 
shared values, as well as an appreciation of distinctiveness, and for side-by-
side collaborative social action, where people come together and share their 
time, energy and skills to improve their local neighbourhood”. The strategy 
was accompanied by a £4 million “Faiths in Action” grant for funding 
programmes for faith and interfaith work in England.  
Funding for developing the capacity of Muslim community groups 
has also been available through the community leadership fund. A variety 
of Muslim organizations received grants that totalled £1.6 million in 2009–
10. These ranged from £3,000 to the Muslim Welfare Association to over 
£126,000 to the Kayaal Theatre.345  
5.2.7  Policing and counter-terrorism  
The British approach of ‘policing by consent’ requires the trust and 
confidence of the communities being policed. Experiences of unfair and 
discriminatory policing have often been the trigger for civic disturbances in 
black and minority ethnic communities. The challenge faced by the police 
was made clear by the finding of “institutional racism” in the police force 
by the report on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Measures taken in response 
to that report include targets on recruitment and retention of police from 
black and minority ethnic groups.  
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After 9/11 attention turned to the need for greater engagement with 
Muslim communities through partnership work. The Metropolitan Police 
supported the creation of the Muslim Safety Forum, to provide an 
opportunity for Muslim civil society organizations to discuss policing and 
security concerns with the police. A Muslim Contact Unit was also set up 
by the police. It “worked with Muslim communities as partners rather than 
informants” and in taking this approach signalled a “radical departure 
from traditional counter-terrorism policing”.346  
After the 7/7 bombings the imperatives of security overrode the 
concerns about funding for groups concentrated on single communities or 
on community cohesion. In the aftermath of the bombings, several 
initiatives were developed exclusively for Muslim communities. These 
included the establishment of Muslim Forums against Extremism and 
Islamophobia (highlighting debate and ideas); a Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board “to promote a more open and modern role for 
mosques”; and the Radical Middle Way, a road show involving Islamic 
religious scholars.  
In April 2007 an action plan to “step up work with Muslim 
communities to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism” was 
published, entitled Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning hearts and minds 
(hereinafter the ‘PVE initiative’).347 It outlined four approaches: i) 
promoting shared values (e.g. through citizenship education in madrasahs 
and supplementary schools); ii) supporting local solutions (e.g. funding 
around 70 local authorities in their own work with local groups, including 
work with universities on student radicalism); iii) building civic capacity 
and leadership; and iv) strengthening the role of faith institutions and 
leaders (including raising the standards of governance in mosques, with 
the development of accredited professional development for imams). In 
June 2008, a further strategy document, Prevent, was published providing 
guidance to local authorities, police and other local agencies on how to 
prevent extremism.348 A significant part of the prevent strategy is funding 
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for local authorities to support and engage local civil society organizations 
in working towards the goals of the PVE initiative. The aim of the funding 
is the development of “resilient British Muslim communities”. As a result, 
the fund is directed at “local authorities with sizeable Muslim 
communities”.349 An initial £6.5 million was allocated in 2007 to the PVE 
“Pathfinder” fund. A further three-year grant of £45 million for local 
authorities was announced for the period 2008–11. At the local level this 
has also involved support from the police for Salafist and Islamist groups 
that have proven effective in challenging recruitment by al-Qaeda.350  
Most of the funding for the prevent strategy is given to local 
authorities. There are also a range of national projects that receive this 
funding, which include the “Contextualizing British Islam” project at 
Cambridge University and funding for the Schools Development and 
Support Agency for work on “Islam and Citizenship” education. Other 
examples of working with Muslim communities include the creation of a 
Muslims Women’s Advisory Group and a Young Muslims Advisory 
Group. Both were developed in the context of preventing radicalization, 
and as such have no parallels in other faith communities. 
5.3  Conclusions  
The fundamental pillars of Britain’s integration policies – protection from 
discrimination and violence, data collection, control of immigration and 
duties to promote good community relations – have been in place for over 
60 years. Although established in a period when minorities were viewed 
primarily through the lens of race and colour, they have developed and 
become more deeply embedded in response to recognition of Britain’s 
increasing ethnic and religious diversity. The concentration of minority 
groups in Britain’s urban centres and local level discretion and autonomy 
in implementing key aspects of social policy have combined with the 
strengthening of these central integration pillars to create a context in 
which multiculturalism has largely persisted as a feature of policy design. 
This is the case for social policy fields spanning from education and 
employment to urban regeneration and policing.  
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Policy-makers have nonetheless had to react to growing concerns 
about the perceived impact of multiculturalism in contributing towards 
fractured societies in which minority groups are thought to live in 
segregated and ‘parallel lives’ to those of the mainstream. The main policy 
response to the civic disturbances of 2001 has been promoting community 
cohesion, in particular shared values and common identities. In policy 
areas such as education, this has forged an additional range of duties and 
activities for schools, citizenship classes and actions to promote cohesion, 
but these exist alongside policies with a more multicultural flavour. During 
the period of the Labour government the greatest change was in areas over 
which central government retains greatest control. First, in the area of 
immigration and citizenship, a liberal approach to the access of citizenship 
that had been based on time spent living in the UK was replaced by policies 
requiring active steps towards integration. Second, the Labour government 
became more selective in the organizations it was willing to engage with 
and support as civil society partners. Increasing emphasis was placed on 
the values of the organizations to which government funding was made 
available. A frequent criticism of multiculturalism was that it gave rise to 
funding for specific ethnic groups and in doing so had led groups to 
concentrate on their differences. After 7/7, however, attempts to shift 
funding away from organizations that work with particular ethnic or 
religious groups gave way to a programme of funding to prevent violent 
extremism, which was largely directed at Muslim civil society 
organizations. The developments in policing illustrate how the 
fundamental need for policy-makers to be effective makes them pragmatic, 
working with the communities and groups present in the local context.  
The direction of policy under the coalition government formed in 
May 2010 remains unsettled. An apparent shift in the policy approach was 
signalled by Prime Minister David Cameron in his speech at a security 
conference in Germany in February 2011. There he argued that the root of 
the terrorist threat the UK faces lies in the ideology of “Islamist 
extremism”, and he maintained that government policy needed to confront 
not only those who support violence but also those “who may reject 
violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist worldview, 
including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values”.351 
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The speech also makes an explicit connection between the threat from 
terrorism and multiculturalism, linking the appeal of Islamist extremism to 
the weakening of collective identity under “state multiculturalism”. 
Yet the practical implications of thi s  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  u n c l e a r .  O n e  
policy shift suggested in the speech was a “shrewder” approach to the 
organizations the government engages with and the identification of a 
series of questions that would be used for judging who the government 
works with, centred on support and belief in human rights, democracy and 
equality before the law. It is not evident how much further this will go than 
the previous government’s strategy of directing support towards those who 
“uphold shared values and condemn or reject violent extremism”.352 A 
more significant policy shift may arise from rejecting the use of non-violent 
extremists in keeping young persons away from violent extremism. 
Although not mentioned explicitly, this appears to be a repudiation of 
counter-terrorism work with individuals and groups from Wahhabi and 
Salafi traditions. It remains to be seen whether this approach survives 
contact with the practical needs on the ground. 
In his speech, the Prime Minister talked about the need for a shift 
from what was characterized as “the passive tolerance of recent years” to a 
“much more active muscular liberalism”353 in which certain values are 
actively promoted, including freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
democracy, the rule of law and equal rights regardless of race, gender or 
sexuality. Indeed, two policies towards which significant parts of the 
Conservative Party are hostile or sceptical – the Human Rights Act and the 
Equality Act 2010 – anchor “muscular liberalism” to the legal and policy 
framework through the duties they place on public bodies to respect the 
European Convention on Human Rights, tackle discrimination and 
promote equal treatment. The speech also leaves unresolved the tensions 
between efforts on the one hand to encourage greater interaction and 
integration, and those on the other hand under the ‘big society’ policy 
agenda to encourage groups, including faith-based organizations, to take a 
greater role in the design and delivery of a broad range of public services. 
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Introduction – Spanish identity and religion  
The Spanish religious context is essential to an understanding of the 
integration process of the Muslim population. During the dictatorship of 
General Franco (1936–75) in Spain, Catholicism was the official state 
religion and one of the elements contributing to national identity. Spain 
was a religious state where nationalist Catholic ideology prevailed. Indeed, 
until the passing of the Act Regulating the Exercise of Civil Law and 
Religious Freedom on 28 June 1967, Catholicism was the only religion 
allowed. From that moment onwards religious freedom was regulated 
differently, more specifically, Catholicism was public while all other 
religions were considered private, meaning that they could only be 
practised in private.  
Looking back over the past 35 years, Spain’s identity was clearly 
outlined and fundamentally based on three overarching factors: religion, 
culture and ideology (see Figure 6.1). This identity was the basis for a legal 
framework and a set of policies that were designed to uphold that identity, 
which was so strict that those not sharing all of these identity factors were 
considered illegal. EMERGING HYBRID INTERCULTURALISM IN SPAIN | 135 




These factors still exist today but operate in a much more open 
fashion, some carrying more weight than others. There is no doubt, 
however, that they are all undergoing a transformation process (see Figure 
6.2). One only needs to pick up a newspaper to see the debates underway 
on the organization of the state – the flag, national anthem, language, 
gender, religion and family, and its relation to Europe. 
While these changes have taken place in Spanish society, they have 
not yet settled into the mindset of Spanish identity. That is why most 
Spanish citizens consider Muslims ‘outsiders’ and fail to understand how 
someone can be both Spanish and Muslim. Spanish public opinion 
identifies Muslim with alien, which, while not causing problems for the 
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Figure 6.2 Spanish identity, 2008 
 
 
Identity is a complex construction involving many factors, which can 
be classified under those helping to build horizontal and those contributing 
to vertical identity. Vertical identity has to do with family culture, origin, 
the beliefs passed down from parents to children and family customs, 
while horizontal identity relates to the era into which one has been born, 
the culture of the moment and what one observes from the surroundings. 
The intersection of these two gives rise to a complex identity. The 
horizontal factor is typically much stronger than the vertical one – the 
essence of intergenerational conflict – especially in Europe with its access to 
global information and cultural influences. The conflict is only 
‘generational’ if adolescents identify with their social surroundings and if 
this is not the case a watered-down version of vertical identity takes 
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precedence. In the view of some authors (e.g. Sageman, 2008354), an 
internally perpetrated terrorist attack is more likely in Europe than in the 
US. For US residents, America is essentially a land of opportunity and a 
melting pot of cultures; regardless of whether this is actually true, that is 
what people believe and everyone can identify with it. A recent survey 
showed that 71% of the Muslims living in the US claimed to believe in the 
American dream, while the overall survey average was only 64%. European 
identity is much less inclusive and can be defined nationally by some 
characteristics with which it is hard for a Muslim to identify. This situation 
is especially magnified in Spain, where ‘Catholicism’ is a substantial part of 
the national identity; in short, it is difficult to be both Spanish and Muslim. 
If we do not rethink the factors constituting identity, we could be in 
for a generation of Spaniards who profess the Muslim religion but who do 
not identify with the country. Young people who are familiar with modern 
information technology and who feel they do not belong are among the 
profile characteristics of the new jihadists. 
6.1  The problem of integration  
6.1.1  The first generation of Muslim immigrants 
Some general observations regarding integration can be made now that a 
sufficient amount of time has elapsed during the second stage of 
immigration from the predominately Muslim countries. Theoretically 
speaking, immigration can be broken down into four dimensions: two 
classified as socio-economic, referring to the individual’s integration into 
society from the viewpoint of assuring a dignified life; and two classified as 
anthropological–cultural, having to do with culture and identity. Table 6.1 
presents the elements making up each of these dimensions. 
Using computers as an example, we could associate the socio-
economic dimensions with the hardware and the anthropological–cultural 
ones with the software. This analogy allows us to define some symbolic 
elements further on. 
Integration in both dimensions develops simultaneously but not in all 
the various elements at the same time, and more significantly, not in a 
linear fashion. Let us trace the integration process of an immigrant who 
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comes to Spain. Initially the individual will seek to satisfy the structural 
elements, i.e. procure the necessary documents, find work, look for housing 
(surely rental as opposed to ownership at the outset) and cover health 
necessities. This dimension will be the central element of concern but that is 
not to say that the individual is ignoring the other elements comprising the 
cognitive–cultural dimension (language, values, beliefs and lifestyle) or the 
identity dimension (sense of belonging and identification). The immigrant 
will certainly try to keep these elements stable and in so doing will use the 
most efficient and safe system possible – seeking out a social and cultural 
space similar to the home environment, a ‘warm’ place.  
Table 6.1. Dimensions of integration 
Dimensions Elements 
Socio-economic Structural 
-  Legal situation 
-  Labour market 
-  Housing 
-  Health 
-  Education 
Social 
-  Social relationships 





-  Language 
-  Cultural values 
-  Political values 
-  Religious beliefs 
-  Lifestyles 
Identity  
-  Subjective sense of belonging 
-  Identification with the society  
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Vidal (2006).  
 
Normally the immigrant seeks contact with people from his/her 
home country and frequents places where one can keep in touch with what 
is going on back home, where they play the same sports, laugh at his/her 
jokes and eat the same food. In a certain sense, the immigrant is EMERGING HYBRID INTERCULTURALISM IN SPAIN | 139 
simultaneously living in two societies.355 If the person decides to regroup 
with the family back home or to form one, s/he will probably have to 
broaden social relationships (which often occurs through the school 
system), hence bringing about a change in the individual’s social 
dimension.  
Therefore, as the immigrant becomes more established, s/he will 
progressively extend these dimensions until a point is reached where one 
does not need to continue further or where the next steps are too great an 
added burden. (If the socio-economic dimension is thriving, one can live in 
a host society without ever having to fully complete the integration 
process.) Some French analysts have suggested that part of the crisis their 
model has experienced stems from practically all of their policies being 
focused on gaining access to the socio-economic dimension (albeit 
precariously). The model has been unable to withstand even the first 
indications of economic crisis affecting the structural aspects. A sense of 
belonging and identity has never developed and the second generation has 
no clue as to where it is from, with the prevailing attitude of “since the cars 
are not mine I couldn’t care less if they burn”.356 
The experience of other European countries allows us to draw the 
conclusion that the policies to develop the hardware are necessary but 
insufficient and that other types of policies need to be applied to develop 
the software, especially concerning the second generation. This observation 
confirms that the migratory process within the EU has entered a new stage 
and it is within this ambit that effective, long-term policies need to be 
applied. 
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6.1.2  Perceptions of the first-generation Muslim population 
As a follow-up to an initial 2006 study, a second one was conducted in 
Spain in 2007 to gain insight into the opinions held by the immigrant 
Muslim population. The study conducted by Metroscopia was funded by 
the ministries of justice, labour and social affairs, and the interior.357 
The survey was conducted during June and July 2007 involving 2,000 
persons from Morocco (57% of the sample), Senegal (12%), Pakistan (11%), 
Algeria (5%) and Gambia, Mali, Bangladesh, Mauritania and Nigeria (all 
under 5%).  
The questions were designed to discover Muslim immigrants’ 
perceptions of their integration process in Spain, their standard of living, 
their labour and family situations, their image of Spain and their 
expectations. The results showed a Muslim population that is integrated 
into Spanish society, westernized and tolerant. This mirrors the results of 
the study conducted by the Pew Research Center in Washington  D.C., 
which in 2005 confirmed that Spain had a Muslim community that was 
very well integrated.  
To put these results into perspective, the Metroscopia study pointed 
out that the population interviewed (aged over 16) was mostly made up of 
first-generation immigrants who tend to compare their current situation in 
Spain with the living conditions they endured in their countries of origin, 
which could account for such positive responses. The study also 
highlighted what is technically referred to as the “social desirability bias” 
of the responses, meaning that when faced with highly controversial 
questions the interviewee tends to respond according to what the 
individual considers the socially acceptable and valued norms of his/her 
surroundings. Bearing these initial aspects in mind, the Metroscopia study 
provides us with valuable information concerning the perceptions held by 
the Muslim population about their integration process in Spanish society.  
According to available data, those who have been in Spain the longest 
express more positive opinions about the host society and their integration, 
while 56% of those who have been in the country for less than a year share 
that positive opinion. The breakdown by nationality shows that 91% of the 
immigrants from Bangladesh and 86% of those from Pakistan claim to feel 
comfortable in Spain. Regarding the reasons immigrants do not feel at 
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home in Spain, the survey pointed to a lack of work (46% of those surveyed 
say that this is the main reason), distance from family and friends, 
difficulties encountered in procuring necessary documents, homesickness 
and a hostile attitude shown by the Spanish population (15% of the total).  
The majority of those surveyed had a family member (48%) or a 
friend (21%) residing in Spain when they arrived. Of those who had a 
family member, 43% had a brother, 21% a father or mother and only 2% 
had a son or daughter. Only 12% of those surveyed claimed to live alone. 
The majority of the married immigrants have spouses of their same 
nationality, with marriages involving Spanish nationals accounting for only 
5% of the total.  
With regard to social participation, the vast majority (80% of those 
surveyed) claims not to belong to any association. Despite this low level of 
social participation, most (83%) of those surveyed considered themselves 
adapted to Spanish life and customs. Half of those surveyed said they 
could understand, speak and read Spanish without difficulty. The majority 
of the Moroccan (51%) and Algerian (54%) immigrants claimed to have no 
language difficulties while those from Pakistan (60%) and Bangladesh 
(59%) reported difficulties with the Spanish language. Among those 
surveyed, 80% considered language an important obstacle at the beginning 
and this is especially true of the Pakistanis, with a figure of 86%.  
While 61% felt that their expectations had been met, 35% said that 
this was not at all the case; 53% of the Senegalese felt disappointed and 
while 57% of the Pakistanis felt that their expectations would be met over 
the long term, only 38% of the Senegalese believe this to be the case. The 
unemployment rate for Muslims as a group is higher than that of Spanish 
nationals, at 22% for the former and 7% for the latter. The unemployment 
rate for the immigrant population as a whole (12%) is also lower than that 
for the Muslim group. The study also p o i n t s  t o  a  s e r i o u s  l a c k  o f  j o b  
stability: 25% of workers have a permanent contract, around 60% have 
temporary contracts and 18% admit that they work illegally. Of those 
surveyed, 26% are skilled labourers, 20% are unskilled labourers, 14% are 
unskilled personnel, 13% work as store clerks/salespersons, 10% as 
business owners with employees and 8% as day labourers. The educational 
level is low: 36% of those surveyed dropped out of school at the age of 10 
and only 9% have a university education.  
Immigrants take a positive view of Spain: 88% feel that there is a 
great degree of freedom, 85% say that everyone is cared for equally at 
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feel that everyone’s religious beliefs are respected. Moreover, 75% feel that 
people are honest and respectful, 72% hold that there are no differences 
between men and women and 68% feel that immigrants are well received.  
Concerning religion, 49% of those surveyed describe themselves as 
very religious, 34% practise their faith irregularly or on occasion and 16% 
consider themselves non-practising Muslims. Some 52% of those surveyed 
claim to fully or almost fully follow the advice and guidelines offered by 
the imam (Muslim ministers) of their mosques, while 38% claim to pay 
little or no heed to these guidelines. Only 13% claim to have encountered 
obstacles in practising their faith.  
With regard to difficulties, a lack of mosques is the one most 
frequently mentioned (by 61% of those who claim to have come up against 
difficulties, 13% of the total). It is noteworthy that the longer the period of 
residence in Spain, the greater the negative perceptions on this subject. 
While only 7% of recent arrivals (less than a year in Spain) claim to have 
encountered difficulties practising their religion, this percentage rises to 
12% among those who have been living in Spain for more than 10 years. 
From among the total group of 13% that has experienced obstacles, 
immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan are those with the lowest degree 
of integration. According to this study, this group is unhappier, feels that 
its expectations have not been met and expresses more serious doubts in 
relation to being able to meet these in the future. They also have a less 
positive image of Spanish society and feel that they have been victims of 
more acts of racism and xenophobia. And lastly, they value the Muslim 
religion over others and have a more positive image of Islamic countries 
than the rest of the interviewees. They are also more accepting of and likely 
to justify Islamic fundamentalism: 14% of this group feel that those who 
perpetrate terrorist attacks are martyrs for the cause of Islam and 11% 
consider Osama bin Laden as Islam’s liberator from the grip of the West.  
Among all the interviewees, only 28% felt that in 2007 in Spain the 
Muslim religion was rejected or mistrusted. The Metroscopia survey 
confirms the results of the study conducted in 2006 by the Pew Research 
Centre, i.e. in general terms those surveyed take a favourable view of 
Western society and its values. For example, only 12% feel that mixed 
marriages are unacceptable. Yet Spanish society is among those with the 
most unfavourable and critical views of the Muslim world. 
Although this study indicates that the Muslim population residing in 
Spain has accepted Western customs, the study carried out by the Pew 
Research Centre shows that 83% of the Spanish population associate the 
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violence.358 Here we find a key element in the analysis – the outlook of 
Spanish society. 
6.1.3  Perceptions of Spanish society 
In addition to the dynamics of the immigrant situation, we must also factor 
in those emanating from the host society. Spanish society is having 
difficulty understanding the changes it is undergoing and in these 
circumstances it is easy to put the blame on immigrants. As mentioned 
earlier, it is very significant that the perceptions of Spanish society held by 
the immigrants from predominately Muslim countries are better than the 
opinion the latter holds of these immigrants. There are a number of 
elements contributing to this situation. 
On the one hand, we have the arrival of immigrants, and although 
this has been taking place over two decades, in the last few years there has 
been an ‘avalanche’. In quantitative terms and considering the economic 
and demographic structure of Spain, the flow of immigrants can readily be 
absorbed but the public does not perceive it in this light. Another factor is 
that in Spain the religious transition did not coincide in time with the political 
transition. Indeed, some authors maintain that the latter would not have 
taken hold had the former not been postponed. In this context, despite an 
intense process of social secularization, Catholicism continues to form part 
of Spanish identity and therefore being Muslim, while respectable, is 
clearly ‘not from here’. These two elements negatively reinforced one 
another in the aftermath of the Madrid attacks, adding an element of 
danger associated with immigrants and Muslims. 
As could be expected, this subject has been on the political agenda 
but on many occasions only to exacerbate the problem. In the municipal 
elections of May 2007, some political parties included the Muslim issue on 
their platform. Probably the most glaring case was the city of Badalona, 
where the opposition party based its campaign on not conceding public 
land to the Muslim community for the construction of a mosque.359 Spanish 
urban regulations include what is known as land allocation for religious 
services, which traditionally has been applied to Catholic parishes. When 
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the city council tried to apply this same principle to the Muslim faith, a 
number of local residents protested, giving the impression that there is only 
one religion in Spain. 
In the March 2008 general parliamentary elections, immigration was 
one of the issues. In this context, there was a call to draw up an integration 
contract to guarantee that immigrants adopt Spanish customs and the 
ensuing discussion included the Islamic veil as an example of a ‘non-
Spanish element’. A large proportion of Spanish society took part in the 
debate, expressing the opinion that the veil is not Spanish. 
Being Spanish today can mean complying with a whole list of 
requirements and not only those related to being Catholic, heterosexual, 
white and a speaker of Castilian (standard) Spanish. For example, it is 
common practice for the media to use the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Spanish’ to 
refer to two different worlds when the comparative terms should be 
‘Spanish’ and ‘Moroccan’ or ‘Catholic’ and ‘Muslim’. Language is of 
fundamental importance in this respect, because underlying this situation 
is the belief that being Muslim is incompatible with being Spanish. 
6.1.4  Religious communities as sources of identity 
Traditionally Spain has had a difficult time accepting ‘things Arab’, the 
result of centuries of troublesome border relations. This has created a less-
than-favourable mindset towards North Africans and translated into 
dozens of verbal expressions that persist. This situation has usually been 
interpreted more in cultural than religious terms, although components of 
the latter have also played a role. After 9/11 and subsequent terrorist 
attacks, however, this interpretation changed, producing a qualitative leap 
with regard to cultural identity. 
Up to the time of the attacks, immigrants from predominately 
Muslim countries represented a challenge for integration efforts owing to 
the cultural friction that, as already mentioned, forms part of the overall 
Spanish mindset. But since the attacks, religion has also formed part of this 
mindset. The term ‘Moors’ had typically been used, but not ‘Muslims’. This 
change in the public discourse has had a powerful effect on this group, 
which has even gone so far as to accept this relationship between culture 
and religion as being true. 
Evidence emerging in recent years focusing on Muslim communities 
in Spain is unanimous in affirming that religious communities are 
beginning to become welcoming sites for immigrants. Many immigrants 
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their faith or not, turn to religious communities for direction and to 
socialize. Muslim communities appear as a cultural oasis.360 In places where 
the Muslim population is large enough, it groups together by nationality 
and we can thus identify, for example, the Pakistani religious community 
and its Moroccan counterpart a mere 200 metres apart but with clearly 
differentiated cultural realities. The need for cultural contact outweighs 
that of religion but in the final analysis it is the latter that is the feature of 
attraction. If transitory, this situation would not pose a problem; the danger 
is if it becomes permanent.  
The integration policies of the different administrations are based on 
the fact that the municipalities and NGOs are the main centres of reception 
for these immigrants, but studies show that the religious communities 
(preferentially ‘national’ ones) are the true ports of entry through which 
services are obtained. These are likewise the places where immigrants are 
taught ‘how one lives in Spain’ or ‘how to be Muslim in Spain’.  
The media pressure exerted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
and the incorporation of religion into the existing cultural conflict has 
caused communities to fold into themselves, making integration even more 
difficult. 
6.2  Models and policies for the integration of Muslim 
communities in Spain 
6.2.1  Religious pluralism in Spain  
Religious diversity in Spain is not a recent phenomenon but one that has 
been present throughout the country’s history, albeit in very different 
socio-political situations and circumstances. Nevertheless, the phenomenon 
has only become visible again in recent periods. 
The increase in immigration in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s was a 
key factor in terms of galvanizing religious pluralism. It is nonetheless 
important to stress the futility of attempting to normalize religious 
pluralism solely on the basis of this premise and formulate measures to 
manage religious diversity through immigration policies alone. For as these 
immigrants acquire citizenship, migratory policies are no longer effective, 
and placing too much emphasis on origin as a factor determining identity 
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does not facilitate the implementation of policies designed to promote 
social cohesion. 
With regard to the Muslim communities in Spain, there are simply no 
real, specific data available on believers, but they are estimated to stand at 
1.2 million persons. Broadly speaking, four groups can be distinguished: 
immigrants from Muslim majority countries, naturalized Muslims, converts 
and second-generation Muslims. Two aspects should be taken into account. 
First, individuals from Muslim majority countries should not automatically 
be identified as Muslims (13–18% of those polled do not declare themselves 
to be Muslims). And second, just like the children of believers of other 
faiths, second-generation Muslims are in the process of losing or changing 
their religious beliefs and practices. 
The only source of objective information available is the Registry of 
Religious Entities (RER) kept by the ministry of justice, which reports a 
total of 792 Muslim communities registered in June 2010. It should 
nonetheless be noted that registration is not compulsory and the number of 
communities is in fact higher, approaching 1,000.  
6.2.2   Muslim communities in Spain and their institutionalization  
The institutionalization of Islam in Spain has grown swiftly in recent years. 
In April 2005 there were only 262 communities registered in the RER; by 
June 2010 there were almost 800. These are not newly created communities, 
but rather newly registered communities, essentially because registration in 
the RER allows them to apply for financial grants for developing projects, 
managed by the Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia. Moreover, 
registration in the RER provides them a legal personality and facilitates 
interaction with the public administrations and the vicinity. 
The geographical distribution of these communities encompasses the 
entire Spanish territory, although their presence in some autonomous 
communities is more marked than in others: 20% are in Catalonia, 14% in 
Andalusia, 12% in the Madrid region and 10% in Valencia. 
Barring exceptional cases of highly developed Muslim communities, 
most share a series of common features:  
•  they are very young communities with relatively short trajectories;  
•  their situation can be qualified as precarious in terms of both places 
of worship and the management of their financial and human 
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•  they have very scant knowledge of the Spanish legal framework and 
of their rights and obligations; and  
•  they offer a basic catalogue of activities to their believers, and in 
many cases, to those in their immediate environment. 
According to data compiled by the National Institute of Statistics, 
2.18% of the resident population in Spain comes from Muslim majority 
countries and of these 13.47% now holds Spanish nationality. The number 
of these naturalized immigrants, coupled with the foreseeable increase of 
those born in Spain and therefore automatically entitled to Spanish 
nationality, makes it reasonable to assume that these figures will rise in the 
future. 
The institutionalization of the Muslim communities in Spain began in 
the North African autonomous city of Melilla. The first Islamic religious 
association entered in the RER in 1968 was the Muslim Association of 
Melilla. In 1970, the Islam Jamaat Ahmadiyya, with headquarters in a 
Cordoba municipality, was registered, followed by the Muslim Zawiya 
Muhammadiyya of Ceuta and the Muslim Association of Spain (AME), 
with headquarters in Madrid, in 1971. Both the AME and Jamaat 
Ahmadiyya were created by students who arrived in Spain in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s from Libya, Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt. 
The Law of Religious Freedom enacted in 1980 subsequently paved 
the way for the emergence of new Muslim associations, which began to 
appear all over Spain. Many of them were championed by and made up 
principally of converts, who played an important role in the first phase of 
institutionalizing Islam in Spain. 
Spain is bound by its constitution to cooperate with religious faiths 
and communities to the extent required by the religious beliefs of Spanish 
society, through the adoption of cooperation agreements. This possibility is 
provided for in the Organic Law of Religious Freedom presently in force. 
After this law was passed, the first steps were taken with a view to signing 
cooperation agreements between the state and the Jewish, Protestant and 
Muslim faiths. 
The first requirement conditioning the signature of these agreements 
was recognition of the minority faith’s notorio arraigo or deeply rooted 
status. In the case of Islam, the Advisory Board for Religious Freedom 
approved recognition of the Muslim religion’s notorio arraigo on 14 July 
1989 (a status that had already been granted to Protestants and Jews by 
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But the signing of the cooperation agreements also hinged on 
compliance with another condition laid down by the government, namely 
the existence of a sole interlocutor for each faith. Hence the constitution of 
the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI) was initially 
made up of nine Islamic religious associations with headquarters in 
Madrid, Granada, Seville, Almeria, Ceuta and Melilla. A few months later, 
the Spanish Association of Muslims split to promote the creation of the 
Union of Muslim Communities of Spain (UCIDE), registered in the RER in 
October 1991. 
The lack of harmony between FEERI and UCIDE coupled with the 
need for a sole interlocutor vis-à-vis the state led to the set-up of the Islamic 
Commission of Spain, with two secretaries-general (one for the federation 
and one for the union), and four members (two for each body). FEERI and 
UCIDE continue to function independently, a situation that has posed 
considerable difficulties in terms of representativeness and interlocution, 
and which remains problematic today. Nonetheless, in April 1992 the 
Cooperation Agreement between the state and the Islamic Commission of 
Spain was finally signed. This agreement regulates a number of matters, 
among which are the following:  
•  the status of Islamic religious leaders, 
•  legal protection of mosques as places of worship, 
•  the conferring of civil status to marriages held according to Islamic 
religious rites, 
•  religious assistance in public centres and establishments,  
•  Islamic religious instruction in schools, 
•  tax benefits applicable to certain assets and activities, 
•  commemoration of Islamic religious holidays, and 
•  conservation and promotion of the Islamic artistic and historical 
heritage. 
The signing of such agreements marked a starting point in terms of 
guaranteeing the exercise of religious freedom. This framework is still 
being developed, however, insofar as numerous aspects – still not 
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6.2.3  Socio-economic integration policies  
According to the study Inmigración y Mercado de Trabajo, Informe 2010 
[Immigration and Labour Market, Report 2010],361 one of the effects of the 
recession has been its impact on immigration flows. Data for 2009 show a 
drastic downturn in the flow of immigration – not yet apparent in 2008 – 
and a far stronger impact on foreign workers: employment fell 11.8% as 
opposed to 5% for nationals. The report also states that the rate of 
employment fell more sharply in the case of Moroccan workers, by 14.5%. 
This reduction in employment has also translated into a fall in social 
security registrations, which also affects Moroccan workers in particular 
(the report uses Moroccan workers as a benchmark for Arab Muslim 
immigration). Moreover, foreigners are losing their jobs in all sectors, 
despite which the proportion of underground employment does not appear 
t o  b e  r i s i n g .  T h e  j o b s  c o v e r e d  b y  w o r k e r s  o f  i m m i g r a n t  o r i g i n  a r e  
concentrated in so-called ‘low qualification’ positions and upward mobility 
by category continues to escape these workers. 
The mobility of workers of foreign origin from town to town is three 
times higher than that of Spanish workers. Likewise, job offers for these 
foreigners are tailing off and demands for qualifications are increasing. 
The scant growth of immigration in coming years means that the 
proportion of workers of foreign origin in the Spanish labour market will 
remain at a steady 15%. Normalizing the status of these immigrants and 
guaranteeing their socialization will be a key objective in the years to come. 
There is a call to highlight the swift incorporation of the immigrant 
population in the Spanish labour market, a population that has been 
systematically channelled towards poor quality jobs. As noted by Pajares 
(2010),362 the outcome is that discrimination is the factor that determines the 
occupations and labour conditions of foreign workers, which in turn means 
that the ability of Spain’s productive system to transform the capacities of 
these workers to good account is limited. Meanwhile, managing diversity is 
fast becoming the new paradigm for business management. 
This social inequality is prompting positive actions targeting ethnic 
and vulnerable groups, also benefiting persons from Muslim majority 
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countries. Financing by the European Social Fund in the context of its 
multiregional operational programme to fight discrimination, coupled with 
central, regional and local government funding, has contributed to the 
creation of employment services and active policies aimed at this 
population. 
6.2.4  Education, public health and police 
In the field of education, the Spanish state is developing a policy to 
facilitate the normalization of Muslim boys and girls in the network of 
public and semi-private schools. There are virtually no Muslim schools, the 
only case being the school linked to the M-30 mosque in Madrid, a private 
establishment financed by Saudi funds and catering for personnel at Arab 
embassies. 
Art. 10.1 of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission 
of Spain regulates the status of Islamic religious education as follows:  
Muslim pupils, their parents and any school governing bodies 
who so request are guaranteed the right of the first mentioned to 
receive Islamic religious teaching in public and private subsidised 
schools at the infant, primary and secondary education levels, 
providing, in the case of private institutions, that the exercise of 
such right does not conflict with the nature of the school itself.  
According to data for January 2010, there are presently 45 Islamic 
religious-education teachers in Spain, all in primary schools, and 24 of 
them teach in Ceuta and Melilla. The transfer of decision-making authority 
for education to the autonomous communities appears to have undermined 
guarantees of this right as provided for in the cooperation agreements, 
insofar as Islamic religious education is only provided in those 
communities where the textbook series Discovering Islam is included in the 
curriculum. The Islamic Commission of Spain, with the support of the 
Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia, is developing this series of textbooks 
for teaching this subject in primary schools. So far, the textbooks have been 
made available for years one, two and three of primary school where the 
state has retained authority for religious education.  
Along these same lines, the same actors in collaboration with Casa 
Árabe are developing materials for teaching Arabic at school level. In 
accordance with the laws in force, any language can be taught as a third 
language in secondary schools, provided enough pupils request it. Four 
secondary schools already teach Arabic as a third language. It should be 
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In the field of professional training, specific courses are being 
developed. Among them, two notable ones are imparted by Spain’s 
national distance-learning university (UNED) in association with the 
Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia, targeting religious and community 
leaders. Their aims are to guarantee quality training provided by 
state/local government or government-approved institutions based on a 
curriculum approved by official institutions. These two correlative, 
‘professional expert’ courses are attributed 19 credits each and have already 
been taken by 75 community leaders and imams. 
It is also standard practice for local corporations and mosques to 
organize courses for learning Spanish. 
In relation to health care, the agreement guarantees religious 
assistance in hospitals, primary care centres and other analogous public 
institutions, although this right is far from being guaranteed on a 
systematic and widespread basis. 
With regard to police procedures, attention should be drawn to the 
initiatives of certain police and law enforcement corps to introduce 
protocols that eliminate ethnic profiles when identifying and frisking 
individuals, and their collaboration with public bodies and civil society 
organizations with a view to improving police management of diversity. In 
this respect, the local police forces in Fuenlabrada (Madrid) and Girona 
(Catalonia), and the Mossos d’Esquadra (regional police in Catalonia) have 
developed procedures for dealing with criminal acts motivated by hatred 
or discrimination and for eliminating discriminatory ethnic profiles. In June 
2010, a platform for the police management of diversity was created, 
involving the national union of local police chiefs and organizations for 
intellectually and physically disabled people, ethnic minorities, 
immigrants, individuals with different sexual orientations, the homeless, 
etc. 
 Generally speaking, it is the local administrations that call the shots 
in terms of formulating policies to normalize religious pluralism and 
manage religious diversity in Spain. In the case of Islam, the management 
and intervention of local authorities has been erratic at best,363 subject to the 
receptiveness and sensitivity of these authorities and the need to manage 
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affairs. These experiences, successful in some cases and not in others, have 
nonetheless been something of a novelty. That is because Spain, unlike 
other European countries, did not have any pre-established integration 
model to follow, given that the challenge of managing religious diversity is 
one that has only emerged recently. 
Still, a state policy for governing religious diversity has clearly been 
taking shape in recent years. This policy is based on recognizing religious 
faiths and allowing them to take centre stage, improving practices for 
managing religious diversity at the level of the public administrations, and 
projecting a more accurate and inclusive vision of religious pluralism in 
general and Islam in particular. A few more years must nonetheless pass 
before the impact of these policies can be evaluated. 
A controversial issue that has found its way into political, media and 
citizen debates has been the requirement for foreigners to take a test and 
follow courses to ‘prove’ the degree of their integration in Spain. 
Notwithstanding the media storm triggered by the announcement of this 
measure, it has not gone beyond the arena of debate or led to the 
implementation of measures of this sort. Nonetheless, these debates have 
not disappeared from the political arena, gaining momentum during pre-
election periods. 
6.2.5  Cultural and religious aspects of integration  
Just as diversity has become part and parcel of Spanish society, 
manifestations of opposition by certain citizens to territorial policies with 
an impact on their immediate environment (i.e. NIMBY) have also become 
more commonplace. In the case of the Muslim community, these 
manifestations have been associated with the location of mosques and 
places of worship, although they have very occasionally spilled over into 
the public arena where they have been dealt with at the level of local 
management of religious diversity. 
So far, Spain has not experienced situations similar to the emblematic 
case of the ban on minarets in Switzerland or symbolic conflicts linked with 
places of worship and prayer houses, beyond situations that have to be 
dealt with daily. The latter are triggered by the precariousness of these 
places of worship, the processing of opening licences, their distance from 
the nerve centres of cities and towns, etc. 
The controversy and social debate that has sprung up in recent 
months in relation to the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools and 
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areas is something else altogether. Doubtless as a mirror effect of the 
French debate, some city and town councils have approved bylaws 
prohibiting the use of full-face veils. Yet the presence of these types of 
garments in Spain is very rare indeed and therefore does not justify 
legislative initiatives and policies of this nature on any account. The 
Muslim communities themselves should contribute to working out 
solutions for problems of this nature. 
An emblematic case that made the headlines was that of a Muslim 
girl who was banned from going to school in the Madrid suburb of Pozuelo 
for wearing a hijab. The girl’s refusal to remove her headscarf, her family’s 
support, the school’s prerogative to set a dress code that forbids the 
wearing of headscarves, the stand taken by the local education authorities 
in favour of the school and against the pupil, and the ensuing media storm 
combined to turn this incident into a national issue, dominating the social 
debate. Also noteworthy is that within 24 hours other schools changed their 
internal rules and regulations to avoid being faced with similar cases, 
changes that were instantly accepted by the education authorities. 
The barometer or periodic survey conducted by the Real Instituto 
Elcano in July 2010 was very revealing in terms of gauging the reaction of 
public opinion to the Islamic headscarf issue. Sixty percent of Spaniards 
(two out of three) are against Muslim schoolgirls being allowed to wear the 
hijab in public schools. Conversely, only one in three (30%) claims to be 
against the exhibition of crucifixes in public schools. 
6.2.6  Spatial integration  
Since specific data on the beliefs of residents in Spain are not available, data 
relative to where believers live are not available either. The residential 
characteristics of the areas where these communities are located have 
nonetheless been identified and checked against sociological studies. 
Immigrants are generally concentrated in certain areas, either in city centres 
(e.g. Lavapies in Madrid and Raval in Barcelona) or in poor and run-down 
suburbs, both usually characterized by urban decay and a shortage of 
resources and facilities. 
For several decades, the implementation of urban regeneration and 
deconcentration initiatives to provide specific facilities and services has 
been underway in neighbourhoods beset with social problems. These 
measures have also benefited immigrants from Muslim majority countries 
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hitherto failed to make any real headway in terms of turning residential 
equity into reality. 
6.3  Concluding remarks – Towards a model of integration 
The Spanish reality in terms of immigrant integration policies and 
particularly policies concerning immigrants from Muslim majority 
countries is both complex and heterogeneous, with various aspects of 
different models (assimilationist, communitarian and hybrid intercultural) 
existing side by side. All this should be considered in the light of the 
Spanish context, marked by a recent surge in immigration and the absence 
of what might be termed a ‘Spanish model’. Positive or negative results of 
actual policies may provide clues as to the shape of a suitable social policy 
in this field. 
The present challenge is a daunting one: acknowledging diversity 
and the need to manage it has become a powerful factor in the social and 
political reality of Spain. Still, it is also at the local level that imaginative 
and effective responses are starting to emerge to address issues of religious 
diversity. 
Broadly speaking and at the risk of over-simplifying such an 
extremely complex issue, although practices representing the three models 
exist, in the general framework of social policy there is a growing tendency 
towards a hybrid intercultural model. Spain is in the process of defining a 
positive integration model based on promoting social cohesion and 
coexistence, one that does not repeat errors elsewhere and one that is 
geared towards bringing international recommendations into line with its 
historical, social and cultural reality.  
In the future, we would like to see a strengthening of this hybrid 
approach for addressing the core issues of potential conflict and achieving 
greater integration of the Muslim community, in the conviction that if 
integration fails, the stage will be set for the growth of violent 
radicalization. In particular, the approach would be enhanced by measures 
in the following areas: 
•  a focus on rights to keep those from the Muslim communities from 
having to live in ghettos by promoting access to public services and 
the exercise of their civic and political rights;  
•  a more thorough application by the government and society in 
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Islamic Commission, with measures to speed up the establishment of 
their places of worship;  
•  the need for resources to support contextualized training of imams 
and other leaders of the Muslim communities to enable them to work 
in a more professional manner and communicate better with Spanish 
society, thus to become social agents of integration; 
•  greater awareness in the teaching of Islamic culture and religion, and 
its contribution to universal, European and Spanish culture with a 
view to overcoming stereotypes; in this regard, the reference in the 
Lisbon Treaty to Europe’s roots (inter alia, religious) is a positive 
example, as no exclusive mention is made of Christianity or Judeo-
Christianity; 
•  the establishment of channels for achieving greater participation of 
the Muslim communities in Spanish society, notably with 
representatives of all religions that have signed agreements with the 
government to join the Immigration Forum created by the ministry of 
labour and social affairs; and lastly 
•  measures to overcome the sense of disenfranchisement felt not only 
by immigrants but also and especially by the second generation, most 
of whom are now Spanish citizens.   156 | 
 
 
7.  TOWARDS A COMMON POLICY ON 
INTEGRATION IN THE EU?  
SERGIO CARRERA &JOANNA PARKIN 
Introduction 
The integration of third-country nationals (TCNs) emerged as a key policy 
domain at the European Union level during the last decade. The entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 transferred the domain of 
immigration from an exclusively national to a shared competence in the 
EU. In doing so, it unleashed a powerful, new, EU policy-making dynamic. 
As member states acknowledged the need to develop common policies on 
immigration, they simultaneously recognized that such policies should be 
backed up by an appropriate integration strategy that would address 
questions of social inclusion, access rights, and cultural and religious 
diversities, which are often ascribed to the phenomenon of immigration.  
This recognition has seen the gradual development of a distinct 
policy framework for the integration of TCNs within the EU’s broader, 
common immigration policy. Nevertheless, and perhaps not surprisingly 
for a domain so closely linked to sensitive questions of national identity 
and belonging, this process has been marked by profound tensions among 
certain EU member states over the transfer of powers to the EU level. These 
tensions have resulted in the emergence at the European level of an 
integration policy agenda of a peculiar character, which does not fall under 
the classical configurations of the European method of cooperation and EU 
law. The sum of the methods and tools developed within the framework on 
integration – the common basic principles on immigrants’ integration, a 
series of reports and handbooks, networks of national officials and a forum 
for civil society and migrants’ organizations – constitute a supranational 
structure that relies heavily on the exchange of ‘good’ practices, knowledge 
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Directorate-General (DG) for Home Affairs. This structure effectively 
amounts to an alternative, or ‘quasi’, open method of coordination.364 The 
peculiarity of this framework of European cooperation is that it has 
developed largely outside the EU legal framework and does not impose 
any legally binding obligations on the member states. Still, a certain degree 
of Europeanization has taken place progressively through other means, 
notably the linking of soft governance mechanisms and policy coordination 
strategies with a common EU financial framework (i.e. the European 
integration fund).  
The EU’s agenda on the integration of immigrants is currently at a 
turning point. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, combined with the 
endorsement of the Stockholm Programme365 has marked the start of a new 
phase in developing common European policies on integration. Together 
they offer a substantially transformed legal and policy context with which 
to take forward EU cooperation in this field.  
This chapter maps the EU’s integration agenda as it has developed 
since 2002. At the same time it reveals the enduring sensitivities that 
surround the attribution of rights to and inclusion of third-country 
nationals (TCNs) in Europe. After this introduction, the first section traces 
the foundations of EU law and policy on integration that were laid with the 
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Programme. 
The second section examines the attempt to apply the open method of 
coordination to measures on immigration – the failure of which has defined 
the current shape of the EU’s framework on integration. The third section 
charts the development of this framework, showing how struggles between 
national and EU-level policy-making have ultimately shaped the 
framework’s normative foundations. Certain elements of national 
integration programmes and policies have been transposed to the EU level, 
making it difficult to speak of a single and distinct ‘European model of 
integration’. The chapter concludes by examining the potential future 
directions of the EU’s integration policy in light of the new legal framework 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the policy agenda for the next five years 
as outlined in the Stockholm Programme.  
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7.1  Amsterdam and Tampere: Integration as equal treatment 
and non-discrimination, using a rights-based approach 
The integration of TCNs is not a new consideration at the EU level. The 
construction of a European internal market and the freedom of movement 
of persons that this has required have seen systematic endeavours to lower 
the barriers to human mobility by allowing EU nationals to move and 
reside freely under the same conditions as nationals of the receiving 
state.366 Since the late 1960s, a number of legislative initiatives and the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg have allowed EU 
workers and their families to enjoy a progressively wider range of 
substantive rights regarding employment, social welfare and security of 
residence. In this way, the integration of EU nationals (i.e. intra-EU 
migrants) into the fabric of the receiving societies was conceived as a 
process of equalization, of granting equal treatment and comparable 
freedoms in a non-discriminatory manner. This has been the approach that 
has defined the more classical EU configuration and understanding of 
‘integration’ as one based primarily on the attribution of rights and equality 
of treatment while exercising the principle of free movement.  
Principles of equal treatment were also reflected in early EU 
initiatives and official discourses related to the integration of TCNs from 
the 1970s onwards. The granting of rights to those qualifying for long-term 
residence and family reunification was regarded as a key source of stability 
and security of residence, and as effective ‘integration factors’.367 But it was 
not until the changes brought by the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam that the mobility and status of TCNs became a focus of 
sustained policy-making and legislative processes at the EU level. The 
Amsterdam Treaty signified a historic turning point in the development of 
the EU’s common immigration policy and its ‘integration agenda’. By 
transferring responsibility for immigration from the intergovernmental 
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sphere of decision-making to shared EU competence,368 Amsterdam 
granted for the first time the necessary legal basis for EU institutions to 
develop policies in matters relating to immigration. These involved, under 
Art. 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(formerly Art. 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), 
measures on the “conditions of entry and residence…including those for 
the purpose of family reunion”. The principles underlying this new policy 
domain were elaborated at a special European Council meeting held in 
October 1999 in Tampere, and resulted in the Tampere Programme, which 
formed the first multi-annual programme on the EU’s AFSJ and established 
the political priorities to guide EU actions between 1999 and 2004. It was 
agreed that 
[t]he European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country 
nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States. 
A more vigorous approach should aim at granting these individuals 
rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. It should 
also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life 
and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.369 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Behind this bold political statement lay the recognition that an 
effective immigration strategy could not be developed without being 
backed up by an appropriate, common integration policy. The Tampere 
Programme indicated an interpretation of integration based on facilitating 
socio-economic inclusion and participation through countering 
discrimination and fostering equal treatment, and ensuring access to a set 
of rights “as near as possible to those of EU citizens”. Consequently, the 
Tampere Programme consolidated and extended a rights-based integration 
template that can be traced in EU official discourses back to the 1970s. It 
paved the way for legislative responses at the EU level that could translate 
the fair-treatment paradigm into a re-framing of the position of TCNs 
within the EU legal order. 
Furthermore, although this strategy was ultimately targeted at newly 
arriving TCNs, and not Europe’s more established migrant communities, 
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an Intergovernmental Conference preceding Amsterdam had seen the 
member states agree on stricter anti-discrimination measures to counter 
racial and ethnic exclusion. Art. 19 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU), which had 
its origins in the Rome and Amsterdam Treaties, gave the Commission the 
authority to propose legislation to tackle discrimination based on race, 
ethnic origin, religion or sexual orientation. The Commission wasted no 
time in acting on its new Treaty competences and the mandate set at 
Tampere, proposing four legally binding directives that fulfilled a rights-
based and inclusive integration agenda: two directives to combat 
discrimination and two directives regulating the rights of TCNs, which we 
subsequently examine. 
7.1.1  The Non-Discrimination Directives 
The adoption in 2000 of two directives regulating non-discrimination 
marked a watershed in the development of European anti-discrimination 
law and policy. The Racial Equality Directive prohibited discrimination on 
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin within the labour market and a 
variety of other societal domains, including social security and health care, 
education, and access to public goods and services such as housing.370 The 
personal scope is broad, applying to TCNs as well as EU citizens. It has 
been noted, however, that protection for those in the former category is not 
complete, given that the personal scope excludes differential treatment on 
the basis of nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing 
the entry and residence of TCNs, and their access to employment and to 
occupations.371 The Employment Equality Directive, on the other hand, 
provides a general framework for combating discrimination on a wider 
                                                      
370 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 
19.7.2000. 
371 Ibid., Preamble, Recital 13; see also R. Cholewinski, “Migrants as Minorities: 
Integration and Inclusion in the Enlarged European Union”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2005, pp. 695-716; and also M. Jesse, “Missing in 
Action: Effective Protection for Third Country Nationals from Discrimination 
under Community Law”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal 
Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2009. TOWARDS A COMMON POLICY ON INTEGRATION IN THE EU? | 161 
range of grounds (including religion and belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation) in employment and vocational training. 372  
By the end of 2006, all EU member states had adopted new legislative 
measures transposing the directives into their national legislation. Indeed, 
although a substantial degree of divergence in standards remains, 
commentators have heralded the “unprecedented round of anti-
discrimination law reform across all 27 Member States” brought by the new 
legislation.373 The process of Europeanization in this domain has seen a 
significant impact in some places on national norms, structures and 
practices in the field of discrimination. By way of example, under the Racial 
Equality Directive the obligation of national governments to establish 
independent ‘equality bodies’ to support those discriminated against on the 
grounds of ethnic or racial origin has given rise to an unparalleled 
infrastructure for sustained litigation on racial discrimination.374  
The EU’s legal framework on non-discrimination was subject to an 
important initiative for renewal in 2008 in the form of a Commission 
proposal for a directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. A 
gradual convergence towards a common model for enforcing equality of 
treatment in Europe’s multiethnic society would be further reinforced if the 
Commission’s proposed new directive, which aims at addressing the gaps 
in the current legislative framework, is passed by the Council, although at 
the time of writing the future prospects for the so-called ‘Equality 
Directive’ are highly uncertain.375 
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2008, pp. 36-44.  
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375 See M. Bell, “Advancing EU Anti-Discrimination Law: The European 
Commission’s 2008 Proposal for a New Directive”, The Equal Rights Review, Vol. 3, 
2009, pp. 7-18. The Equality Directive would prohibit discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation in the fields of 
social protection, education, goods and services, thus addressing criticisms that the 
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7.1.2  The Family Reunification and Long-Term Residence Directives  
A rights-based (near-equality) model also underpinned the Commission’s 
proposals for directives regulating family reunification (proposed in 
1999)376 and the status of long-term resident TCNs (proposed in 2001).377 
Both pieces of legislation sought to enhance the rights of TCNs in terms of 
security of residence, mobility and family reunion. The first directive 
sought to lay down the conditions for the exercise of a right to family 
reunification by TCNs regularly residing in the EU.378 The second aimed at 
establishing a common European status of long-term resident for those 
TCNs regularly residing in a member state for a period of five years and a 
package of related European rights and administrative guarantees.379 
Yet in contrast to the non-discrimination legislation, whose adoption 
was remarkably rapid, the draft directives on the rights of TCNs faced a 
difficult reception in the European Council. It is important to take into 
account the post-9/11 political climate that formed the backdrop of the 
negotiations, during which a progressive trend towards securitization 
could be observed on the migration and integration agendas of several EU 
member states. The progress of the two draft directives through the 
Council was marked by long negotiations that saw a number of proposed 
provisions watered down and more restrictive elements ‘uploaded’ from 
                                                                                                                                       
current framework affords certain groups more protection than others. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations in the Council on the European Commission’s 
Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation (COM/2008/426 final, Brussels, 2.7.2008) are currently blocked. The 
blockage stems from reservations on the part of the German government linked to 
concerns over subsidiarity and the lack of an adequate legal basis. 
376 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003. 
377 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of November 2003 on the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004. 
378 A. Wiesbrock, Legal Migration to the European Union, Leiden: Brill/Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2010. 
379 K. Groenendijk, “The Long-Term Residents Directive, Denizenship and 
Integration”, in H. Schneider (ed.), Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge 
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the national to the European context.380 Consequently, the legislation finally 
adopted in the Council is not fully reflective of the aims envisaged by the 
original Commission proposals or the spirit of the Tampere Programme. In 
particular, member states (notably the Netherlands, Germany and Austria) 
inserted into the directives a number of references to integration ‘measures’ 
and ‘conditions’ as requirements to be met in order to benefit from the 
rights and guarantees afforded by the legislation for TCNs.381 
Hence, Art. 5(2) of the Long-Term Residents Directive stipulates that 
“Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with 
integration conditions, in accordance with national law”. The wording of 
the provision was changed at the insistence of Germany and Austria from 
“integration measures” to “integration conditions”, allowing member states 
to require immigrants to pay the financial costs of the integration measures, 
as opposed to attending courses financed by the receiving state.382 
Likewise, a reference to integration measures was inserted into the Family 
Reunification Directive in Art. 7(2). To this provision was added the 
qualification that, with regard to refugees or family members of refugees, 
integration measures may only be applied once the persons concerned have 
been granted family reunification. But stating that refugees may only be 
subject to integration measures after having been granted family reunion 
opened the door for member states to apply integration measures before 
granting family reunion rights to non-refugee TCNs, in other words, while 
still in the country of origin (for example, the ‘integration abroad’ tests now 
employed by the Netherlands).  
Indeed, given that neither of the directives provides a definition of 
the term ‘integration’, member states h a v e  b e e n  l e f t  a  w i d e  m a r g i n  o f  
discretion in how they choose to interpret and apply these provisions. Still, 
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it must be noted that the degree to which member states are free to use 
integration requirements in national legislation to condition access to the 
European freedoms, rights and administrative guarantees envisaged by the 
directive is constrained by the obligation to respect the general principles of 
EU law on proportionality, non-discrimination and fundamental human 
rights.383 This was confirmed by the European Commission in the first 
evaluation of the national transposition of the Family Reunification 
Directive, and by the ruling of the Court of Justice in European Parliament v. 
Council (Case 540/03).  
Nevertheless, the addition of new, more restrictive provisions by the 
member states in the Council had the effect of diluting the Commission’s 
original proposals and re-framing EU discourses on (and conceptualization 
of) integration under EU immigration law and policy. In both directives, 
integration is seen to move from an approach aimed at facilitating a 
newcomer’s inclusion in society through the granting of rights and a secure 
legal status, to one in which status and rights are awarded as recompense 
for “acculturation”.384 In the case of the ‘integration abroad’ measures, 
migrants are faced with the paradox of having to demonstrate their 
integration into a member state before having stepped foot onto the 
territory of the country in question.385 Such measures reflect the tendency 
among certain governments (such as France, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Germany) to employ integration as a means of regulating the entry of 
immigrants, and the increasing conflation of discourses surrounding 
migration, insecurity and social inclusion. This tendency is also manifested 
in the so-called ‘civic integration’ programmes, contracts and tests, which 
have increasingly become part of national immigration regimes. They serve 
as a mandatory obligation on TCNs to demonstrate that they know, 
understand and respect the receiving society’s language, history and 
institutions as well as its common shared values and way of life as a 
condition for being granted entry, security of residence and family life. 
Thus in France for example, applicants for permanent residence permits or 
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for family reunification are required to sign an integration contract and face 
sanctions if they fail to fulfil the conditions of that contract.386 Denmark has 
recently followed the Dutch example, amending its legislation to provide 
for integration tests as both a condition for permanent residence and a 
condition for obtaining an entry visa.387 In such cases, ‘integration’ is less a 
question of facilitating inclusion and more one of regulating immigration. 
By transferring such elements of policy to the EU level, member states have 
not only shifted EU discourses and the classical European understanding of 
integration as inclusion, security of residence, equality and access to rights, 
they have in turn legitimized the existence or justified the introduction of 
such restrictive practices at the national level.  
7.2  Origins of the EU framework on integration: A proposal for 
using the open method of coordination on immigration 
The strong, nationalized flavour characterizing the Family Reunification 
and Long-Term Residence Directives reflects the broader sensitivities – and 
resulting obstacles – that the Commission encountered when attempting to 
communitarize aspects of migration policy. The Commission’s attempt to 
apply the open method of coordination (OMC) to policy-making on 
immigration in 2001 similarly reveals the underlying tension between the 
intergovernmental and supranational forces of European integration in this 
domain. Following Tampere, the Commission recognized that the 
development of a common immigration policy would require a 
coordinating mechanism resembling that which had recently been adopted 
to implement the European employment strategy. The OMC has been used 
at the EU level since 2000 as a key means by which the Commission can 
steer, support and coordinate member states’ policies in sensitive areas 
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through the exchange of best practices, benchmarking, periodic reporting 
and multilateral scrutiny.388  
In a Communication of July 2001, the European Commission 
presented a proposal to apply the OMC to Community immigration 
policy,389 which built on the rights-based agenda set at Tampere. The 
proposal foresaw a central role for the Commission in overseeing the OMC. 
Moreover, it identified the integration of TCNs as one of the most 
important areas for the coordination of national policies through the OMC, 
announcing its intention to put forward 
a specific Community Action Programme…to support legislation 
and policy development within a European framework through 
the improving of knowledge, the strengthening of the capacity of 
all the actors involved and the raising of awareness with respect to 
integration strategies.390  
Yet, such was the unwillingness of the member states to contemplate 
coordinating policies concerning the entry and treatment of legal migrants 
that the proposal did not even reach the Council table.391 The blocking by 
member states of the traditional channels of policy-making forced the 
Commission to look at other means of establishing European cooperation 
in the field of migrant integration. Consequently, since 2002, a set of ‘soft 
law’ governance instruments has progressively been established, which 
rely on techniques of knowledge sharing, policy coordination and the 
exchange of information, operating through the medium of formalized 
networks, reports, handbooks and ministerial meetings. Together, the sum 
of these alternative coordination mechanisms forms what has been 
denominated as the European framework on integration.  
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7.3  The EU framework on integration: A common European 
policy in the making 
Despite a reluctance to cede control of integration policy, questions of 
integration and social cohesion were progressively moving up the domestic 
political agendas at the turn of the century and a degree of policy 
cooperation at the EU level was deemed necessary. In October 2002, the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council called (for the first time) for 
coordinated action and greater policy coherence in member states’ 
integration policies. As a first step, the 2002 JHA Council conclusions 
proposed establishing a group of National Contact Points on Integration 
(NCPs), a network of experts drawn from the relevant ministries of each 
member state, tasked with promoting information exchange, monitoring 
progress and disseminating best practices at both the national and EU 
levels.392 In recent years, one of the core responsibilities of the NCPs has 
been to feed into the preparation of the Handbooks on Integration. The 
Handbooks are prepared by independent experts (the Migration Policy 
Group) on behalf of the European Commission and seek to facilitate the 
exchange of information among member states by providing a summary of 
what they call ‘best practices’ and recommendations to support 
practitioners and policy-makers.393  
                                                      
392 Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2455th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 14-15 
October 2002. 
393 The first edition of the Handbook on Integration was published in 2004 (J. Niessen 
and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policymakers and Practitioners, European 
Commission, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, Brussels, 2004). It highlighted 
‘best practices’ in civic participation and courses for newly arrived immigrants, 
along with exploring the use of indicators and benchmarks. The second edition, 
published in 2007, again contains ‘good practices’ and ‘lessons learned’, and 
includes a thematic focus on practical measures that eliminate inequalities through 
civic citizenship measures and the acquisition of competences through language 
proficiency and education (J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for 
Policymakers and Practitioners, European Commission, DG Justice, Freedom and 
Security, Brussels, 2007). The third edition was published in April 2010 and groups 
practices under categories that include “the mass media and integration”, 
“acquisition of nationality and practice of active citizenship” and “immigrant 
youth, education and the labour market” (J. Niessen and T. Huddleston, Handbook 
on Integration for Policymakers and Practitioners, European Commission, DG Justice, 
Freedom and Security, Brussels, 2010.) 168 | CARRERA & PARKIN 
Following the JHA Council conclusions in 2002, the European 
Commission responded by presenting a Communication on immigration, 
integration and employment in 2003. Kostakopoulou (2010) notes that this 
document reproduces the “liberal-multiculturalist paradigm of equality” 
established in the Tampere discourse on the fair treatment of TCNs.394 
Indeed, the Communication calls for a “holistic approach” to the 
integration of TCNs, one that considers “not only the economic and social 
aspects of integration, but also issues related to cultural and religious 
diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights”.395 It also defines 
integration as a “two-way process” between the TCN and the receiving 
society, and establishes a link between integration and employment, 
identifying immigration as a positive solution to Europe’s economic 
challenges and ageing population.  
7.3.1  Common basic principles for immigration and integration policy 
These themes were picked up and carried forward by the European 
Council meeting at Thessaloniki in 2003,396 where heads of state and 
government confirmed their support for cooperation in this area, 
recommending the development of a set of common basic principles (CBPs) 
on integration and inviting the Commission to prepare an annual report on 
integration. The first such report was adopted in 2004,397 and the annual 
reports on integration have since provided a regular overview of migration 
trends and integration policies in the EU member states, compiled in 
conjunction with the NCPs. 
The adoption by the European Council in November 2004 of The 
Hague Programme398 – the second multi-annual programme on the EU’s 
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AFSJ for the period 2005–09 – positioned integration (yet again) as a high 
priority on the Union’s agenda. At the same time it affirmed national 
sovereignty in this domain, stating that “the development and 
implementation of integration policy is…the primary responsibility of 
individual member states rather than of the Union as a whole”. Even so, the 
Council underlined the importance of a set of CBPs for immigrant 
integration policy that could serve as a reference point for the development 
of current and future integration policies. A list of 11 principles was 
subsequently adopted by the JHA Council (under the Dutch Presidency of 
the EU), which may be summarized as follows:399  
•  CBP 1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states.  
•  CBP 2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU.  
•  CBP 3. Employment is a key part of the integration process. 
•  CBP 4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and 
institutions is indispensable to integration. 
•  CBP 5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants. 
•  CBP 6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and 
private goods and services, should be on a basis equal to national 
citizens and in a non-discriminatory way. 
•  CBP 7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state 
citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. 
•  CBP 8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, 
unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with 
national law. 
•  CBP 9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and 
in the formulation of integration policies should be promoted. 
•  CBP 10. Integration policies and measures should be mainstreamed 
across all relevant policy portfolios. 
•  CBP 11. Clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms must be 
developed. 
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The CBPs reflect the first real attempt at the EU official level to flesh 
out a common definition – and what some would term ‘model’ – of what 
integration means in an EU context. Nevertheless, as noted by Carrera 
(2009),400 the list of principles rather appears to offer “a synthesis and 
compilation” of the various conceptualizations of integration that have 
appeared in EU policy and legislation during the past decades. The 
principles laid down are so broad as to be largely symbolic, and could fit 
almost any national context, policy or integration philosophy (from the 
most radical acculturation to the broadest intercultural paradigm) in the 
EU. They provide convincing proof of the argument that there is currently 
no single, coherent and consensual ‘European model of immigrant 
integration’. Instead they offer a reflection of the varied approaches and 
competing understandings of integration across the national arenas of the 
EU member states. The wide scope of the CBPs can be seen as an attempt to 
accommodate the different public policy responses adopted by the EU 
member states for managing ‘their diversities’, whether these are rooted in 
traditional assimilationist or communitarian approaches.401  
There is a good deal of debate surrounding the continuing relevance 
of national, theoretical models on integration, particularly in light of the 
tendency for approaches and official discourses to evolve with the 
changing policy context at the national level, shaped by contemporary 
realities, constructed insecurities and events. The EU itself is not 
impervious to such shifts. It could be argued, invoking Art. 167 TFEU, 
which enshrines respect for the diversity of European populations, that the 
                                                      
400 Carrera (2009), op. cit. 
401 The migration and citizenship literature alludes to a number of modes of 
migrant integration, which in turn correspond to differing citizenship models (see 
D. Kostakopoulou, “’Integrating’ Non-EU Migrants in the European Union: 
Ambivalent Legacies and Mutating Paradigms”, Columbia Journal of European Law, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2002, pp. 181-201). Broadly speaking, the assimilationist model 
requires the minority community to abandon important aspects of its identity 
(ethnic, cultural or religious) and to embrace the culture and values of the host 
community, a process that is viewed as necessary for political belonging, national 
cohesion and the preservation of the national identity. The communitarian model 
places emphasis on the maintenance of a community’s distinctive identity, and 
strives to accommodate migrants’ culture, language and ethnic identity. These 
models are explored in more detail elsewhere in this book. TOWARDS A COMMON POLICY ON INTEGRATION IN THE EU? | 171 
EU is theoretically based on a multicultural or intercultural model.402 But 
the declining popularity of ‘multiculturalism’ that has been detected 
throughout Europe, and the emergence of new (restrictive and 
acculturation-related) conceptualizations of integration in European 
countries have left their mark on the EU framework on integration.  
It is also possible to trace a paradigm shift in the classic EU 
configuration of migrant integration within the CBPs.403 Undoubtedly, the 
list of principles reflect a continuation of the inclusive integration agenda 
established at Tampere. They highlight the contribution of immigrants to 
the host society and set out a broad field of intervention, ranging from 
employment and labour integration, non-discriminatory access to public 
goods, and the protection of cultural and religious diversity to the 
promotion of civic and political participation. Yet the CBPs also include 
entirely new elements emphasizing migrants’ obligations to respect the 
basic values of the EU (CBP 2) and to acquire basic knowledge of the host 
society’s language, history and institutions (CBP 4). The inclusion of these 
two principles represents an entirely new discourse in the European 
framework on integration. It is one that echoes the insertion of integration 
conditions into the Directives on Family Reunification and Long-Term 
Residence and which chimes with the growing prevalence among an 
increasing number of member states to introduce ‘civic’ integration 
measures on domestic immigration agendas.404  
The inclusion of CBPs 2 and 4 serves to legitimize and support a 
notion of integration based on conditionality, whereby newcomers are 
expected to meet certain mandatory requirements in return for the package 
of rights and benefits offered by member states. This could be seen to 
indicate an assimilationist turn in the EU’s normative framing of 
integration, demonstrating the extent to which more restrictive national 
categories of integration have found their way into the European 
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framework.405 By contrast, Spain’s attempt to inject a more ‘multicultural’ 
stance into the CBPs by adding an explicit obligation to proactively further 
migrant languages and cultures was rejected by the other members of the 
Council.406 
The new conceptualization of integration that emerges in the CBPs 
was taken forward and elaborated in the Commission’s 2005 
Communication on a Common Agenda for a Framework for the Integration 
of TCNs in the EU. The Communication recommends “[e]mphasizing civic 
orientation in introduction programmes and other activities for newly 
arrived third-country nationals with the view of ensuring that immigrants 
understand, respect and benefit from common European and national 
values”.407 
This action is just one of a number of practical measures set out in the 
Communication, which aims at providing guidance on how to implement 
the CBPs. These actions are divided between those to be implemented at 
the EU level and those to be undertaken at the national level. The 
Commission is careful, however, to note that the national level proposals 
are “indicative and not exhaustive and leave the member states to set 
priorities and select the actions as well as the way in which they are to be 
carried out within the context of their own national situations and 
traditions”.408 This serves as a reminder that the CBPs are not legally 
binding and their impact relies entirely on the political will of the member 
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states. The Commission’s 2005 Communication also proposed the creation 
of a European Integration Forum that would bring together stakeholders 
active in the field of integration at the EU level, as well as a European 
website on integration, designed to build a pan-European community of 
integration practitioners. These tools, both of which are now in operation, 
are geared towards facilitating the exchange of information among 
practitioners in the member states, and they complement the cooperation 
and information-sharing activities of the previously established 
instruments in the framework, including the handbooks, annual reports 
and NCPs. 
7.3.2  European integration fund  
None of the instruments described above imply enforceable obligations on 
the EU member states. These ‘soft’ policy tools have nonetheless been 
accompanied by a somewhat harder instrument with the adoption by the 
Council, in June 2007, of the Commission’s proposal for a European 
integration fund (EIF).409 The objective of the fund is to enhance member 
states’ national efforts to enable TCNs, and especially those newly arrived, 
to “fulfil the conditions of residence and to facilitate their integration into 
European societies, in accordance with the CBPs”.410 The role played by the 
EIF should not be underestimated. With an overall budget of €825 million, 
the fund provides for concrete financial incentives to steer member states’ 
integration strategies in a way that ensures their compliance with the CBPs. 
Essentially, by linking funding to integration programmes, the EIF is able 
to match policy ambitions with clear results. 
Under the EIF budget, €57 million (7%) is reserved for actions at the 
Community level – initiatives of a transnational nature or actions that are 
seen to benefit the EU as a whole. Community actions tend to take the form 
of studies, communication campaigns and transnational networks for 
information exchange and are managed by the European Commission. 
Examples of such projects awarded funding in 2009 include the 
“Immigrants Citizens Survey”, which aims at gathering migrants’ views 
                                                      
409 See the Council Decision of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the 
Integration of Third-Country Nationals for the Period 2007-2013 as part of the 
General Programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” 
(2007/435/EC), OJ L 168/18, 28.6.2007.  
410 See Recital 10 of the Preamble and Art. 2.1 of the Decision, supra. 174 | CARRERA & PARKIN 
and establishing a needs assessment for their integration, and “Migrants in 
the Spotlight”, a project training media professionals to improve the 
accuracy of media coverage of migration.411  
The remaining €768 million (93% of the EIF) is distributed among the 
member states to finance national programmes. These national 
programmes encompass funding for pre-existing governmental integration 
and immigration policies as well as co-financing for projects at the local 
and regional levels, often involving civil society actors. The allocation of 
funds among the 27 EU countries is determined according to a scale that 
takes into account the number of legally resident TCNs in each member 
state. The European Commission has adopted strategic guidelines 
establishing a framework for intervention that gives priority to the 
promotion of the CBPs. On the basis of the strategic guidelines, member 
states present a draft multi-annual programme that will be implemented in 
annual programmes and which requires approval by the Commission.412  
When defining their multi-annual programmes, member states are 
required to target at least three of the four priorities set by the Commission 
(of which the first and second priorities are mandatory):413 
1)  implementation of actions designed to put the common basic 
principles for immigrant integration policy into practice;  
2)  development of indicators and evaluation methodologies to assess 
progress, adjust policies and measures, and facilitate coordination of 
comparative learning;  
3)  capacity building in policy, coordination and intercultural 
competence in the member states across the different levels and 
departments of government; and 
4)  exchange of experience, good practice and information on integration 
between the member states.  
                                                      
411 European Commission, European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country 
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With respect to priority 1, the Commission recommends that actions 
should be “designed to introduce newly-arrived third country nationals to 
the host society and to help them acquire basic knowledge about the host 
society’s language, history, institutions, socio-economic features, cultural 
life and fundamental norms and values”.414 Accordingly, among the 
potential actions suggested by the Commission under priority 1 are 
developing language tuition, vocational training and civic orientation 
courses in both the country of origin and the receiving member states. The 
actions also include setting up information services for job seeking, legal 
assistance and access to social and economic provisions. In addition is the 
establishment of structures and mechanisms for consultation with migrant 
representatives and associations, such as intercultural and inter-religious 
platforms of dialogue. The latter is consistent with the Commission’s 
emphasis on a partnership approach, with member states required to 
implement their multi-annual programmes in cooperation with civil 
society, such as NGOs and migrant organizations, as well as local and 
regional public authorities.415  
Despite the framework provided by the strategic guidelines, it must 
be noted that the European Commission’s supervisory role of the fund is 
limited. The member states enjoy a wid e  m a r g i n  o f  d i s c r e t i o n  w h e n  i t  
comes to allocating funding, and they define, within the priorities set by the 
Commission, their own criteria for awarding financing to particular 
projects. Thus, a glance at examples of projects co-financed by the EIF 
reveals highly varied actions. These range from a 2008 NGO-led project in 
Poland supporting the cultural and artistic activities of immigrants in 
Warsaw and a 2007 Greek project implementing educational programmes 
as pre-departure measures for potential migrants in Moldova, to the UK’s 
use of EIF funds to implement a reform of the government’s immigration 
admission procedures.416  
                                                      
414 Commission Decision of 21 August 2007 implementing Council Decision 
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415 See Art. 10 of the Council Decision of 25 June 2007 establishing the European 
Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals for the Period 2007-2013 as 
part of the General Programme “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” 
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These examples provide a taste of the kinds of projects supported by 
the EIF at the national level. Still, it is hard to draw broader conclusions 
regarding the use of the fund, given that information on EIF-funded actions 
by the member states is not systematically gathered and published by the 
EU. This lack of information makes it very difficult to assess the extent to 
which activities financed at the national level are actually in line with the 
guidelines established by the Commission. The absence of a quantitative 
assessment of national programmes under the EIF should soon be 
remedied, however, with the publication of the Commission’s first 
evaluation of the EIF scheduled for early 2011. 
7.3.3  The continuing immigration–integration policy debate  
Running in parallel with the above-mentioned soft law initiatives launched 
and coordinated by the European Commission, the EU’s integration agenda 
has been driven forward at the intergovernmental level through regular 
informal meetings held among the ministers responsible for integration in 
the member states. A ministerial meeting in Potsdam in May 2007 was 
aimed at renewing the political debate on integration strategies at the EU 
and national levels and the outcome of the Potsdam discussions fed 
directly into the JHA Council conclusions two months later, under the 
heading “Strengthening of Integration Policies in the European Union by 
Promoting Unity in Diversity”.417 The conclusions supported development 
of the so-called ‘European Modules for Migrant Integration’ to provide 
guidelines and common standards for fostering programmes for newly 
arrived immigrants and called for the creation of common indicators to be 
used by member states on a voluntary basis to assess the effectiveness of 
integration polices. Another key outcome of Potsdam was to launch an 
exchange of practices among the member states on “intercultural 
dialogue”.418 
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The link between intercultural dialogue and integration was taken 
forward in a report drafted by the German government and annexed to the 
declaration produced by the follow-up ministerial meeting in Vichy in 
2008.419 W h i l e  n o  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r c u l tural dialogue was provided, the 
report put an emphasis on “items such as common related values, the 
creation of a common identity, the promotion of civic participation through 
the acquisition of the main national language, etc.” It is interesting to note 
that references to ‘values’ – both European and national – have appeared 
with increasing regularity in official EU documents concerning integration 
and raise a number of questions, including what exactly these values might 
constitute.  
The Vichy Declaration focused on the promotion of European 
fundamental values, “such as human rights, freedom of opinion, 
democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, and the 
compulsory schooling of children”. While this statement refers to a set of 
standard, ‘neutral’, liberal democratic norms, often the concept of European 
values is left undefined and employed alongside terms such as national 
‘identity’ and ‘heritage’, leaving room for ambiguity. One might question 
whether the emphasis placed on the migrant ‘other’ respecting a 
constructed set of national or European liberal democratic histories, 
principles and values puts into question the relation of such requirements 
to the very values they seek to impose, such as cultural and religious 
pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination.420  
The French Presidency in 2008 was keen to seize the political 
momentum that was building around a future strategy for EU immigration 
policy.421 In autumn 2008 the French Presidency presented a European Pact 
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on Immigration and Asylum, which sought to steer approaches in the 
development of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.422 The Pact 
embodies an inherently intergovernmental approach, which has been 
contrasted with the Commission’s earlier June 2008 Communication on a 
Common Immigration Policy in Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools.423 
Whereas the Commission’s Communication places greater stress on the 
equal and fair treatment paradigm, the Pact mirrors a number of national 
priorities of the French government in the fields of immigration and 
integration. For example, the Pact calls on member states to regulate “more 
effectively” family reunification by taking into account the country’s “own 
reception capacities and families’ capacity to integrate, as evaluated by 
their resources and accommodation in the receiving country and their 
knowledge of that country’s language”. This is accompanied by a call for 
“specific measures…that will stress the respect for the identities of the 
member states and the EU and for their fundamental values”. The Pact 
served once again to illustrate the ongoing tension between the 
establishment of a European immigration and integration policy and the 
perpetuation of member states’ competences and power of discretion over 
these fields. As seen elsewhere, the specific dynamics characterizing the 
development of the integration agenda, embedded within the EU 
immigration policy and driven by a strong intergovernmental stance, has 
favoured the emergence of a new understanding of the integration of 
TCNs, uploaded from the national models of particular member states to 
the European sphere.  
The common EU immigration policy has thus provided the means to 
strengthen the nexus between immigration and integration, and to 
reinforce particular national philosophies and integration policies of a 
rather restrictive nature. At times, the Commission has been seen to share 
and endorse more restrictive, national interpretations of integration. This is 
perhaps explained by the security-oriented agenda of DG Home Affairs 
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(previously DG Justice, Freedom and Security), which is responsible for the 
integration dossier within the Commission and which is largely informed 
by the approaches prevailing in the national ministries of interior and home 
affairs. It is important to underline that certain, more restrictive elements of 
national models – notably those attempting to link access to rights and 
security of residence to immigrants’ compliance with conditions (e.g. 
knowledge of the host country’s language and society) – risk coming into 
conflict with general principles of EU law, such as fundamental rights and 
non-discrimination, upon which the European project has been built. The 
new framework established by the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm 
Programme now offers the possibility to counter such tendencies by 
establishing a stronger role for the EU in integration policy. 
7.4  Towards a second generation of the European integration 
agenda: The Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme 
The publication of the third Handbook on Integration in 2010 marked the 
completion of the set of measures foreseen by the common agenda for 
integration of 2005. With the consolidation of the first phase of the EU’s 
integration agenda, Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström 
announced that the Union was “opening a new phase in the active 
promotion of diversity and migrant integration”.424 This second phase of 
the EU’s integration strategy will take place under a substantially 
transformed legal and policy context. With the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the Stockholm Programme, there is a 
new legal and policy architecture with which to address some of the 
dilemmas and difficulties encountered so far in the elaboration of the EU’s 
integration framework.  
One of the most important changes brought by Lisbon is that it draws 
EU initiatives on integration under the formal treaty framework and within 
the scope of EU legal checks and balances. With the inclusion of Art. 79.4 
TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty now provides an express legal basis for the Union 
to promote the integration of legally resident TCNs: 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide 
incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view 
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to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing 
legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States. (Emphasis added.) 
Although the new article stops short of providing for the 
harmonization of national laws on integration, by granting a clear Treaty 
basis, Lisbon offers the prospect of b r i n g i n g  r e a l  i m p r o v e m e n t s  t o  t h e  
current soft law framework. Two changes in particular must be 
highlighted.  
First, integration policies will now be governed by the ordinary 
legislative procedure (formerly the co-decision procedure), giving the 
European Commission the right of initiative and establishing qualified 
majority voting in the Council. Crucially, the now binding consultation of 
the European Parliament could help inject a democratic dialogue that has 
so far been completely absent from the policy-making process on 
integration. 
Second, the inclusion of a Treaty basis on integration means that this 
domain will now be brought within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
in Luxembourg. Previously, activities taking place within the scope of the 
framework on integration remained (at least formally) outside the system 
of checks embodied by the EU legal system. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
validity of the new measures adopted – and their national implementation 
– could be subject to judicial review and scrutinized for their compatibility 
with the general principles of EU law,425 in particular the principles of 
proportionality and fundamental rights, the application of which should be 
strengthened by the now legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The Stockholm Programme, the EU’s guidelines for the AFSJ for the 
period 2009–14, builds on the new configurations provided in the Lisbon 
Treaty. It offers a renewed policy framework in the domain of immigration 
and has identified the integration of TCNs as a crucial priority for 
cooperation during the five years it covers.426 Among the concrete steps 
outlined to achieve this objective, Stockholm calls on the Commission to 
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develop an official, joint ‘coordination mechanism’ – essentially 
formalizing the status of the current ‘quasi’ OMC process for integration 
matters. Furthermore, Stockholm places fundamental rights at centre stage 
of the EU’s integration strategy. Under a new section entitled “Proactive 
policies for migrants and their rights”, the Programme reaffirms the 
Tampere obligation to grant TCNs a set of rights “comparable to those of 
EU citizens”, emphasizing that “this should remain an objective of a 
common integration policy and should be implemented as soon as possible, 
and no later than 2014”. Accordingly, it calls on the Commission to review 
the Family Reunification Directive and particularly the provisions relating 
to integration measures.  
The strong emphasis placed on ‘rights’ in the Stockholm Programme 
and the consolidation of the Commission’s power in the domain of legal 
immigration offer a window of opportunity for bringing the European 
integration agenda back in line with the spirit of Tampere and for 
reinstating the Union’s classic framing of integration in terms of equal 
treatment and equal rights. It is arguably in this respect that a ‘European’ 
role in integration policies holds the greatest potential value, through the 
articulation of a coherent and rights-based normative vision of integration, 
one that breaks with the dominant framing of the last years, which has 
been defined by its links to immigration law and management of the entry 
and residence of TCNs. A renewed, post-national framing of integration, 
supported by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and legal principles of 
non-discrimination, could act as an important counterweight to nationalist 
narratives that reflect a tendency towards more exclusionary discourses 
and mechanisms. 
Despite the prospects brought by the new landscape of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Stockholm Programme, articulating a genuine European 
policy on integration will not be straightforward. While the framework on 
integration is now officially covered by EU law, the precise governance 
mechanisms that will operate in this policy domain have yet to be 
clarified.427 Furthermore, some caution should precede the heralding of a 
new era of European cooperation on integration, given the disjuncture 
between discourse and action that has come to characterize integration 
policy at the EU level. Indeed, when looking at the series of multi-annual 
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programmes in the AFSJ, from Tampere, through The Hague and now the 
Stockholm Programme, integration has consistently been ranked among 
the highest priorities. Although the member states – through the Council – 
have repeatedly called for greater coordination of national integration 
policies and EU initiatives in this field, they have shown reluctance when 
translating intentions into concrete policies. 
Nevertheless, the new Treaty competence offers scope for the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice 
to provide an institutional and legal counterweight to the JHA Council, 
which will no longer constitute the sole actor unilaterally deciding policy 
priorities in the field of integration. Only time will tell how this new 
framework will be developed in practice and whether it will generate a 
strong and consensual narrative on the inclusion of newcomers in EU 
member states. 
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Appendix 7A. 
Table 7A.1 Priorities of the European Commission’s strategic guidelines setting out a framework of intervention of the 
European integration fund for 2007–13 
Priority   Title  Description*  Status 
1  Actions to put 
common basic 
principles into practice 
Actions under priority 1 to primarily target newly-arrived TCNs and may include 
programmes and activities designed to introduce newly-arrived TCNs to the host 
society and to help them acquire basic knowledge about the host society’s 
language, history, institutions, socio-economic features, cultural life and 
fundamental norms and values.  
Mandatory 




Actions under priority 2 should facilitate the development of clearly-defined 
objectives and assessment instruments at all levels of integration governance, i.e. 
national, regional, local and European. This is expected to support the 
development of common models and standards at EU level. 
Mandatory 




in the member states 
across the different 
levels of government 
Actions under priority 3 should strengthen capacity at national, regional and local 
level to develop integration policies based on the CBPs, through for example 
training, information exchange and stakeholder consultations. Mechanisms should 
be developed to co-ordinate and exchange information and experiences among the 
different stakeholders who implement integration policies. 
Optional 





the member states 
Actions under priority 4 should facilitate the exchange of experience, good 
practice and information between the member states focusing on, inter alia, 
ensuring that integration is an important component of policy on economic 
migration, and on promoting the acquisition of basic knowledge of the host 
society, its language, history, institutions and respect for the basic values of the 
European Union. They should also foster cooperation between regional and local 
authorities from different member states and involve non-governmental 
stakeholders. 
Optional 
*Source: Synthesis of Annex to the Commission Decision of 21/VIII/2007 Implementing Council Decision 2007435/EC as regards the adoption of 
strategic guidelines for 2007-2013, OJ L 168, 28.06.2007, Brussels. 184 | 
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